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

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FROM THE LIBRARY OF
PRESIDENT
JAMES B. ANGELL

LOGOPOLIS,

OR

CITY OF WORDS;

CONTAINING A DEVELOPMENT OF THE

SCIENCE, GRAMMAR, SYNTAX, LOGIC AND RHETORIC OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BY

EZEKIEL HILDRETH.

PITTSBURGH:
PRINTED BY A. JAYNES, FRANKLIN HEAD, THIRD STREET.
1842.

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, TO WIT:

Be it Remembered, That on the 6th day of November, A. D. 1841, EZEKIEL HILDRETH, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, the title of which is in the words following, to wit:
"LOGOPOLIS, or CITY OF WORDS, containing a development of the Science, Grammar, Syntax, Logic, and Rhetoric of the English Language, by Ezekiel Hildreth." The right whereof he claims as author and proprietor, in conformity to an act of Congress, entitled, "An Act to amend the several Acts respecting Copy Rights."

RICHARD W. MOORE,
Clerk of the Western District of Virginia.

From the Library
of
James B Angell
4-12-51

DEDICATION.

I HAVE followed the occupation of Teacher, with very little intermission, for thirty-five years. I have served in the private ranks; and though serving in this humble station, I have not been a mere incurious drudge, performing my daily task without observation, and without inspection into the nature and reasons for the various evolutions, manœuvres and discipline, practised in the field of literary campaigns. Therefore, stimulated by a motive common to us all, and by no means unworthy of our high destination, I have attempted to rescue from the shades of oblivion those services, which would otherwise fall a sacrifice to the ravages of time.

This monument however, consists not in marble columns, ornamented with glowing inscriptions; nor in titles, interspersed on the pages of history, but in a *little Book*, containing illustrations of the nature and use of that literary instrument, called Language, written or spoken; and also shewing the formation and economy of its manual, called Grammar; in which explanations are given, and rules and directions laid down for literary discipline. And like most public servants, who have been faithful and honest, all I have to bequeath you, is my services, my countrymen; and after you have heard the document read, it will remain for you to determine whether or not, it is worth your while to attest and give it publicity.

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

It may be proper to say a few words, explanatory of the meaning and propriety of the title of the work; but it will be necessary to say many, in order to give even a faint notion of the view taken of the subject matter discussed under this head. LOGOPOLIS defined, is a city of words; and when it is considered, that language is literally and truly an assemblage of *arbitrary pictures* of realities themselves, (the sayings of the wise to the contrary notwithstanding,) the title perhaps will not appear very inappropriate.

If the component parts, which constitute a city, embrace the plan or plot, the buildings, the inhabitants, their government and laws; in fine, all their institutions, civil, moral and religious, what hinders the pictures of these great and important realities, from having the same relations? But enough perhaps has been said on the *head*,—let us pass to the body. A knowledge of language in its grammatical, rhetorical and elocutionary departments, has been sought after, more or less by all; but every one, who has desired the appellation of *classical*, has studied its science, its logic, and its criticism. Various however, have been the systems, treatises, schemes, and devices of authors, to facilitate the acquisition of this knowledge. Every subsequent writer has come forth with assurances to the public, that his is a better, or an improved plan; but after it has undergone the test of experiment, it has often been thrown aside. If it be asked, what new scheme is here proposed? the answer is, none, as regards any particular branch, in its separate and single consideration; but a universal plan, that unites the whole into one; because the subject matter is, in itself, one inseparably connected whole. It is as much so, as the union of the roots, the trunk, the branches, and the foliage of a tree, is necessary to its healthy growth.

Nature around us has her beginnings, her formation, her construction, and her vigorous maturity. And not only these, but her nascent powers, giving impulse to these beginnings, &c. She has also her *time*, *place* and *condition* of operation, before formation commences. Let language then, be compared to a tree; its roots, her words or parts of speech; its trunk, her construction; its branches, her sentences and periods; its foliage, her rhetoric; and its whole organization, through which fruit is produced, her logic, by which knowledge is conveyed to the mind. On what does this tree rest? On the bosom of the earth, its fostering mother, where reside the energizing powers of warmth and moisture—the life and vigor of its growth. On what is language based? Our corporeal frames, where reside the vital, the vocal, and intellectual powers, diffusing their mutual stores of joy and gladness through social life. The design of the work is to shew, that language is a *transcript* not only of nature material in her visible and tangible properties and qualities, but also of her powers and energies, bursting forth into being of infinite variety; that words are the names of *all these*, whether we consider them as principles or operative powers—as individual being—as class or kind, species or genus; that these words are distributable into communities, circles, societies, and families, except a few straggling old bachelors and maids, as in real life,—but these too have their descent; that these families have their patriarchal heads or first parents; that the *verb* in any language, is the name given to these patriarchs or primogenitive heads; that the verb in its nature, is *sui generis*, having no species, and therefore, never derived from any other part of speech whatever; that other parts of speech are adopted and made verbs by prefixes and suffixes, as signs of their adoption; that the verb is the original fountain and source of all derivation, although the contrary position is assumed by others; that mode and tense have not been well defined; that considered in themselves they belong no more to verbs, than to any other parts of speech. In fine, that the verb is a name given to powers and energies, both in the physical and intellectual world, which constitute the *primum mobile* of the whole system of language.

Now then, as ignorance and knowledge stand in direct opposition to each other, and our usual course in passing from the one to the other, has been circuitous, laborious, and slow, that pioneer, who can open the road and level the way, that lies directly between them, will certainly be the easiest to follow, and the cheapest in the end.

LOGOPOLIS, &c.

LECTURE 1.

ON THE CONFORMATION OF THE ORGANS OF SPEECH IN ARTICULATION.

Although there is a variety of English Grammars now extant, and of such reputation as to induce the belief, that another publication would be entirely useless, yet the author of the following pages has thought otherwise, and therefore, he has offered his own thoughts on the subject for public perusal. The excellence of any treatise, on whatever subject, arises from a full development, and a natural arrangement of all the several parts, that compose the whole; and when these are discussed in their separate and individual capacity, and as they stand related to each other in their natural order of cause and effect, such a treatise never fails to arrest public attention, and to produce the effect aimed at by all, who write for public utility, to wit, public instruction and public improvement.

In the following treatise an attempt will be made to shew, that the real and natural order of the subject has not, as yet, been rightly pursued, or at least, has not been pursued in that easy, clear and convincing manner, in which a more judicious arrangement would have presented it. In proof of this, we will inquire first, what LANGUAGE is,—and secondly, what GRAMMAR is, or intended to be.

Language, in the true etymology and composition of the word, means the act of the tongue; for the word is compounded of two Latin words, viz. lingua, signifying the tongue, and ago, signifying to do, to act, &c.; and our verb act is directly from the first supine of ago, which is thus conjugated, ago, agere, egi, actum, which last becomes our verb act by dropping its final syllable. All supines in

Latin possess the entire operative energy of the verb. But our language has followed the example of the Latin in using the second person singular of the imperative mode, which is age, as lingua, age, and in English, language.—And here I will remark, that all our words, which end in age, take this imperative of ago—as postage, ferriage, storage, usage, &c. meaning the act or proceeds of the post—the act or proceeds of the ferry, &c. But I shall discuss this matter more fully, when I come to treat of the derivation and composition of words—their prefixes and suffixes. Secondly: Grammar, in the true etymology and signification of the word, coming as it does from the Greek, means a written precept or rule of conduct for general observance, or a written instrument containing rules and directions for public and private inspection and guidance. Grammar has been called a science,—but undeservedly so; for it is neither more nor less, than an art. Because an art is the exercise or practice of man in making, framing and constructing some material or fanciful fabric, according to his own will and pleasure, subject however to the controling influence of the principles or elements of science. I shall endeavor to make this appear in the following illustration: In the first place, let us inquire what is meant by the term science, and what is meant by the term art,—and then we can judge, by which of these terms the word grammar ought to be defined.

The word science, taken as an appellative or technical term, means a system of first principles or elements, which as a whole, compose the foundation or ground-work of that system, whether in the animal, vegetable, mineral, intellectual or moral kingdoms, or in any particular department of either of them. But science, taken in the signification and meaning of the term, denotes a knowledge of these principles with regard to their active and operative powers, and relations to each other in maintaining the economy and harmony of that system, together with the knowledge of those effects which result from their regular and uniform operations. Science then, is any system of nature presented to our view in that order and relation of principles, established by God himself, and producing their results according to that order. These principles or elements as such, are the frame-work of nature, physical and spiritual;

and such, as are active and operative principles, exerting their energies in that order and relation established for them, constitute the beauty and harmony of the universe. I say, such, as are active and operative principles—for the elements of geometry and numbers, are all relative, or rather mere abstract relations of being with being, in regard either to extent and amount, or to magnitude and quantity; and over these man has no more control, than he has over his own existence. And here let me introduce the philosophy of Solomon, where he says, that Wisdom built herself a house, and set up seven pillars—seven pillars of distinct shapes. Here are the seven crystalizations of matter in their atomatic forms or shapes, on which depend the seven colors, or rays of light, and the seven sounds of music. So geometry has her seven primitive figures, to wit, the circle, the square, the triangle, the sphere, the cube, the prism and the cone. In some departments of nature, the elementary principles are all active and operative, producing their results in a regular and connected chain of cause and effect; such, for instance, as belong to the system of astronomy, organization, chemistry, &c. But in others again, the elementary principles or foundation of the system, are all mere abstract relations of being with being, and are referable and reducible to one, ultimatum, or single origin of the whole; and this origin is absolute position, from which extent is considered, either single, duplicate or triplicate, constituting what we call length, breadth, and thickness. Or in other words, constituting distance, surface or superficies, magnitude, and quantity. And here I could make several observations, that would doubtless be interesting to many, on the subject of absolute position as occupied by the Father of Wisdom, before she built her house, and while as yet, she was in the *bosom* of the Father; but I forbear, it being rather foreign to our main object. The word art, comes from the Hebrew verb arah, which signifies to pull, to pluck, to take, to gather, to cut, to carve, to separate, to divide, &c.; and the noun of it is art, that is, the pulling, the plucking, the taking, the gathering, &c. The Greeks took this same verb, and made their verb aro, which signifies to fit, to adapt, to construct, &c. But the Greeks being great lovers of architecture, formed their generic term for art, from a verb and a noun in their own language, viz. from the first indefinite participle passive of the verb ticto, which signifies to bring forth, to make, to create, &c. and the participle is techtheis—but the participial termination being dropped, the root or remaining syllable is tech; and by adding the plural noun nee, meaning edifices, even to those of ships, the word becomes technee,—that is, the production of edifices.

Now the intelligence of man enables him to apply his mental and physical powers to matter, and to mould and shape it, to separate and divide it, to cut and carve it, to mix and compound it, according to his own fancy. And this he actually does, in every department of the material kingdom. But in the first place, he exercises his physical powers upon the materials around him, and produces a vast variety of fabrics. Hence arise the fabricating arts. And secondly, he applies his mental energies in search of the elementary principles of matter, and having discovered many of their uniform modes of operation, he takes the liberty to direct and guide these active and productive agents, in various modifications of quantity and quality, as it may suit his views. And thus we see productions, altogether different from those found in the laboratory of Nature,—such as gorgeous array, glittering ornaments, splendid decorations, attractive shows, glowing pictures, and sumptuous entertainments. All these are the production of what is called the liberal or fine arts, and sometimes they are called the imitative arts,—such as statuary, chemistry, music, painting, &c. Art then, is the work of man, entered into the work-shop of Nature, and seizing upon her materials, with the use of his own and her instruments, he constructs for himself, various fabrics, modeled after his own inclination. Thus we see, that man is deservedly styled Lord of creation; and the elevated position of man in the animal kingdom, is strikingly illustrated in the account given of Adam, that after the whole tribe of animals had passed in review before him, and he had given names to them all severally, he found not among them a companion, nor one, with whom he could associate

But it has been shown, that grammar is the work of man: it is therefore an art, the art of establishing a scale of articulate sounds, called vowels and consonants; the art of forming characters, or letters to represent those sounds, and of combining those sounds into syllables—those syllables into words—those words into sentences and periods. Words again are made to undergo a variety of modifications and change of termination, in compliance with the several relations, which they bear to each other in point of government and agreement. But these alterations and change of terminations are very different in different nations or tribes of mankind. So also do their scales of articulate sounds differ from each other, both in point of articulation and the order of their arrangement. These all partake of the peculiar taste and habits of those who, being the most prominent and influential characters among their associates, are looked upon as the proper guides and patterns for imitation. And here you will find the reason why all languages written or spoken, or rather the grammars of all languages, undergo so many alterations and changes in their pronunciation and orthography or spelling, in after ages; for, like all other human institutions, they are capable of great improvement upon their first or infant establishment. But language, like chemistry or music, has also its science as well as its art, which art is the grammar of language, just as the making of tunes is the art or grammar of music. And these tunes are constructed on the unalterable relations in the harmony of sounds, commencing from any assumed pitch or key. Music then has its immutable relations of harmony for its elementary principles, though the making of tunes is an art, the work of man—different in production—being modeled to suit the ear and taste of the composer. The same is the case with chemistry. It too has its science and its art, as seen in the various productions of the laboratory. And what is the science of language? It is a system of certain organized parts of the human constitution, with their appropriate functions, so constructed as to enable the possessor to change their forms and positions, in order to produce a variety of vocal and articulate sounds. A short description of the most prominent of these, may suffice here, inasmuch as this is not a treatise on anatomy. I will here use for a moment the word organ, in a collective and generic sense, as applied to a well known instrument of music. Then, we will call the human chest, neck and head, a musical organ, whose prominent parts are the lungs, the throat, the nose and mouth, having the tongue for an organist, inasmuch as the tunes played are attributed to him by the very name given to the performance, to wit, language, the act of the tongue. Let us call then, the lungs its bellows, the trachea its blowpipe, the larynx its diapason, and the mouth its music-box, where the keys are arranged, and the tongue sits as organist. I said that the mouth might be considered the orchestra or music-box, where the keys are arranged. But it will be necessary to go a little farther into detail, in order to shew the philosophy of articulation, and the application of the comparison. The mouth is a hemispheroidal cavity, like an oven, with apertures at each end of it. The interior aperture is formed by the tonsils, &c. behind which, and between which and the larynx, there is a kind of antechamber with a binary passage, one through the nose and the other through the mouth. The tongue lies on the base or floor of the mouth, having its under side near the centre made fast to the base. And while the anterior half of the tongue is left unconfined, and allowed to play freely in the mouth, the under side of the posterior half is united all along with the base of the antechamber, till it meets with the larynx and terminates there. But the contracting and expanding power of the tongue is so great, that the posterior half possesses a large share of mobility, insomuch that the old adage will apply,—to wit, "the tongue wags at both ends." Both ends of the tongue, then, are employed alternately in forming articulations; and the tongue and the lips are the direct and efficient agents in the whole operation. The first articulation is effected by the lips, but the second by the tongue in contracting at the centre or roots, as it is called, so as to close up the interior aperture of the mouth, and produce the second articulation, G or C hard. The third articulation is also produced by the tongue in extending the anterior end to the upper gums, and thus intercepting the flow of the breath, which produces the sound D. The fourth is produced by the posterior half of the tongue swelling less than it did in the case of G, and thus the sound of E is produced—and so on, alternately, till the duty falls on the lips again, as in F. Thus, we have the order, or natural scale of music for the basis, or commencement of all alphabets, the original of which is that of the Hebrew. And here, I will shew you the reason and philosophy of the fact, that the semitone comes between E and F, in the natural scale of music.

You will recollect, that I said, there is a kind of antechamber between the interior aperture of the mouth and the larynx, with a binary passage—one part leading thro' the nose, and the other through the mouth. These may be denominated the greater and lesser tubes. In sounding E the interior aperture of the mouth is partially closed up, say one-half of it, by the tongue swelling at the roots, and therefore, the sound is divided, and one-half of it sent thro' the nose; but in articulating F the tongue has returned to its natural posture, and therefore, that half, which was sent through the nose, is brought back through the mouth, consequently, making only half a tone between E and F.

The characters on the Greek scale of vocal music, are in direct proof of all this. For, the next letter after E, in the order of their alphabet, has no labial sound in it, consequently, they were compelled to introduce a new character, that had a labial sound, by calling it digamma, which has one; and it is the very Roman and English F, even in form. Thus we have the order in the natural scale of music, for the basis or commencement of all alphabets—and the origin of which is that of the Hebrew. Now, inasmuch as the sound A was produced by the lips opening, so also, it is their natural and proper function to stop it again, and not that of the tongue. For, if the valve of an organ-tube, has given place, and permitted the air to pass through, it also belongs to that valve to stop it again. So here, the lips, by stopping the sound A, have made the first joint or articulation, which is B, so that, we have a sound or voice, first made through an open mouth, and then stopped or cut off by the lips, making an articulus or joint in the sound, which is called a consonant. The first articulation has been made by the lips; the next question is, where is the most natural and proper place to make a second? The question is very easily and naturally answered by saying, "at the other end of the hole," that is, at the roots of the tongue; because the mouth is the orchestra or box for the tongue to play in, and has apertures at each end of it, both of which must be attended to in their turn. Therefore, the tongue swells at the roots, and closes up the aperture at the other end of the box, making thereby another articulation, which is gamma, G, or C, or K. For, you must remember, that the moment the lips have stopped the sound by closing, they must open again to complete the articulation, and to render it possible for another to be made; therefore, the voice is still sounding, and if the lips should stop it again, we should have all B's and no C's. Consequently, if the office is denied to the lips, the tongue must perform it; for there is no other member, that can. And here let it be remembered also, that C in our language takes the place of the Hebrew gimmel, or the Greek gamma, which is the third letter in the alphabets of those languages. And I venture to assert, and challenge a refutation, that all words in the English language, which begin with *gn* or *kn*, are of Greek origin, and are derived from those words in that language, which begin with *g*, or gamma, and with *k*, or kapa. Take for instance, the words gnat and know. It is said by etymologists, that these words are of Saxon origin. If they came to us through the Saxons, they came to the Saxons through the Greeks. For, it is recorded in Cæsar's Commentaries of the Gallic wars, that the Helvetii and several other tribes used the Greek letters, or rather, that their statistics were all made out in Greek letters, and that these documents were delivered to him, by which he ascertained their resources, and the amount of their numbers both of men, women, and children. The tongue then, being the principal agent in producing these articulations, either at one end or the other of its music-box, by closing up these apertures, or partially so, we readily perceive the propriety of the term language, that is, the act of the tongue. We also perceive the reason why, the consonants are classed into labial, dental, palatine, guttural, and nasal; inasmuch as these are the several points, at which the articulations are made. Thus, we have a scale or gamut of sounds, called the alphabet, which means A, B, and which in the English language, consists of 26 sounds, with their corresponding characters or letters.—This scale however, differs from that of music, in its regular gradation of sound rising and falling by a fixed ratio of difference, though the syllabic pronunciation of words set to music, assumes the same harmonic proportion between each other, that belongs to the notes of music.

From what has been said, I think it sufficiently manifest, that language has both its science and its art, and that the art of language is the grammar of language, written or spoken. Grammar then, comprises in its incipient consideration, a scale of sounds denominated vowels and consonants, with their appropriate characters or letters. And these sounds are the product of the combined efforts of the elementary principles or science of language; that is, they are the results of a peculiar organization of a certain part of the human body. The next object of grammar is the combination of letters into syllables, syllables into words, and words into sentences and periods. Words then, in their component parts—in their integral and individual character, as parts of speech—in their derivation and construction—in their composition, distribution, and classification—in their various modifications and change of termination in passing from one part of speech to another—in their change of termination by prefixes and affixes—in their change of termination with regard to their several relations to each other, in point of government and agreement—corresponding to the great and momentous realities, for which they stand as representatives; words I say, in all these several respects, constitute the grand object of grammar, and the chief business of the grammarian.

LECTURE 2.

SHEWING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ABSTRACT AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS.

Having shewn the reason and philosophy of Language, we will next inquire into its uses and its objects. Among the beings, that inhabit the earth, man is a peculiar race, who possesses a distinguishing characteristic, that separates him from all other animals. This peculiar characteristic is intelligence or intellectual light, that lighteth every man coming into the world. Consequently, he is styled, Lord of creation; and this exalted title he appears not to have arrogated to himself, but in the annals of his race, it is recorded, that this noble appellation was pronounced upon him by the Author of his being. And the vast and various monuments of his art and skill, give abundant evidence, that he is not undeserving the name. If therefore, by his own operations he has given sufficient proof of his high and exalted destiny among the animal tribes, it might be naturally and justly supposed, that he possessed some peculiar gift, which enabled him to maintain this superiority. Is it not then matter of astonishment, that we should find one among us, especially among those esteemed wise, who could hesitate for a moment to yield assent to, and acknowledge the superiority of his nature? I answer, not in the least; for this very gift has given him ability to become one of the most absurd and inconsistent beings on earth, inasmuch as by it he is able to pass the bounds prescribed to mere physical organization, and to revel in the luxuriant fields of abstract and abstruse speculation and thought. But he carries along with him the whole family of sordid appetites belonging to his animal nature; and because he finds himself, not an angel, but still a man with a troublesome brood of importunate attendants, he pronounces mortality and corruption to be his sole inheritance, and therefore, he yields a willing obedience to sensual desires, that never subside but with the decaying energies of his physical nature. Here we discover a remarkable distinction between the animal man and the brutes. While the appetites and passions of these, left to their freedom, seldom or never go beyond the limits prescribed for vigorous and healthy enjoyment, those of man unrestrained, will carry him to the extremes of excess, and leave him to perish in the vortex of ruin. Hence, it is very manifest, that man possesses a superior principle of mental energy, designed not only for self-government, but for the purpose of elevating him above the filth and scum of putrescent matter, and make him acquainted with celestial scenes, that will never cloy. But it is equally manifest, that, while he occupies this material domain, if he yields up his rightful sway and self-control, to fawning indulgence and listless security, he will sink below the reptiles under his feet. Whence arise these opposite extremes of elevation and depression, but from the untrammeled freedom in the mental liberties of man? We see no such vibrations among the brutes. It is the divinity of man, that stirs within him for better, or for worse. It is an intellectual light unknown to brutes. And although brutes have a mind or instinct, (call it what you please, for I have no choice,) which possesses the power of reasoning in a greater or less degree, yet there is a vast difference between the realities expressed by the terms, reason and intelligence. The mental power expressed by the latter, that is, intelligence, is as far superior to the former, as the effulgent sun-beams are superior to the glimmering star-light. By what infatuation or oversight metaphysicians have been led to give the pre-eminence to reason, I cannot tell. But St. Paul, who by the way was the best of metaphysicians, has made intelligence to constitute the immortality of man. He applies it to God, and calls him the great Intelligence on high, at whose right hand Jesus Christ sits as High Priest interceding for the saints. A moment's reflection on the origin and application of the two terms, is sufficient, for deciding to which of the two the preference belongs. If the term *logos* is applied to the Son of God, as the word of God, and as his Christ, or light, that lighteth every man coming into the world, I think, it has lost nothing by being preceded by an intensive Latin preposition, which by the way, is of Greek origin. Perhaps, it will be asked here, what has all this to do with grammar? I answer, that, whatever peculiar advantage or modification of being man possesses over that of brutes, is a primary object of grammar, inasmuch as it is an elementary principle of language, by which and concerning which the details of grammar are made up. And this is the very reason why, man is seen conversing with his fellows, in a different manner from that of brutes. But it is said also, that brutes have their language as well as man. To this I reply, that those, who are willing to herd themselves among the swine, have full liberty from me to dignify their nasal monotony with the name of language, if they choose. I said, that there is a vast difference between the realities expressed by the terms reason and intelligence. In proof of this I will lay open the fountain of both, and then the reader may judge for himself, to which of the two the pre-eminence belongs. The word *reason* has its origin in the Hebrew, and is derived to us through the Greek. Both the Jews and the Greeks applied it wholly to the operations of matter in its elementary condition or in an organized adjustment. In the first place, they applied it to the flow, current or stream of water, air or breath; and secondly, to the results of organic movement in talking, speaking, uttering, &c. So that, it was applied altogether to physical operations. But the word *intelligence* has its origin in mental operations—that is, it first signified in its verb, to meditate, to cogitate, &c.; and secondly, in its noun, it signified the results of mental operations, or thought, &c. So that, in its entire signification, it applied directly to the powers and operations of mind. It is derived to us directly from the Latin, and is compounded of the Latin preposition *inter*, and the verb *lego*, and becomes *inter lego* in its component parts, but *intelligo* in its composition, as every one knows, who has any acquaintance with the economy used in the composition of words. But its origin is Hebrew, and is derived both to the Greeks and Latins from thence. Now the mind of a brute possesses reason, that is, a power to discern physical objects through physical means, to wit, through the senses. Nay more, the mind of a brute recognizes the pictures or emblems of these sensible objects, and their relations to each other and to his own sensual gratification, through the medium of its retentive energies. But this mental power is all absorbed in the acquisition of the objects of his senses, and terminates in their gratification alone.

It would derogate from the wisdom and goodness of God, to suppose, that he has created beings, organized them for sensual gratification, and given them a vital movement, that generates appetites and desires, and that at the same time, he has withholden from them mental ability to seek out, and procure the proper means for satisfying these affections. But observation and experience prove the reverse of all this; for, while on the one hand, the worm appears entirely destitute of all mental economy, having no need for any, inasmuch as he is placed in the very midst of the objects of his voluptuousness, and therefore, not obliged to seek them out; on the other hand, we notice, that the bee, who is destined to roam and to seek out the objects of his support, possesses a knowledge and skill of course and distance, that seems to mock even the science and art of the mariner. Nay more, he appears to practice on the principles.of civil economy with such uniformity and undeviating precision, that his social intercourse is less interrupted, than that of man. But all this, so far from giving any warranty to the conclusion, that the bee possesses the intelligence of man, proves the very reverse. For, as I said before, the physical economy of the brutal creation, is so adjusted and so restrained in its operations, as to ultimate in the welfare and happiness of each individual. But is this the case with man? Far otherwise. In all his pursuits, whether personal, social, private, or public, we notice instability, change, excess, confusion, and final prostration. And what is the cause of all this? It is because he possesses a principle of intellectual light, which was given him for the purposes of discipline and self-government, and in which he enjoys a mental liberty and freedom, which have been denied to the brute; and out of which, have arisen personal and social responsibilities and relations, unknown to the rest of the animal tribes. Therefore, although he possesses all the animal affections in common with the brute, which call for gratification, yet his intellectual eye, or mental sight, catches thousands of objects, that do not exist in the physical kingdom, nor are they derived from the objects of sense, or from their relations—such as right and wrong, approbation and disapprobation, and abstract truth. These are purely ethereal and apart from all matter; of which there are no pictures or emblems in the mind, nor can there be from the very nature of those mental objects. And the moment, that the intellectual eye loses sight of them, they are gone, and can never be regained, in any other way, than that, by which they were first introduced to the mind. These objects leave no traces behind them, except the recollection, that they once were seen. The mind must possess the realities themselves, for they admit of no emblems; otherwise there will be a complete void. He, who has once seen a mathematical truth through the medium of premises properly arranged, and consequent on that arrangement, will attest to the truth of this; and will moreover confess, that he can never see that mathematical truth again, until he has arranged the premises, as they once stood before his mind in their naked reality, and not in substitute or pictorial emblem. To be sure, he could tell you, that he still retained the conviction of their abstract result, and that he once saw this truth through a certain arrangement of these premises; but what that arrangement was, or what those premises or mental objects were, he cannot tell.

Thus it appears, that man is a rational being, and not only rational, but a social being; and not only social, but an intellectual being; and not only intellectual, but a moral and accountable being. Therefore, he has great need of some medium, by which a record of his actions and doings or deeds, may be kept and transmitted to those, who have a right to know and inspect them. And this medium he has, it being the *art* or *grammar* of language, that is, articulate and written symbols of his thoughts and actions, and of his social relations and responsibilities, arising out of his intelligence. Here are advantages and prerogatives, which belong to no other race of beings, that inhabit the earth. Consequently, those who consider human speech of no higher order and dignity, than the mere result of organization, peculiar to all vocal animals, degrade their own elevated rank in the scale of creation, and cast a stain of folly and caprice, on the wisdom and goodness of Him, who made all things well. Therefore, it must be seen and acknowledged, that all ranks and orders of beings are endued with a definite capacity, and furnished with the requisite means of providing for their own individual and social welfare and happiness. This fact forever precludes the foolish notion and degrading supposition, that man, because he has a physical nature in common with the brute, has not other capacities and higher destinies, which render his medium of communication and social intercourse, more exalted, than the chattering gibberish of a magpie. Let no one then, give the noble appellation of language to any other oral sounds, than those of human speech.

It has been said moreover, that words are *signs* of our ideas: if so, how are the errors of false narrative ever detected, or the crudities of incoherent propositions so readily discovered? No doubt the narrator had correct views of the subject before him, but he has used those symbols, that stand for other realities; therefore, he has possessed one thing, and communicated another. But if words are the *signs* of our ideas, the errors of his narrative could never be detected; for, his ideas being correct, and words being their *signs*, they must of necessity produce in the reader's mind a train of ideas corresponding to his own. The same would be the case with the reasoner. His own views of the subject may be correct, but his symbols are bad; for they are not the representatives of what he intended; therefore, he has possessed one thing, and communicated another. The word *idea* is direct from the Greek, and it applies to objects discerned both by the organic and mental eye. It is also applied to sight, or the abstract result of seeing, that is, to the effect produced by having objects before the organic eye or the mental eye.

But you must understand, that mental objects never exist in substantial forms, but always exist, either in pictorial forms of substance, or in pure essence of being; as truths in principle, or truths in fact. Therefore, mental sight or view of objects, whether they are essential or pictorial, is the direct and immediate *cause*, that produces consciousness or conviction in the mind, which is equivalent to *notion* in its true etymological singleness or unity of meaning, but not in the common acceptation of the word. For, words in their etymon, have one single, original, and direct application to definite objects, which objects however, may be in themselves either simple, or complex, as to their constitution. And here, by the way, is the whole ground for the supposed synonomy of words, to wit, in the simpleness, or composition of the objects, which words are made to represent. If the object is single and simple in its entire presentation, like an abstract truth, or an axiom of any kind, the object itself being uncompounded, must, and will have an appellation of the same nature with itself; and therefore, its name will be single and simple. Hence the reason, that the Greeks used the word idea to denote, both physical view and mental sight; because man possesses both these faculties.

But all physical objects exist in substance, and therefore, capable of being represented by pictures; and all true notions of them come first to the mind through the medium of the senses. But, when the objects themselves are absent, the mind views those pictorial forms, which it drew on their presentation by the senses, and this pictorial view will be more or less correct, full, and complete, in proportion to the power and skill of the mind in making drafts, and in laying permanent colors. Here then, is the whole secret of the different abilities of mankind in drafting, painting, &c. or in whatever relates to physical delineation, even to that of descriptive narration. Here too, is the whole foundation of phrenological detail. For, the draftsman, painter, or whatever artist, does in fact, even when the real object stands before him, directly copy from the picture stamped by the mind on the tablets of the brain, and not from the real object itself; inasmuch as his organic eye must attend to the delineations, which the artist is forming on the canvass, paper, or whatever else is before him. And with the chisel, stile, or brush in his hand, he traces out those tabular delineations, and brings that pictorial form to a substantial one again. For, you must remember, that canvass, paper, colors, wood, and stone, are substances, which constitute a real standard of comparison between the tabular form and the original prototype; as a picture, or a statue is compared with its original. I say, while all these operations are going on, the mind perceives in the work some discrepancy, want of symmetry, defect in shade or tint, &c.; and on this account the work is stopped. And having more confidence in the original, than in his own pictorial form, his eye is again turned to the original, and he takes another peep at it. This second view perhaps, will restore the vanished lines and faded hues of his cerebral picture; but if not, he takes a third, a fourth, a fifth, and so on, till experience teaches him, that the materials of his mental apparatus, are too tense, rigid, and unyielding, to receive any distinct and abiding marks, or vivid hues; and in this case, the artist must and will fail in the just execution of his work. The same course of repetition is pursued with each and all our senses. But these operations, whether successful or not, are very far from having any moral quality in them, that affects the character of the individual, as an intellectual, moral, and accountable being; far otherwise. For, his moral notions, and moral sentiments, are derived entirely from another source; not from his mental views of pictorial forms stamped on the tablet of his brain, but directly from a mental sight of moral objects, such as truth and falsehood standing in their naked reality, before the mind, and made visible to it by that *to phose* or intellectual light, shed upon the mind of every moral and accountable being, just as the effulgent sun-beams spread their rays around on physical objects, and render them visible to our organic eye. Therefore, let not the phrenologist exonerate his patient from moral obligation, on the score of defects in his organization.

Hence, whatever exists only in essence, such as truth in general, or the axioms of philosophy and science, will never admit of a stamp or picture; consequently, we cannot have an *idea* of them, taking idea in the sense of *picture* or emblem; but will and must have an *idea* or *sight* of them, in that sense or reality, and in that alone, which is the result of a mental sight of essential and uncompounded objects. And here is the philosophy, and here the truth of St. Paul, where he says, that while on earth, we see as through a glass dimly, but then, face to face,—that is, we shall see as we are seen, and know as we are known. Yes, we shall see spiritual beings in their true essential forms, and not in the pictorial shapes of our own imaginations. This sight too or mental view of ours, will be as real and as genuine intuition to us, as the sight of other spiritual beings, is to them in viewing us. Here too, will be spread before our keen and piercing sight, that Book of remembrance spoken of in scripture, on whose broad folios are stamped in full relief by the finger of God, the essential forms of all our thoughts, words, and actions; and those, whose lips have not been sealed with the blood of the Lamb, will stand forth our bold and loud accusers before the just and supreme Judge of all flesh. But here I must stop, lest I be thought to have turned metaphysician and moralist, instead of grammarian. Now the truth of the matter is this, that words written or spoken, are definite ***symbols*** of ***real*** objects, either in the physical world or in the abstract and moral kingdom. And when they are once formed and put into circulation, they are as permanent in their symbolic character, and as fixed in their value, as the glittering coins, that flow from the national mint.

It has moreover been said by many, that words have their opposite meanings, but this also is not true. No word in any language was ever intended to represent opposite properties, opposite qualities, or beings with opposite natures. Words are often used in transition as it is called, that is, in transfer from one thing to another of a similar nature. It only belongs to those words, which are general and particular in their application to beings and their actions. For example, a mare is a horse, but a horse is not a mare; a bitch is a dog, but a dog is not a bitch. The words horse and dog are specific names, given to a class or species of animals without regard to sex. Now the whole will always contain a part, but a part will never embrace the whole. So here, the word horse is specific, and any individual of that species may claim it, for, it embraces him; therefore, a mare is a horse. But in reversing the order the comparison is not made between the species and an individual as one of that species, but between the species and a particular ***modification*** of an individual of that species. In like manner all circles are ***figures***, but all figures are not circles.

Again, any operative principle producing effects of whatever name, is called a verb, and will claim the general or universal term, ***power***, and this term will always apply to every word denoting action; because the individual can never assume any other ***modification***, than different ***degrees*** of energy, or of acceleration of movement. Here then, is opened a vast field for transition, though it is not more transition, than it is variety, or different *modes* of operation, which the same power is said to produce, in its different applications. So other parts of speech will apply to different beings in similar conditions, acting in similar manners. Words then, are the symbols of beings themselves, their state, condition, and their actions, together with all the variety of relative circumstances; or in other words, they are the representatives of truths in principle, and of truths in fact.

Having shewn the use of words, I now proceed to their classification, according to the nature of the objects, which they are made to represent. The world around us presents a varied medley of diversified beings, with which we are more or less conversant, and intimately connected.—Each individual, with whom we must or wish to act, or concerning whom we have occasion to converse, must have a name, by which he can be distinguished from all others. This name however, is not always restrained to a single being, but is applied to many individuals, who have the same appearance, or who possess the same properties and qualities. For example, the words bean and pea are applied to the whole species collectively, or to a single grain of either species. But, when we wish to talk about a single bean or pea, we make use of two little words called articles, which are *a* or *an*, and *the*. The word article means literally, a joint, knuckle, or a single thing of any kind; therefore, it is used in speech to denote one single thing, or a number of things of the same kind, taken as one whole or parcel. The article then, restrains and limits the name or noun to a single object, or to a group of objects, according as the subject of discussion embraces one or more. Thus we can say, a hill and a valley, that is, any hill and valley indiscriminately; or we can say, the hill and the valley, if some particular hill and valley are under consideration; or we may say, the hills and the valleys, if a particular order of hills and valleys are meant, and even if hills and valleys universally are intended. These two articles in the English language, give it a wonderful advantage in point of elegance, force, variety, and precision. In point of elegance and variety, by throwing in a vowel-sound between two words, for the sake of harmony and poetical measure. In point of force and precision, by directing the mind to definite objects. For example, "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," &c. "Many a man has fallen a sacrifice to his own rashness." "Every man has his race to run, but many a one has stumbled at first setting out," &c.

In such sentences as these, there is a beautiful and poetical grace, dignity, and precision, that would be entirely lost without the article. And here it may be noticed, that, although grammarians allow the force and dignity of the expressions, yet they think them a violation of a rule of syntax. But in this they err—as I will endeavor to prove. The words *any* and *many* are of Hebrew origin, notwithstanding etymologists derive them from the Saxon. The word *any* has the same signification in English, that it has in Hebrew. It refers to *place* indiscriminately and universally considered. As any man, that is, a human being wherever you find him. But *many* circumscribes and limits the universality of *any*, and brings it within the confines of numerical reckoning. It is derived directly from *any*, by prefixing the Hebrew formative letter *m*, which signifies in that language the same as our words from, out of, apart from, more than, besides, &c. Thus compounded it becomes a verb, and means to count, to number, to reckon; or counted, numbered, reckoned. Therefore, as *any* denotes being existing in place indiscriminately, *many* cuts off this universality of *any*, and brings it within the bounds of numeration. You see then, why it becomes a verb in the Hebrew. These two words form a contrast between universality and limitation, either of time, place, or number. The true meaning then, of the phrases, "Full many a flower," "Full many a gem," "Many a man," &c. is this: a flower numbered, reckoned or considered, in divers times or places—a man numbered or reckoned in divers times or places. The word is taken in its numeral *account*, and not in its numeral *amount;* as "Full various a flower," &c. Thus we see, that place, time and number, necessarily accompany, and are inseparably connected with all beings, or objects of our senses and thoughts.

LECTURE 3.

ON PLACE, TIME, NUMBER, AND PERSON.

Place, time, and number then, each in its turn, demand our particular attention. These are the accidents or conditions, in which a created being necessarily *exists;* and each has its own peculiar modification or change. And first of place. To place belong six cardinal modifications, like the sides of a cube—thus, before and behind, above and below, right and left. These all pertain to an individual as such, and would belong to him, if there was no other created being. But when he is considered with regard to a second being, these modifications or conditions become interchangeable, social, and reciprocal,—consequently, they acquire a duplicate ratio, and increase to 36 in number. And when a third is introduced the ratio becomes triplicate, and the number is 216,—thus increasing in geometrical progression. How multiplied are our social relations! who can number them? But these interchangeable and social conditions or relations are not the origin and foundation of that modification of a name or noun called *case*, notwithstanding the learned world assert, that they are. The cases of nouns arise from another and an entirely different source. They are referable and applicable to a single being, even to God, who is the fountain and source of all being. They arise from the different considerations in which a creator, actor, or operator is viewed with regard to his own work. And first, the creator, actor, or operator is in the *recto casu*, or in the making, doing, and governing case, called the nominative case. Secondly, inasmuch as his works resulted and proceeded *ex eo*, or from and out of him, they are referable and related to him as their generator; he is therefore their father, and then he is in the genitive case, called possessive case in English. Thirdly, inasmuch as the being formed did not provide his own properties and qualities, they are therefore gifts, grants, or donations, and the author is the donor; then he is in the dative case, known in English by the word *to* placed before a noun or pronoun. Fourthly, inasmuch as every being is the author of his own works, and therefore chargeable with them, so they do charge and accuse him as their author; he is then, in the accusative case. Fifthly, inasmuch as the being made is indebted to the maker, for what he is, and looks to him for protection and support, the author then, is in the vocandi casu, or vocative case. Sixthly and lastly, inasmuch as the author used his own power and skill in framing his work, he is the workman, and therefore the instrumental cause of his work—he is then, in the ablative case, known in English by the words *with* and *by*.

These are all the accidents or conditions, in which an author can stand with regard to his work, and his work to him. Hence we see, that the grammar of language has yielded to these circumstances, and followed the footsteps of nature more or less exactly in the formation of its cases, by different terminations of nouns and pronouns. We see moreover, that these six cases have a direct reference and are applied to a being in regard to himself as an author, and his work or results of his operations, and not to his social and reciprocal relations; and that, this connection between the author and his own work, is the very origin, from which proceed our interchangeable relations with one another as members of society private or public. But in connection with place, time, and number, there are three attributive properties belonging to all beings individually considered, and without regard to relationship of any kind. These are first, existence or standing forth *per se*, that is, in person. Secondly, power, that belongs to his person or singleness of being. Thirdly, the energy, action or operation of his power in producing effects. These three, together with place, time, and number mentioned above, constitute the six primary fountains, from which have flowed all the simple words in any language, and to some one of which any simple word can be traced and refered. These three moreover, are the very essential properties of being, and belong to God himself, and are the very Trinity spoken of in scripture. If it is asked, why number does not belong to God, as well as to created beings, the answer is at hand, that unity is not ***number***, because it is the origin and foundation of number, which means to reckon or sum up; and you cannot reckon or sum up one, but you can two.

Secondly of time. Time has reference to the operations and effects of power, with regard to their anticipation, progress, and final termination; and these three considerations, constitute the foundation and doctrine of time or tense in grammar. The word time comes from the Greek word *temno*, which signifies to divide or to separate into small portions; and thus, those small portions or periods of duration, which are requisite for the accomplishment of any operation, are applied to verbs, or to that class of words, which denote the various operations of intellectual and physical power. And these operations are spoken of, or declared to be in anticipation, now going on, or to have terminated in certain results, under the terms of past, present, or future time or tense. Therefore, with regard to the operations of whatever power, duration may be considered as divided by the present or current period, into two portions, posterior and anterior, called past and future time or tense. The word tense comes from the Latin word *tendo*, which signifies to strain, stretch out, or to direct our course or attention to some definite object. I have no particular predilection for the one to the exclusion of the other; inasmuch as either will answer all the purposes, for which they were introduced into grammar. Time seems to have a direct reference to the division of duration, while tense seems to direct our attention to the results of power produced in time as a portion of duration.

But, since there is a vast variety of operations considered in different aspects of present, past, and future time, language treats of them, not only under these three heads, but also under several intermediate periods between the present and ultimate past, and between the present and remote future. Thus, while the wheel of time is constantly revolving, bearing upon its broad periphery the results and destinies of human allotment, language pursues the retiring scene, till it sets in obscurity; or turns to the rising future and prophesies events, before they are flushed with a ray of certainty. The present or current time is assumed by the English with other languages, as the dividing line or mark of distinction between these two grand anterior and posterior halves or portions of duration; and it becomes the standard of comparison, to which all operations are refered with regard to the past and future. And, as all operations both human and divine, having reference to some definite and ultimate result, must necessarily eventuate in the order of succession, and be concatenated by many reciprocal and modified relations, therefore some languages have recognized these circumstances in the peculiar construction and different terminations of their verbs—while others again, have chosen to designate them in the peculiar construction of their *sentences*, and not by different terminations of their verbs. This is particularly the case with the English language. It has less variation in the verb, than any other language, of which I have any knowledge, and yet it expresses a greater variety of modifications of time in the present, past, and future, than even the Latin or the Greek. It has three distinct forms or sentences to express the present, seven to express the past, and eight to express future time, making eighteen in the whole. Never was there a language so simple in its construction, and yet so copious and definite in designating the different periods of time, that are requisite for a full display of those reciprocal and modified relations, which necessarily belong to the order of succession in the routine of events.

Several English verbs undergo no change at all with regard to time—such as put, let, must, ought, &c.; and yet the present, past and future, are clearly distinguished by the form of the sentence in which they are found. No verb undergoes more than one variation in point of tense, and this belongs to the past, which expresses the power of the verb executed—as study, studied, write, wrote. The verb assumes only two participial forms called the present and past or perfect. The present always ends in *ing;* but the past tense and perfect participle of about one hundred verbs, are variously formed, called irregular. Sixteen verbs have the same form in the present and past tense, and the perfect participle. There are eight, which are defective in one or both of the participles, and about seventy, which form their past tense and perfect participle alike, but not terminated in *ed*. These are also called irregular, because the root or present tense undergoes a change.

All other verbs form their past tense and perfect participle by adding *d* or *ed* to the root, and are therefore called regular. There is moreover, a flexibility in the participles, that gives to the language a wonderful facility in forming sentences to express what is called the active and passive voice. There is however, a serious objection to this term *active* and *passive* voice, inasmuch as it does not convey by its own signification, a true notion of that reality couched under the term. The term, to mean any thing, that belongs to its office, ought to designate that communicant and recipient energy, or reciprocal influence of power, which every created being must necessarily experience, either as an agent or communicant subject putting it forth and affecting others, or as a recipient subject of its effects produced upon him by others putting it forth. This pliancy of the participles, thought to be a defect by some as tending to obscurity, gives them a variety and scope, that can never be surpassed by any other form whatever. For, it acts on the principle of the combination and permutation of numbers so replete with choice and variety.

I said, that the English language has three forms or sentences to express the present tense—seven to express the several modifications of the past tense, and eight to express the future. But it must be remembered, that the past and future modifications of time, are contrasted with, and have reference to each other in two different points of view; that is, the productive *effects* of the verb are first considered with regard to past and future time; and secondly, the finished *results* of the verb as matter of fact, or as an event, are also considered with regard to time past and future. Here is the mystery of that mysterious nonsense, taught in grammars about the *perfect* and *pluperfect* tenses—which will be explained under the head of verb. In these two respects then, the past and future tenses are contrasted with, and have reference to each other, through the medium of the present tense, which is the standard of comparison, and to which the other two refer; therefore, they have reference to each other through this medium. And this is the reason, that the English language employs both the present and past tenses of certain verbs to form those sentences, which designate its future modifications with regard to the productive effects and finished results, of executive verbs mentioned above. And it is moreover, the reason why, it has one more form of future tense, than it has of the past, inasmuch as it uses both the present and past tenses of certain intensive verbs, in the formation of its future expressions. Any verb in our language, which denotes a habitude of mind, or a mental affection or condition, and which precedes an executive verb, will express the future tense of this executive verb. For example, I desire to learn, I wish to learn, I mean to learn, &c. Or, I desired to learn, I wished to learn, I meant to learn, &c. In all the above examples, the executive *effects* of the verb *learn*, are in *futuro.*

Perhaps it may appear paradoxical to some, that the past tense should represent future action; but this apparent contradiction is entirely done away, when the true nature and meaning of the future tense, are fully understood. For, it must be remembered, that the present, past, or future *declaration* or annunciation of an action, is not the object, which language has in view, when it treats of events under those heads, but the operative *power* of the verb, as now exerting, having exerted, or about to exert its energy in the production of effects. Therefore, future events will as naturally come under past declaration, as they do under present declaration. For example, I say, that the sun will rise; or I said, that the sun will rise; or I said, that the sun would rise. Here the future with regard to the verb rise, is as clearly and as truly maintained in the one expression as in the other; for, the real object of the declaration is not as yet, realized; no act being performed, except the act of declaring. And although it is a truth simple and manifest, that time in the declaration has no necessary connection with that time, which belongs to the event of an executive verb, and at which language aims as its sole object, yet grammarians treat of it, as though there was some necessary connection. And not only so, but they blend with it another consideration still more delusive, which is, the present and past state or condition, in which any agent is said to be, or to have been; and out of which all finite power must receive its efficiency, or ability to work out an effect. For example, I desire to learn, or I desired to learn. Here, the efficiency implied in the verb learn, is not at all affected by the present and past time of the verb desire;

and the primary object of the declaration is still in *futuro*, being that of learning. What objection then, except prolixity, can be alleged against the scheme, which our language has evidently chosen to express its past and future time—that is, by sentences, and not by different terminations of the verb? And is this prolixity done away by calling half a dozen words-one, as is the case with our grammarians in their auxiliary arrangement of the several tenses of English verbs?

One of the primary duties of a grammarian is to illustrate the analysis and synthesis of a language, upon which depends the correctness of its grammar, or of speaking and writing it. But the principles and doctrines of analysis and synthesis are particular as well as general and universal; therefore, any language may have a scheme peculiar to itself, and this is particularly the case with the English. For I know of no other language, except the Saxon, that has not an express termination of the verb to denote future time. Consequently, it is under the necessity of designating it by circumlocution. And this is the reason, as I said before, why it has so many modifications of future time, and also why it has one more example in this, than in past time; inasmuch as it employs the present in addition to the seven past modifications, to express its future gradations. To say in general terms, that analysis is taking apart, and that synthesis is putting together, sheds very little light upon the necessary modifications and adjustment of parts, which every piece of mechanism must undergo before any operative synthesis can be effected; therefore, he who intends to benefit mankind, must enter into a detailed account of the analytical and individual adjustment of all the parts, on which their usefulness depends, and also point out the order and relation of their synthetical position, before he attempts to discuss the consequent results flowing from synthetical connection. Every machine being designed for some definite purpose, is considered as one, and entire in itself, whether it consists of two or of fifty parts. So, in language, a simple sentence in grammar, being a definite expression of some mental or physical operation, may consist of two or of a dozen parts or words. Consequently, it is not the province of the grammarian to say, whether there shall be in a sentence, one, two, or three verbs or words of operative signification, by which a complete result is effected, but only to shew what part each sustains, and how far its influence extends in accomplishing the ultimate end or design of the sentence. It is not his province to invent and model a grammar, and palm it upon the language, but to illustrate analytically and synthetically that grammatical and sentential construction, which the language has assumed and modeled for itself.

Enough has been said on the subject of time, to shew, that this wholesale business of dealing out words, like casts of staves, is about as instructive and edifying, as the exposition given of fortification by the Frenchman, who defined it to be two twentifications. But when I come to treat of the nature of that class of words, called verbs, the absurdity of this auxiliary concatenation will be made still more apparent; therefore, I will close this lecture with a table, in which is exhibited that scheme, evidently adopted by the English language to express its present, past, and future modifications of time.

Definite form of operative power.

PRESENT TENSE.

I learn, do learn, am learning.

PAST TENSE.

I learned, did learn, was learning.

Definite form of finished action, as an event.

PRESENT TENSE.

I have learned, have been learning.

PAST TENSE.

I had learned, had been learning.

Definite form of future operative power.

PRESENT TENSE.

I will learn, or will be learning.
I shall learn, or shall be learning.
I can learn, or can be learning.
I may learn, or may be learning.
I must learn, or must be learning.

PAST TENSE.

I would learn, or would be learning.
I should learn, or should be learning.
I could learn, or could be learning.
I might learn, or might be learning.
I must learn, or must be learning.

Definite form of future finished action, as an event, or matter of fact.

PRESENT TENSE.

I will have learned, or will have been learning.
I shall have learned, or shall have been learning.
I can have learned, or can have been learning.
I may have learned, or may have been learning.
I must have learned, or must have been learning.

PAST TENSE.

I would have learned, or would have been learning.
I should have learned, or should have been learning.
I could have learned, or could have been learning.
I might have learned, or might have been learning.
I must have learned, or must have been learning.

What difference in point of time with regard to the effects of the executive verb *learn*, is there between the foregoing, and the following examples?

Definite form of operative power.

PRESENT TENSE.

I intend to learn, or I intend to be learning.
I desire to learn, or I desire to be learning.

PAST TENSE.

I intended to learn, or I intended to be learning.
I desired to learn, or I desired to be learning.

Definite form of finished action, as an event, or matter of fact flowing from the verb learn.

PRESENT TENSE.

I intend to have learned, or to have been learning.
I desire to have learned, or to have been learning.

PAST TENSE.

I intended to have learned, or to have been learning.
I desired to have learned, or to have been learning.

Take any verb in the English language, that expresses a mental or physical affection, as love, fear, hope, wish, desire, &c. and join it to an executive verb, you will have the same constructed sentence. I ask any one to point out a shadow of difference with regard to time, between the four first and the two last of the foregoing examples, and a hundred others, that might be cited. Who does not perceive, that the action or productive effects of the verb *learn* are all in *futuro?* no results as yet being produced by that verb; though the intensive power of the other verbs, has operated. I challenge any one to shew the least difference. All those distinctions hitherto attempted, are worse than useless. No wonder then, that foreigners and tyros among us are puzzled and unable to acquire a proper use of our modes and tenses, or even a proper use of several of our verbs, that express a habitude of mind or body. No wonder the Frenchman said, when he fell into the water, that "I *will* be drowned, for no one *shall* help me."

If there is no possible difference in the foregoing examples, with regard either to time or to plain, distinct and positive declaration, what objection can there be to the placing them all in the indicative or definite form of the verb, inasmuch as they all equally indicate, announce and affirm? No one ever dreamed of putting the verbs *intend* and *desire* in any other mode or form, than the indicative; or in any other tense than the present and past. Who does not perceive, that the efficient or executive verb in any and in all the above examples, is that of *learn?* All the others indicate a habitude of mind, or a mental affection, authority, ability, liberty or obligation, &c.

And here I will shew you a mystery with regard to the nature of all verbs, which signify a mental operation, or a physical affection. They become intransitive or transitive in direct accordance with the views of the agent, who exercises their power; that is, they become intensive or executive just as he applies them. If he uses them simply to designate the exercise of mental faculties and sensibilities, or physical emotions, they become intensive and consequently intransitive, inasmuch as their effects or influence, pertain wholly to the agent himself. But if he uses them in an executive sense, they extend their influence beyond him and embrace an object, and are therefore transitive; for example, he loves to study—he loves to do his duty. Here the verb *love* is used in an intensive sense—simply expressing the exercise of that affection in the agent himself, and therefore intransitive, requiring an executive verb to follow it in the infinitive or indefinite form. But in the following sentences it is executive: as he loves study—he loves his duty—he loves his friends, &c. Here the verb *love* extends its influence beyond the agent and embraces an object; and it is therefore transitive and executive over the object of this affection.

In the above illustration you discover the reason why, the verb *do* admits of a repetition in the same sentence: for instance, I do do my duty. The first *do* is used in an intensive sense, indicating merely the tensity of mental or physical powers; but the second do is used in an executive sense, and therefore transitive,—controling the following noun, duly. Its place might be supplied by a variety of other executive verbs without altering the sense of the sentence.

Every language has a greater or less number of verbs, which indicate a mental or a physical affection,—all of which have an intensive or intransitive application, and most of which can be used in a transitive sense, governing a following noun; especially when that noun expresses the *modus operandi* of the verb; as to live a life—to dream a dream, &c. Moreover the verb *have* possesses the same intensive and executive application, which belongs to the verb *do* with many others. And when a verb or participle follows *have*, the same intensive meaning is attached to it, that belongs to other intensive verbs: for example, I have written a letter, or I have been writing a letter.

Grammarians however, call *have* in the above examples, an auxiliary verb; and why do they not call it auxiliary in the following examples? I have to attend court; I have to act a double part; I have to watch day and night, &c. Here the verb have is evidently used in an intensive sense. So also is it used intensively in the examples first cited, to wit: I have written a letter—I have been writing a letter.

This verb is of Hebrew origin, and from the Saxon spelling of it, there is no doubt that they derived it directly from the Hebrew, and not from the Latin verb ***habeo.*** But one thing is certain beyond all contradiction, that the four nations, to wit, the Jews, Latins, Saxons, and the English, have used this verb in the same way; that is, they have all used it in an intensive and executive sense. And the Jews and Latins applied it particularly to mental and physical affections; a proof of which you have in our words habit, habitude, habiliment, &c. which come from the Latin. Therefore, let no one hereafter, call this or any other verb whatever auxiliary; inasmuch as no verb, in any language under heaven, can express less or more, than some mental or bodily habit, some mental or physical affection, or some executive and overt act.

From what has been said, I think it abundantly manifest, that our verbs ***will***, ***shall***, ***may***, ***can*** and ***must***, with their inflection, are principal verbs, if they are any thing at all. For, whatever expresses power in any degree, weak or strong, must express it in a separate, distinct, and integral unity. Therefore every verb has its own definite and separate power, and ought to be parsed or disposed of in a sentence, by showing what that power is, or how far it goes towards making up the efficiency requisite to produce the effect indicated in the entire sentence.

LECTURE 4.

ON THE ORIGIN OF NUMBER AND PERSON, AND THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES.

I said, that each and all words in any language, are referable, and may be traced to one of six primary fountains, or generic heads, from which they have flowed; and that these fountains are first, separate and distinct being or individuality; secondly, power, or an operative principle; thirdly, the movement or action of power; fourthly, place; fifthly, time, or a portion of duration; and sixthly, number. These six are the generic heads of classification, under which the whole catalogue of words, or the vocabulary of any language, is arranged, embracing the entire scope and range of human thought. In the physical or material kingdom, each and every individual exists, consists, and subsists, under some concrete form, peculiarly modified to suit the station, rank, and sphere of action, for which he was designed by the Creator.

The variously modified components of form or structure, are attributes or qualities called adjectives, of which there is almost an endless variety. The productive efficiency belonging to this structure or form, and consequent upon that peculiar adjustment of parts, is called physical power, under the names of property, capacity or faculty. This too is diversified in various degrees of productive energy co-extensive with the diversity of form. But inasmuch as my subject confines me to that class of beings called the human race, I must direct my attention to man alone, and endeavor to illustrate the principles, on which he constructs his sentences of speech, whether they are single, complex, simple or compound; and also to point out the essential and distinctive difference between a single and complex, a simple and compound sentence. The simplest integral sentence, that can be formed or uttered, embraces those first three grand realities mentioned above, to wit, individuality, power, and the operation of power. But these three realities may be fully expressed in two words, one denoting the agent, if the being is exerting his own power, but if not, denoting the subject or recipient of another's power—and this word is called the noun or name of the being. The other word expresses the working of power, which is the faculty of the being, if he is an agent putting it forth, but if not, it expresses the influence of power belonging to him as a subject or recipient of the effects of another's power. And this word is called a verb, communicant or recipient according as the action is given or taken. Hence we discover, that the forms of the verb under the terms of active and passive voice, are derived from the fixed and reciprocal relation between all finite beings.—Hence too, we perceive that single words, whether simple or compounded, are necessarily abbreviated and imperfect sentences—of which time, place and number, are copious sources.

If however, the verb is transitive in its operations, that is, if the power produces an effect beyond the agent to whom it belongs and in whom it resides, three words are requisite to make the sentence full and complete. And the reason is this, that one word is required to denote the agent, called the nominative—one to denote the action of his power, called the verb, and one to denote the effect or result of his action, called the object. But, if the power of the verb produces no influence beyond the organized structure of the agent himself, both the action and the effect reside in him, and consequently the verb expresses them fully. All such verbs are called intransitive, because the whole energy of the verb is expended and terminated in the agent himself: therefore, two words will form a full and complete sentence. So, on the contrary, when the power of a verb extends its influence beyond the being in which it resides, and produces its effect, this effect being extraneous to the agent, must have a separate term of its own. Therefore, all such verbs are called transitive.

Here *we discover*, the origin of cause and effect, united by an intimate and inseparable relation; and here too *we perceive*, have resulted the reality and notion of number and person, time and place. For the great First Cause having operated once, introduced number, and along with it, person, to wit, first and second. The first person belongs to himself, and the second to his effect. His second operation introduces a second effect, and along with it a third in *number*, but not a third *person;* for all his effects are second to him in point of person, let their *number* be what it may. Now, these effects become secondary causes, producing their effects in turn, and therefore they are *prime* to their own effects, and their effects are second in person to them; but they are third in person to the primitive or any other, except their own cause. Thus we see, that person stops at the third rank or order, which pertains to the effects of secondary causes, because every effect, whether of the original or of the secondary cause, when it becomes an agent, assumes the rank and order of secondary cause, and becomes prime or first in person to its own effects, which effects can never be more than third in person to any other cause whatever beyond their own cause, since they are second to it and it is first to them. Consequently, the effects of secondary causes assume three persons, being third in person to the primitive or any other cause, and second in person to their own immediate cause, and prime or first in person to their own effects. Person then, relates to the application of words to beings, with regard to the order of their relationship, that is, either to a being, as chief speaker narrating his own acts; or to one, addressed by him, and charged with the performance of certain acts; or to one, whom he names, and declares to have performed certain acts.

Having shewn what constitutes a simple and therefore single sentence, and also what renders it complete or imperfect; and having also developed the origin of number and person, let us now direct our attention to the consideration of sentences under a complex, simple or compound form. The term sentence taken in the true signification of the word, means a perception or discernment of the mind, derived from some one of the five senses, or from the operative energy of its own power; but in a grammatical point of view, it means a collection or set of words, in which some opinion, judgment, decision or act, is declared to be, to have been, or about to be performed; and in this latter sense, I shall here discuss it. I said, that from the intimate union between cause and effect, there had arisen the reality and notion of number and person, time and place; and that person is restricted to three orders, while number, time, and place are allowed to run on, and multiply in endless succession. In time, place and number then, we have a copious source of all those abbreviated and imperfect sentences, terms and phrases, arranged under the classified heads of adverb, preposition, conjunction and interjection.

To number also may be refered our two articles. Person applies to all pronouns of whatever description; because it arises out of the relation between cause and effect; and every pronoun refers either to cause or to effect, under the character of one of the three persons. The adjective and participle refer directly to the noun or pronoun, and they often usurp its place, as the good, the wise; because they always denote, either some specific or essential ingredient of magnitude, space or number, some habitude of body or mind; or some moral and intellectual quality or action of accountable beings. Here then, are developed the reason and use for that modified form of the verb, called the participle; for, while it retains the action and time of the verb, it reduces a sentence, which would otherwise be compound, to a simple one, and even to an imperfect sentence.

For instance—the committee having met, drafted and reported the bill, were discharged from any further action on the subject. In this example, by the use of the present and past participles, four distinct sentences are reduced to one complex single sentence, having only one nominative subject, and one definite verb. That form of the verb, which simply points out its operative power, drops the consideration of time, and therefore becomes an indefinite expression, called by grammarians the infinitive mode; but reason and propriety demand for it the appellation of indefinite *form*; inasmuch as form belongs to *expression*, and mode to *action*. So the participles, especially in English, drop the consideration of time by their position, and then they become adjectives, expressing physical, moral, or intellectual qualities, according to the nature of the verb, from which they are derived. For example, the flying clouds: here the participle *flying* drops the consideration of time, and becomes an adjective expression. But, the clouds are flying, is a sentence in which *flying* maintains its participial character. The following is an example of the past or perfect participle: A large portion of the community have informed themselves on political subjects. Here *informed* is a past participle, possessing the action and time of the verb, and governing an objective case after it. But in this sentence it is an adjective: Political subjects are well understood by the *informed* part of the community. Here informed drops the consideration of time, retaining only the action of the verb, and thus becomes an adjective, expressing a mental quality.

Grammarians however, tell you, that the phrase *have informed*, is a verb in the perfect tense. Those, who prefer this mode of parsing words in casts or parcels, are at liberty so to do; but I can never consent to call that analysis, or synthesis, which disposes of articles in packages.—If the words *have* and *informed* must be joined, having such an intimate connection with each other, as necessarily belongs to the parts of a whole, you could never separate them by substituting the noun in the place of one, and the sentence still make sense—thus, a large portion of the community have information on political subjects. No one ever thought of making the phrase, *have information*, a verb, which might be done with about the same propriety, as the phrase, have informed. The truth is, that each and every word has its own definite meaning, no matter what degree of energy, size, consideration, dignity, rank, station, significancy or insignificancy, the word embraces.

Thus far I have developed the origin of all the parts of speech, except the noun and the verb, and have refered them to their proper sources; and when I shall have disposed of these remaining two, a complete catalogue of the *sources* of the parts of speech, will have been accomplished. In reasoning on the nature of a verb, or rather, on the nature of what it implies, this conclusion is forced irresistibly upon us, to wit, that the verb is *sui generis*, that is, without origin, and therefore eternal. Hence arises its indefinite form. The verb then, is the root, fountain, and ultimate source of all derivation whatever; inasmuch as it includes in its own essence, individuality of being, efficiency or power, and the spirit or working of power. Therefore, it embraces the name or noun; and it is a singular fact, that in the Hebrew language, the same word, which, as a verb, denotes the existence of being, is also the name of the great First Cause.

Cause and effect then, are the true, proper and ultimate objects of thought; and language can express them fully in their own native simplicity by two, or at most, three words, according as the verb happens to be intransitive or transitive. Or it can clothe them in all the foppery of fanciful epithets, that flow from the diversified qualities of concrete forms, placed in the different circumstances of time, place and number. Here then, is the tawdry wardrobe of Rhetoric, which language unlocks to the admirers of gorgeous array, and from which wit and fancy make such prodigal selections, that they often dazzle the sight, puzzle curiosity, and bewilder conception.

Let it not however, be supposed by these observations, that I undervalue the proper claims, or that I wish to withhold from rhetoric its real and legitimate office, which can never extend beyond a clear and prominent presentment of the subject clothed in its own native, and therefore, essential attributes. But, when we overstep the modesty of nature by attempting to decorate the beauty and loveliness of simple truth, we tarnish the lustre, weaken the force, and consequently, lessen the effect of that, which is, when unadorned, adorned the most.

From what has been said on the nature of cause and effect, shewing the intimate relation subsisting between them, as being the true and real foundation, on which the proper construction of sentences depends, the following conclusion is the natural result, that the verb is the most essential ingredient in forming a sentence; and that a thorough acquaintance with its true nature, is absolutely necessary in order rightly to understand, either the construction, or the resolution of a sentence. Therefore, I will now call your attention to the consideration of the verb.

There appears to be a greater diversity of opinion among grammarians on the subject of the verb in its several considerations of signification, and modes and tenses, than on any other subject belonging to grammar. Various schemes have been adopted by different writers, and presented to the public, containing a greater or less number of modes and tenses, with a greater or less degree of complexity or combination of words in forming the tenses. But no one appears to have perceived, comprehended and developed the true doctrine of the subject, as suggested by Nature herself, and pointed out by the application and use of this class of words; for, had these writers looked into the animal, or even the vegetable kingdom, they must have discovered, that each individual assumes a separate and distinct existence, being possessed of such organic structure, with its appropriate functions, as is requisite to maintain this existence. And that, to each organ there is assigned an appropriate function to perform—the due performance of which depends upon its own peculiar and definite energies, and not upon auxiliary contributions. Therefore, language being a descriptive emblem of nature universal, portrays by record or by tradition, as it is written or spoken, the separate structure and peculiar movements of each and every individual that presents itself for delineation. Consequently, the powers and energies of all orders and ranks of existence, both high and low, great and small, being entire and complete in themselves, must and will have appropriate terms to express them in their separate, distinct, and operative movements; and these terms are classed under the general name of verb.

Now, the truth of the matter is this, that each and every verb in any language under heaven, is an expression of a distinct and separate power in itself; and this arises from the nature of the verb, or the signification of the word under that head. In proof of this, let us inquire in the first place, what is meant by the term *verb?* The Latin word *verbum*, from which our term verb is derived, comes from ferveo, fervere, fervi, or ferbui, and the noun would be *ferbum;* but we know, that the consonants *f* and *v* are interchangeable in the Latin, as well as in the English language—like wife, wives; therefore, it becomes *verbum*, or verb in English. The word is very happily chosen as a term of classification of those words arranged under this head, since they all signify power operative and operating. And the term itself implies the fervor of heat or caloric, or even of any power in its active movement. I said, that every verb has a distinct signification of its own; and this fact arises not only from the nature of persons and things, but from the nature of that reality, which verbs represent, to wit, *power*. Now, if a verb has no distinct meaning in itself, it can never acquire one by the most intimate connection, any more, than a dead man can acquire vitality by being united to a live one.

Every verb then, represents power distinct in its own unity of being, having a greater or less degree of energy. But, the degree of energy belonging to power, does not affect its singleness of being, any more, than the size or bulk of any portion of matter, affects its singleness of being. One grain, or the least particle of sand, has as distinct and separate existence, as the loftiest mountain. So also has power, in whatever degree of energy it may exist. Therefore, it is high time, this auxiliary establishment of verbs was laid aside, as being not only supernugatory in the formation of tenses, but also extremely unphilosophical and contrary to common sense. It is just, like the *disjunctive conjunction.* What a ludicrous figure a man and his wife would make, having formed a disjunctive union by marriage! But whatever war or clashing of elements there may be in human nature, all is peace and harmony in an abiding union, between the several members of a compound sentence, or between the periods of a piece of good composition. Let not grammarians then, pervert names, and call that disjunctive, which unites realities together, with a more indissoluble tie, than the Gordian knot.

Under the term verb we arrange every species of power, that belongs to the intellectual and physical kingdoms. It has been shewn, that the term *verb* includes in its meaning, a high degree of excitement or action, whence arose the propriety of the word as a term of classification. So the term *power*, in its etymon, means actor or doer, &c. Etymologists derive it from the French; but be this as it may, the word takes its origin from the Greek verb *poieo*, which signifies to do, or to effect by almost any mode of operation; and the agent noun is power, doer, effector, &c. Power then, is either sapient, sciential, or operative; or in other words, it is creative, directive, or executive. The great First Cause possesses all these to infinity; therefore, He is called the Omniscient, Omnipresent, and Omnipotent Being. All verbs then, are necessarily active, because they are the representatives of power; but where there is no operative energy, there is no power: consequently, the idea of a non-efficient efficiency, is rather ludicrous. But all verbs are not transitive, because they do not all produce effects beyond the limits or confines of that jurisdiction, over which they preside. I said, that power may be arranged under three grand heads called creative, directive, and executive: consequently, power when applied to God, is always transitive; but when applied to created beings, it is transitive or intransitive according to the particular species of power denoted by the verb. But to attach the term neuter to verbs, is worse than ridiculous. For, to say that power is neither transitive nor intransitive, nor even active, is making it nothing at all. Consequently, in calling it neuter, is like talking about a dead live man, or a non-acting actor, or torpid activity. Therefore, all verbs are necessarily active, with a greater or less degree of energy. Perhaps I shall be asked, what activity there is expressed by the verbs *be* or *am*, *sit*, *stand*, *lie*, *sleep*, &c. To this question I answer, that all physical power is executive—operating in one of three modes, either propulsive, intensive, or constrictive. Consequently, when I sit or stand, my organic powers are intensive; but when I lie or sleep, they are constrictive in a greater or less degree, according to circumstances; for, if you intend that the word *lie* shall express simply position, you attach to it the same species of power, that belongs to the verb *be* or *am;* that is, you affirm the exercise of that preservative and protective power, which is the constant attendant of all physical being whatever. For, by whatever fiat physical being exists, by the same fiat it continues to exist. Therefore, all such verbs are active, but not transitive, in the common acceptation of the term transitive. Nevertheless, any verb whatever, will govern a noun purporting the result or operation of the verb: for example, to sleep a sleep, to dream a dream, to run a race, to fly a flight, &c.

And here I cannot forbear noticing the wonderful efficiency of power indicated by our little verb *be* or *am*, which includes in it all power; and comes to us both from the Greek and Hebrew. *Be*, comes from the Hebrew, and *am* from the Greek. It is the appellation Jah, I am, which God pronounced upon himself, and directed Moses to use as his proper title, when he spoke of him before the Jews. Therefore, when we say that any thing *is*, we affirm that it exists, consists, and subsists by the energy of God's omnipotence. Now the Hebrew language forms its gerundive expression by prefixing one of several letters or prepositions called formative, to the infinitive mode; and our verb *be* is precisely like the Hebrew infinitive, having the preposition *b* before the verb. Therefore, the Hebrew expression, *be*, the English, *in being*, the Greek, *eis einai*, and the Latin, *in esse*, are all exactly parallel expressions, and mean the same thing; that is, in being or existing. Our verb *am* is from the Greek verb *eimi;* but the verb *be* was first introduced, and it had no variation either in mode and tense, or in number and person. Every verb then, has and must have, from the nature of the reality, which it expresses, a distinct, separate, definite and ultimate meaning, indicating power operating, having operated, or about to operate, under some peculiar and specified modification of circumstances; and this power is predicated in the declaration, to belong to an individual as an agent, communicating it, or to him as a recipient or subject, experiencing its influences. Therefore, power being reciprocal in its operation, is applied to all created beings, both as communicants, and as recipients of it.

And this is all that grammarians mean, if they mean the truth, when they call verbs active and passive, and place them in the active and passive voice. Thus power, being an active principle, can never be passive in its operations, but always salient. Consequently, the term *passive* is highly objectionable when applied to verbs or to utterance, inasmuch as neither of these are *passive* in any proper sense of the term. But matter is passive in the full extent of the word, and liable at all times to experience the influences of power, from the plastic hand of its creator, or from the art and skill of man. Therefore the voice, declaration, or utterance of the verb, is made under certain modifications or changes of termination, to shew that the being to whom it is attributed, is either an agent or communicant putting it forth and affecting others, or that he is a recipient of its influences, and therefore affected by it proceeding from others.

Thus we see, that the term *passive* does not apply with much propriety, either to the action of the verb, or to the act of utterance; but that it applies wholly to the *condition* of the subject or nominative of the verb, as having communicated or received its influences. Therefore, I greatly prefer the term, communicant and recipient voice, as being much better calculated to develop the real object of language in this matter. Having discussed the nature of verbs, we will now turn our attention to that modification of them, called moods or modes. This subject appears not to have been so clearly defined, as not to leave room for further improvement. For, it is discussed in a way, that applies the change made in the form of the verb, to the *action* or *modus operandi* of the power belonging to the verb; but this is not the fact. No change whatever takes place in the *modus operandi* of the power under these different forms of the verb; but the change has a direct and entire reference to the modified *condition* of the communicant or recipient subject of power.

Each and every verb in itself expresses a distinct *mode* in which power operates, as read, write, run, walk, stand, &c. So each individual being has his own constituted mode of existence, either as peculiar to himself, or in common with others. Consequently, mode applies as justly and as properly to the constitution of beings, under which they exist, as it does to their actions. But the *modes* of their actions are all pointed out by the different verbs made use of, to express them; and each verb has its own peculiar *mode* of operation. Does mode of grammar then belong to the verb, as having reference to the action of the verb; or does it belong to the verb as having direct reference to the *condition* or *circumstances*, under which the subject of the verb portrays its action as an agent, or as a recipient of its action? The latter consideration is undoubtedly the fact, although *mode* is treated of by all grammarians, as belonging to the action of the verb, and not to the condition of the subject. Place an agent in whatever condition, if he performs the action of the verb write, he writes; if that of eat, he eats; if that of run, he runs.

Language then, in the economy of its verb, has consulted the nature of things, and the variously modified *conditions* and relations, in which beings exist, and under which they act; consequently, different languages have chosen different schemes to represent this diversity of condition. Some designate it by change of termination of the verb, and some by particles or abbreviated expressions, or by both. Therefore, the facts and results, the certainties and doubts, the probabilities and predictions, the apprehensions and fears, the successes and disasters, the trials and experience, the treachery and deceit, the weal and the wo—in freedom or slavery, in liberty or oppression, in sickness or in health, in time or eternity—are some of the great objects of language, upon which it declaims in positive assurance, and with bold authority, or in speculative hypothesis, with earnest entreaty or canting generalities.

Thus we find, that language has five different forms of the verb in declaring events, and expressing their results. These are called the indicative, imperative, subjunctive, optative, and infinitive. But all languages do not have five distinct forms of the verb to express them. Mode then, in a *grammatical* point of view, does not apply to the *form* of the verb, in which we speak or announce its action, but applies to the kind of action, which the verb under some form expresses. Thus, we speak in a positive and indicative form when we say, that John writes, James learns, George studies his lesson. This form of expression is called the indicative, because it declares positively, and without any reference to the *condition* or circumstances, under which the agent performs, or performed the act. We also speak with authority, and command others to act: then we speak under the imperative form, as write thou, write ye, &c. We also merely declare or announce the action of the verb, without predicating it of any particular being; as to write, to learn, to study, &c.; and this form of expression is called the infinitive, because the action of the verb is not restricted by number or person, to any particular being or beings. We speak under an argumentative and reasoning form, as if John writes attentively, he will improve; or if you divide a line into two equal parts, the square of one of these parts is equal to one-fourth of the square of the whole line.

In the above examples, we lay down premises, and draw conclusions resulting from them. We also speak in qualified terms, adapted to the *condition* or *circumstances* of the agent or recipient of the action of the verb.

Here then, the action must and will take place under certain contingent considerations, with regard to the subject himself, as acting either at his own election, or under restraint with regard to certain relations, which every complex event imposes upon certain individuals, who take part in the same.

This form of the verb, called by grammarians the subjunctive mode, is always attended by abbreviated terms or phrases explanatory of the variously modified condition of the subject, under which he performs the action of the verb or experiences its influences. And although the verb undergoes a change of termination, as in Latin and Greek, yet this is not done in consequence of any change in the *modus operandi* of the power of the verb; but only in compliance with the *modified condition* or concomitant circumstances, or otherwise affected part, which the subject sustains in the results of the event. And here, let it be remembered, is the reason, that all languages have such a copious list of adverbs, conjunctions, adverbial or independent phrases, explanatory of time, place, number and other concomitant circumstances, which are more or less interspersed through every species of composition written or spoken. From what has been said, I think it sufficiently evident, that mode in *grammar* has no reference whatever to the *action* of the verb, but that it refers wholly to the *form* of the verb, in which the action is declared as being performed, under *modified conditions* of the subject, either as an agent or as a recipient of it. For, as I said before, the verb by itself points out the *mode* in which power, physical or intellectual, operates. Here too, is developed another important truth, which seems to have escaped the notice of the learned and philosophic world. I mean the wide and essential difference there is between the *state* of a being, whether physical or intellectual, and the *condition* in which he *stands*, if he exists at all.

Let the honest inquirer after truth, never lose sight of this important reality, through whose opening vista light is diffused upon the surrounding scenery, revealing many objects of earnest inquiry *standing where* they were not sought for. From what has been said moreover, on that form of the verb called subjunctive mode, I think abundant proof is given to shew, that it is no more a subjunctive mode, than one indicative mode is subjunctive to another. But the English subjunctive mode, as seen in our grammars, has no analogy to the subjunctive mode of the Greek and Latin, unless you place the verbs may, can, might, could, would, should, &c. in the subjunctive mode. But our grammarians have arranged these and the like under a *potential* mode, which appears to have about as much sense in it as to say, that water is wet—that dust is dry—and that grease is greasy. For, whether you apply the term *potential* to the power indicated by the verb, or to the *manner* of the declaration, the impropriety is equally apparent; because the declaration has been made, or the verb would not be expressed; and to say, that a person has power to do what he has already done, is not saying much for edification; and to say, that power is powerful, is also trifling. Now the fact is this, that language, in forming its inflections of the verb, has conformed to the nature of those circumstances, which affect and change the *condition* of the agent or subject of the verb; therefore, it has constructed forms expressive of this change, either by different terminations of the verb, or by differently modified sentences.

That form of expression in the Greek and Latin, called subjunctive, is always rendered into English by may, can, might, could, &c.; but these words were never called subjunctive expressions, although they are the only words in English, that will express the subjunctive forms of these languages. I am an uncompromising advocate for the definiteness of terms, and for using such terms, as do, and will convey to the mind of the reader a distinct and definite notion of the subject in its true features. And this a writer is able to effect, if he has a proper knowledge of what words mean, or are intended to represent. If words have no distinct and definite meaning of their own, and are subject to the caprice of every one, who chooses to use them as his fancy may dictate, language is of little importance; for, I see no great difference between a character, picture, or emblem of any thing and every thing—and one of nothing at all. I object therefore, to the term, *subjunctive mode*, as used in grammars, because it leads to erroneous conceptions with regard to the matter of fact intended by this form of the verb, under that name. By what marks of distinction do we discover and classify each individual of the vast multitudes of beings, that compose the three grand kingdoms of matter, if not by the properties, qualities and habitudes, belonging to each in those kingdoms?

And although many individuals in each of these departments, possess properties, &c. in common, yet these common properties are so modified in their apportionment to each individual, as clearly to distinguish him from his fellows. So then, words being an emblematic representation of all the above realities, either in their generic, specific, or kindred capacities, undergo a modification in one way or other, to suit the case or *condition* of each individual under his own allotment.

But man is a free agent, and therefore, possesses the liberty of choosing and refusing; and his language recognizes it in the construction of its verb, because this class of words represents his power or ability of doing. That modification of the verb called subjunctive mode, is the one in which this choice or election, is designated; though all languages do not express it by the verb alone, but some express it by particles, called adverbs and conjunctions,—and this is the case with the English and others. So, some languages have no form of the verb to express desire or a wish, called *optative mode*—though all languages, I venture to affirm, have some way of expressing the mental affection under which an executive or overt act was committed; and this is the fact in the English language. But no one ever thought of giving our verbs an optative mode, although they have as much an optative form, as they have a subjunctive form. The Hebrew language recognizes both desire and choice, but it has no form of the verb to express them, and consequently it has neither optative nor subjunctive mode. Desire and choice are announced under the indicative form, and the construction of our verbs, are precisely the same. We have no particular form of the verb to express them.

In every example, which our grammarians have given of the subjunctive mode, there is a violation of syntactical relation. For instance,—"Were I to strive, yet I could not succeed." "Though he chide me, yet will I respect him." Here, in making the plural form of *was* agree with the singular pronoun *I*, the first principle of syntax is violated; and the same is the case with the verb *chide* and the pronoun *he*. The verb is in the plural form; but the pronoun is in the singular number. The phrases, *I is*, *I has*, &c. called vulgar, are much more in accordance with syntactical relation, than the above examples of the subjunctive mode. The fact is, our language has no particular form of the verb, to express either desire or choice, any more than it has for expressing the third person of the imperative mode. But all these circumstances are clearly pointed out under the indicative or imperative form, accompanied by appropriate and discriminating terms. So that, these forms are properly sentences, and not modifications of the verb itself. There is so little variation in our verbs, that it is necessary to express the nominative term, to which the verb belongs, except in the imperative mode, where it is seldom done, unless emphasis, a particular specification or an attribute of the nominative, demands it. For instance,—"Come, ye blessed," &c. Here the pronoun *ye*, is expressed, because the term *blessed*, is an attribute and belongs to it. English verbs undergo no change in the imperative mode; but this mode is very easily distinguished from the indicative, because the verb always introduces the sentence.

Perhaps I shall be asked why, I do not object to the imperative mode, as well as to the subjunctive mode, inasmuch as it too has no particular form. To this I answer, that there is no analogy between the imperative and the indicative mode, nor between the imperative and the subjunctive mode. It is one thing to command a person to do an act, and quite another to declare, that he has done it,—or that he is about to do it under certain conditions. That mode in any language called subjunctive, is no more nor less, than a modification of the indicative mode; for the action of the verb belonging to the agent or subject, is as really indicated or announced in the one mode, as it is in the other. The only difference between the two modes, is this: the indicative makes an unqualified assertion of an act being done or performed, without regard to the condition of the agent or subject; but the subjunctive mode qualifies, not the *modus operandi* of the action of the verb, as is taught in grammars, but the *condition* of the agent or subject, in which he is said to perform the action, or to be influenced by it. And this qualification, modification, or mode of *condition*, is denoted by certain abbreviated terms or phrases, going before it.

Now, if any language, in the construction of its sentences, has chosen to express this choice, or this contingent condition of the agent or subject, by certain abbreviated terms alone, and without any change in the verb, I see no plausible reason, for forcing upon it a mode, which the verb does not recognize by any definite marks of its own. Therefore, it ought to be rejected as unnecessary in the delineation of facts—or rather, as prejudicial to simplicity, method, perspicuity, and precision.

LECTURE 5.

ON THE FORMATION AND RESOLUTION OF SENTENCES.

Having shewn the reason and philosophy of language, that is, its elements or science in the formation of articulate sounds—their combination into syllables and words, and also the use and application of words in oral and written speech—I will now proceed to consider their grammatical and syntactical relations. But, before I proceed, I will present for the inspection of the reader, various examples of single sentences, beginning with the simple sentence of two words, and advancing to the most complex one, which consists of a dozen or more words.

Man dies. Water flows. The birds are singing. A ship sails on the sea. The winds blow over the land. The trees blossom in the spring. An honest man speaks the truth. Great and good men are patterns for imitation. In this changing and uncertain state, we suffer many and sore evils. Chastened by the severities of affliction, we lose much of our attachment and relish for the shifting scenes of this fading and transitory world.

The foregoing examples contain specimens of the simplest sentence, consisting only of two words; and they advance to one composed of two dozen, which is very complex; but still it is a single sentence, because it has only one nominated subject with its definite verb, while all the other words go to make up the definition of the *condition* of the subject in time and place. Each word in any of these sentences, has its own peculiar office to perform towards making up the entire sentence. Consequently, it has its own definite meaning attached to it. For, every sentence is intended to convey a distinct and definite notion of a certain property, quality, action, relation, or incident, that pertains to some person, place, or thing.

The separate meaning, or distinct signification of each word in a sentence, does its part towards forming this notion of said property, quality, &c. But the office, situation, and sentential duty, which each word performs in the *construction* of a sentence, is quite distinct and apart from its own significancy, as a term by itself. The different offices and sentential functions of the several words, that compose a sentence, are distinguished by particular names, according to the nature of that office, which each word sustains. In forming sentences, that will convey an *idea* of all the varieties of circumstance pertaining to the state and condition of persons and things, words have been classed under ten heads refering to the *office*, which each sustains in the sentence. Consequently, each class or general head must have a variety of words different in meaning, but sustaining the same office and duty; since there are many thousands of words in the language, but only ten different offices belonging to any sentence however complex. From this fact it will be readily seen, that a sentence may conform to all the requisitions of grammatical *construction*, and yet be sheer nonsense—an evident falsehood, or a direct contradiction in meaning; since words of different or opposite significations, perform the same office in forming a sentence.

Here then, the questions naturally arise, what is the nature of these offices, and what is meant by parsing grammar? The answer to the first of these questions is this—that beings exist and act in time and place; consequently, they must have some sort of state and condition belonging to them. This state and condition are subdivided into ten departments, corresponding to the different *views* or considerations, under which persons and things are represented in the occupancy of their state and condition. Although state in the abstract, is one and the same to all beings existing in this world, yet different beings have very different *constitutions* or constituent forms, in which they present themselves to our notice. Therefore, not only the different forms as such, are noticed, but the component parts of these forms, are closely inspected. Consequently, state and condition are divided into as many different departments as there are different *views* taken of an existent being. And first, of the form of the being as such, under which he is viewed. It is very manifest that he must have a term of designation; therefore, he has a name, called a noun—as man, horse, tree, &c. Secondly, of the *manner* in which he is viewed, both individual and specific, with regard to other beings; as a man, a horse, a tree; or the men, the horses, &c. Thirdly, he is viewed with regard to his appearance and structure; as white or black, good or bad, &c. which are attributes belonging to him, called adjuncts or adjectives. Fourthly, he may be viewed or considered as an absent being, or one out of sight; and then he must be viewed through his representative, or one who stands in his place; consequently, he has a pronoun, or name for him; as he, she, it, &c. Fifthly, he may be viewed with regard to his actions and operations; as when he eats, drinks, writes, speaks, &c.; therefore, he has names given to his operative powers, called verbs, which term means effervescence or glowing, like that of heat; a very fit and appropriate term to represent the movement of operative power. Sixthly, he may be viewed, as putting forth several kinds of powers at the same time—one being introductory to the performance of the other; as *opening* his mouth he puts food into it; extending his hand he seizes his enemy. Consequently, he is considered, as dividing his actions—as performing different movements to accomplish a single purpose; the one being a participant, or accessary to the other. But the accessary movements require and have different forms of the verb to express them; therefore, they are called *participles*. Seventhly, he may be viewed, as acting in different degrees of energy; as swiftly or slowly, earnestly or carelessly, &c. He also may be viewed, as performing his actions in time and place; as here or there, now or then, formerly or latterly, &c. These all belong to, or they are intimately connected with his actions. They are therefore, called adverbs. Eighthly, he may be viewed under the same general aspect, not only as performing several kinds of actions in time and place, but also with regard to the tendency and direction of his actions in their movements and final results; that is, with regard to his power going forth from him, and producing its effects apart, or out of his place. Consequently, his movements with their effects are exposed or set forth to our view, and become separate and distinct from him; therefore, this exposure is indicated by a class of words, called prepositions. But I greatly prefer the term exponent; for it designates the office much better than the term preposition; or rather it designates precisely the office, while preposition gives no proper intimation of it. Therefore, he has exponents to his actions. Ninthly, he may be viewed with respect to his personal and social relations, which consist in the contrasted degrees of strength, value, merit, demerit, equality or inequality of his properties, attributes, and actions, compared with each other, or with those belonging to other beings. Also with regard to the contingency, possibility, liberty, freedom, opposition, and resistance, which are the constant attendants of every being in his present state and condition. All such words then, as define or designate any of these circumstances, are properly significates. Therefore, he has significates of the condition in which he acts. The term conjunction is a miserable vehicle, in which to convey a true notion of the real office and duty of that class of words. Tenthly and lastly, he may be viewed with admiration and praise, or with horror and contempt; consequently, we have words to express those emotions, called interjections.

Thus we discover, how easily and naturally a sentence advances from a single and simple expression of two parts of speech, to wit, the noun and the verb, to the most complex one of ten parts of speech. We discover moreover, that a being can be represented in the full extent and variety of his state and condition, under ten sentential divisions of expression. The economy of state and condition then, is distributed into ten *divisions*, each of which has a distinct classification or term of office.

The noun or subject, and the verb, are the origin of the other eight, which are equally divided between them.

The article, adjective, pronoun, and interjection, have originated from the four distinct views or considerations, which pertain to the subject as the object of our notice; that is, the article designates the subject in its individual and specific character; the adjective designates the subject in its constitutional character, or peculiar structure and aspect; the pronoun, as its representative, designates the subject in its primary or efficient character; and the interjection designates the subject either in its sovereign or abject character; that is, in its exaltation or degradation.

The participle, adverb, exponent, and significate, are derived directly from the verb or adjective, and denote the peculiar circumstances under which power is operating, has operated, or is about to operate, in the production of its effects.

The participle designates the incipient influence and succession of operations, in which different powers unite and contribute their individual efforts in the production of final results.

The adverb designates the *manner*, in which power operates, (the verb itself indicates the kind of power put forth,) and points out the time when, and the place where, its operations eventuate.

The exponent designates the tendency and direction of potential movements, and defines the bounds and locality of their incipient and final termination.

The significate points out some particular personal or social condition, in which a being enjoys his endowments, exercises his powers, and maintains or loses his rights and immunities.

Thus we perceive, that language in the full extent of its grammar and logic, is like a well constructed and organized government, distributed into three grand divisions of legislative, executive, and judiciary heads.

Grammar, in its sentences and periods, embraces the legislative and executive heads.

The agent subject in a sentence is the legislative, and the verb is the executive head, and logic is the judiciary head.

Each of these departments has its subordinate offices, and each office has its own peculiar function or duty attached to it. But all are associated in the grand administration of general benefit.

As government yields no public good without the co-operation of the legislative and executive heads, so sentences give no efficient results without the union of the subject and the verb. The subject or noun being the sentential legislature, has four offices attached to it, under the names of article, adjective, pronoun and interjection; but each of these offices has its own peculiar duty allotted to it. Therefore, those words, that are capable of filling their several offices, must possess such qualifications as the nature of their several offices demands; otherwise they cannot discharge the duties thereof. So the verb being the sentential executive, has four subordinate deputies to assist him in the discharge of his entire administration. Each of these deputies however, has his limited sphere of action; therefore, each is denominated by an appellation, that designates both the office and its duty. Thus the verb has its cabinet of officers under the names of participle, adverb, exponent, and significate.

Those who undertake to form sentential governments then, are restricted to two departments or heads, with their respective and definite number of offices, in the construction. In order however, to make judicious selections and appointments in this republic of letters, and to give full and complete effect to its entire operations, we must study, not only the genius of this sentential government in its official departments, but also the personal qualifications of those individuals, whom we choose and appoint to the discharge of their respective functions. Therefore, the nature, derivation and signification of the several parts of speech, cannot be too carefully considered, nor too rigidly nor closely examined.

Having shewn the reason why words are classed under ten heads called parts of speech, we will now illustrate their nature, office, and duty. And first, of the *participle.* The definition hitherto given of this class of words, appears to be more childish and foreign to their nature, than that of any other class; for these words are said to be "participles, because they partake of the nature of a verb, an adjective, and a noun." The definition might have gone on, through the whole catalogue, and still it would have left us entirely ignorant of their true nature. What then is their real nature? A satisfactory answer to this question, is not only very easily obtained, but there needs no very labored disquisition to shew the great facility, conciseness, and expedition, which this class of words affords us in communicating the different modes of operation, or rather, the combination of powers, which are requisite to accomplish a *single,* tho' very complicated purpose. It is very manifest from their own signification, that they represent power, as now operating, or as having operated. Consequently, if they are the significates of different powers, these powers are, or were requisite for the accomplishment of some specific purpose. But when these powers are expressed in the regular inflection of their respective verbs, they must be associated by the copulate significate *and*, making thereby as many distinct single sentences, as there are participles. For example,—

He settled his affairs, and made all necessary preparations for his journey. He set forward on the 15th instant; he congratulated himself on his present favorable prospects; and he anticipated great reward for his future diligence and enterprise.

This paragraph contains five distinct sentences, which will be reduced to one by turning four of its verbs into participles, thus: Having settled his affairs, and made all necessary preparations for his journey, he set forward on the 15th instant, congratulating himself on his present favorable prospects, and anticipating great reward for his future diligence and enterprise. If the verb admitted of no participial forms, the above simple, though very complex sentence, must have remained distributed into five distinct simple sentences, requiring five nominative cases—one for each definite verb. Whereas, by the economy of participles, there is but one nominative case, and one definite verb. These two forms of the verb then, are called present and perfect participles, not because they partake of the nature of any other part of speech than the verb, but because the power of the verb expressed by them, is requisite to the completion of a certain complex purpose, which would not be effected without the union of different operative powers. Therefore, the agent being one, and his ultimate object being one, but requiring different operative powers in the progress, the incipient and successive operations are designated by participles, and the last finishing stroke is expressed in the inflected form of the verb. But where there is more than one single purpose, each separate purpose must be accomplished by the proper verb in its own inflected and definite form, as illustrated in the following example: He watches, defends, and secures his country's freedom. Here are three distinct points of attention, or separate objects of action, pertaining to freedom, each verb performing a full and entire purpose by itself. But if freedom is made the means, through which something else is to be the final result, each of the above verbs will assume its participial form, thus: Having watched, defended, and secured his country's freedom, he finally gained the respect and friendship of her enemies. Therefore, these forms of the verb have received the name of participle, from their actual participation in the production of some single and definite result, and not from any reference to other parts of speech.

Secondly of the exponent, called *preposition*. The definition hitherto given of this class of words, is not true; for they do not "connect nouns with one another, and shew the relation between them." But they shew, or point out the tendency and direction of power operating intransitively as to its effects; consequently, they give locality to, and shew the amount of that operation with regard to its effects. Therefore, they are exponents of power, and refer directly to the verb. The intransitive operations of power then, gave rise to this class of words; and a proof of this is seen in the fact, that every intransitive verb, or more properly intensive verb, becomes transitive, when one of these words is prefixed or affixed to it; thereby giving greater efficacy to a very significant word. Here then, we find the proper office, and ascertain the legitimate duty of that class of words hitherto called *prepositions*. They are the exponents of power, and give direction and locality to intensive operations, having the form either of the present and perfect participles, or the imperative form of the verb.

There are two other classes of words called *adverb* and *conjunction*, which seem to be very troublesome guests to grammarians; since we find, that no two of them agree in their classification, except in this single point: when they are in doubt, whether to call the word an adverb or a conjunction, they give it the general term *particle!* This is a very convenient alternative, since it will mean any thing, something, or nothing, just as you please. But in this shift they put themselves in the same predicament with the boy, who said, that there are eleven commandments; for, by calling certain words *particles*, they make another part of speech, increasing the catalogue to eleven.

But before we attempt to solve this difficulty, and to point out the definite office and duty of each of these three classes of words, we must take a general survey of the different objects, which words are intended to represent—differing both in their nature and presentment. The Adam and Eve, or the primogenitors of all the other parts of speech, are the *noun* and the *verb*. These are the original pillars, to which the others refer. The noun embraces existence of every kind, whether substantial or essential, considered as primary or secondary causes; or as the products of said causes. The verb, as its name signifies, embraces the effervescence or moving energy of said causes or agents. Consequently, it is the general name for operative power of every kind, which may be classed under the two general heads of *intensive verb*, and *executive verb*.

The next inquiry is, to which of these two grand pillars, do the other parts of speech severally attach themselves? I have already shewn, that four belong to the noun, and four to the verb. But there are three classes of words, viz. the adverb, preposition and conjunction, that appear not to have definite limits prescribed to them, since they often usurp each other's place in different sentences, and even that of the adjective and noun too. But this is no more, than what the adjective, noun, and verb, do among themselves. And there is no marvel in it; since we can talk of the attributes and actions of beings as matters of fact, as well as of their existence. But the actions of beings eventuate in time and place as necessarily, as they themselves exist in time and place. Consequently, when the actions and doings of persons and things are spoken of as matters of fact, or as general results, these results must be represented as having taken place in some definite point of time and position: The same words then, which are used to designate the time and place, in which beings are acting and doing, and which modify the operative energies then and there put forth, will apply, and are used to designate these circumstances, when we speak of those actions and doings as abstract results or events. But in the first instance, those words are associated with attributes and operating powers or verbs, designating the peculiar energies and modes of operation while the work is going on in time and place; but in the second instance, they are associated with the acts or names of the actions of those powers, designating the *relations* of those results *to* time and place.

Consequently, at one time, they are associated with attributes and operating verbs, and at another, with the results or nouns of the same verbs. Therefore, since beings exist in time and place, and act in time and place, the same words, which accompany power operating, and for that reason called adverbs and exponents, pointing out, not only the manner of acting, but the time and place of acting—the same words I say, will also apply to and accompany the actions of verbs, considered as events or finished results. Here is the grand secret, and the reason, that adverbs and significates sometimes assume the office and perform the duty of exponents, and even that of adjectives; and that, exponents sometimes assume the office and duty of adverbs, and even that of adjectives.

But this is not all. Persons and things possess, not only inherent attributes, which constitute them what they are in their individual characters, but there are incidental and concomitant circumstances, which apply to them while existing in time and place, or in social compact. Many of these incidental circumstances, especially those of time and place, are as clearly pointed out by their abstract *relative terms*, as by their specific terms. For instance, we often say, the *now* time, instead of the present time. We often say, the *above* considerations, instead of the foregoing considerations. We often say, the *uppermost* point, instead of the highest point. We sometimes say, they *often times* came, instead of, they often came, &c.

The fact is, that the several divisions of duration and space, in their constituent and definite parts, are expressed by nouns; as a moment, a day, a month, a year—the town, the country—Charleston, Boston, &c. But these same parts, in their abstract and relative considerations, are expressed by adverbs and exponents; as now and then, here and there, where and when, late and early, above and below, before and behind—refering to place, or before and after refering to time. Thus we find, that the constituent parts of duration and space, in their definite and specific characters, are always expressed by nouns; but in their abstract and relative considerations, they are always expressed by adverbs and exponents.

We find moreover, that duration and space, in their divisions and subdivisions, have the same economy, that belongs to the material universe in its divisions and subdivisions. The constituent and concrete parts, or individual beings, that compose the material universe, have names or nouns to designate their absolute and integral forms; but when these forms are viewed in their constituent and peculiar properties and attributes, or in their comparative aspects, these properties and attributes are expressed by terms called *adjectives*, being attached to said forms to designate their several marks of distinction, and to shew the differences belonging to, and existing between them. But these attributes and tokens of difference, though positive in degree, are indefinite in *amount;* and when they are viewed in comparison with those of other beings, they are still indefinite in amount, though comparative and superlative in degree. Thus the material universe is divided by the economy of nature into definite, concrete, and individual forms, each possessing its own peculiar properties and attributes. But by the art of man, these forms are subdivided into abstract, indefinite, relative and comparative considerations or views, which considerations or views are expressed both by adjectives, adverbs, and abstract nouns; as great, greatly, greatness—wise, wisely, wisdom.

So also universal duration, and universal space, are divided by the economy of nature into definite and specific portions, since each individual form occupies its own place and period of time; but by the art of man, these portions are subdivided into abstract, indefinite, relative, and comparative considerations or views, which are expressed by adjectives, adverbs, exponents, and abstract nouns; as present, now, here, before, and presence; remote, remotely, far from, off, beyond, and remoteness; close, closely, at, near, nigh, nearness, and closeness. Now it is very manifest, that these adverbs and exponents are relative and comparative expressions, even in their positive forms. But whatever is relative and comparative, admits of and assumes the degrees of comparison. Consequently, these adverbs and exponents assume the degrees of comparison like adjectives; for they are precisely similar expressions of the *artificial* considerations of the natural divisions of duration and space, that adjectives are of the artificial considerations of the natural divisions of the material universe. Moreover, whatever is comparative, is also external in its application; consequently, these comparative expressions apply to beings as incidental or concomitant qualities, and not as inherent attributes. Therefore, whenever adverbs and exponents are used comparatively, they assume the character of qualities, and admit the degrees of comparison, thus: Soon, sooner, soonest; often, oftener, oftenest; here, hither, hithermost; there, thither, thithermost; up, upper, uppermost; neath, nether, nethermost; near, nearer, nearest, or next; far, farther, farthest; inner, innermost, or inmost; out, outer, outermost, or utmost, &c. So also the indefinite expressions of quantity assume the degrees of comparison; as much, more, most; little, less, least, &c.; because whatever is indefinite as to its *amount*, either in extent, magnitude, capacity, value, weight, or measure, admits of, and assumes the degrees of comparison.

On the contrary, whatever is definite as to its amount in either of the above considerations, will not admit of the degrees of comparison, for the very best reason in nature, that its *amount* is certain, limited, and fixed; consequently, it cannot be comparatively increased nor diminished; as three, four, five, &c. Herein rests the whole doctrine of the comparison of adjectives; that is, in the indefiniteness of their amount, embraced in a variety of considerations. Therefore, all adjectives and adjective expressions, that are indefinite in their amount, with regard to merit, demerit, value, &c. admit of degrees of more or less of that indefinite amount; but wherever this amount is certain, fixed and limited, they will not admit of the degrees of more or less; for whatever is certain, is absolute and determinate. Here then, we see the reason why, *much* and *little*, with their inflections, take the office, and do the duty of adverbs; since they are indefinite expressions of quantity, and apply as naturally to abstract results, as to concrete beings; that is, they will qualify or graduate the indefinite amount of the attributes of beings as readily, as they do the *quantum* of their numbers. But attributes are expressed by adjectives and participles in their positive and comparative *amounts;* but the *amount* of their relative similitude and social affinity are expressed by adverbs; as great, greatly; wise, wisely, &c. Consequently, *much* and *little*, with their inflections, apply as naturally to adjectives and adverbs, as they do to nouns. But all words, that qualify or graduate the *mode* of existence, the *mode* of action, and the *mode* of similitude and affinity, are adverbs; consequently, when *much* and *little* or their inflections, qualify or graduate any of these, they are adverbs, for they fill this office; as he was much afflicted, more unhappy, most unfortunate, &c. Here too, is the reason, that *much* and *little* will qualify one another, and even their own inflections, since they are *indefinite* expressions of quantity both in their adjective and adverbial character. For example, he was much more afflicted, and much less assisted, &c.

And here let it be remembered, that the comparative consideration of things, is an entirely distinct and separate matter from the relative consideration of things; and this distinction must never be confounded, nor lost sight of. Because, comparison is an artificial contrast, but relation is a natural similitude and affinity; consequently, adverbs admit of, and assume the degrees of comparison or contrast, inasmuch as they express an *indefinite* similitude and affinity, both of essential attributes and incidental qualities; and moreover, since similitude and affinity may be in various degrees of likeness or alliance. Therefore, in their characters of relation or affinity, the adverb always has an adjective or a verb expressed, which it modifies; and the exponent always has a noun or pronoun expressed, which it controls; as he stepped *lightly* over the floor; he gradually raised his hand above his head, &c. But in their comparative characters, the adverb admits nouns after it, to which it applies, like an incidental or adventitious quality; and the exponent, instead of controling the following noun, applies to it in the same manner; as he oftentimes failed in his undertakings; he ascended to the upper floor; he has overlooked the above considerations; he ran to the outer door; he came to the inner temple, &c. But when exponents are used to denote the relative positions of time and place, considered as parts of a whole, they are adverbs performing the same duty, that the terms *now* and *then* and *here* and *there*, do; because they have laid aside their character of *specific guides*, or directors of operative power, and assumed that of general and relative position. Thus, they came *up* to the house; they went *down* to the river. The essential difference then, between an exponent and an adverb is this, that an exponent shews the tendency and direction of productive power, and gives it a definite and specific locality, as emanating from, operating in, or terminating at some fixed point of time or place; while the adverb shews the relative similitude, or natural affinity between productive powers, essential attributes, and incidental qualities; and moreover shews the general divisions of duration and space; as where, when, now, then, here, there, &c.

Here we see the reason why, an exponent having assumed the character of an adverb, receives another exponent after it; and also why an adverb of time and place, will admit an exponent to precede it; since it is a general term for a specific name. Here too we see the reason and propriety of substituting the term exponent for that of preposition; since they are really and truly attendants on the verb, and will legitimately terminate a sentence, as seen in the following exponents, viz: from, with, to, at, for, by, in, of, out, under, &c.

For example: Where have you come from? What are you thinking of? Whom did you vote for? Whom shall we go to? &c. Transposed thus: From where have you come? Of what are you thinking? For whom did you vote? To whom shall we go?

The word *where* being the abstract relative term for the word *place*, takes its office, and sustains the same affection, that the noun does. And being moreover, a contraction of two words, when resolved, reads thus: From what place have you come? *Where* then, is derived from the two Latin words *quæ area;* meaning, what place? This is evident from the old English spelling of *where*, thus, whare and quhare. And an evidence of the origin of adverbs, as has been stated, is seen in the fact, that their syllabic termination *ly*, used to be written *like;* and many of our adjectives coming from nouns, still retain this termination, as godlike, workmanlike, &c.

Having shewn the origin of the adverb and exponent, we will now seek for that of the significate, hitherto called conjunction. I said, that there is a vast difference between relation and comparison; that is, between considering or viewing the attributes of beings, their productive powers and various effects, with regard to their relative similitude and social affinity, and considering or viewing these same particulars with regard to their comparative *amount*, which may be the same or different in number, value, strength or variety, as possessed by different beings. The former consideration embraces similitude and affinity, but the latter consideration embraces the comparative *amount* of those particulars in different beings. Therefore, in the comparative *amount* of attributes of powers and of effects, in their number, strength, value, and variety, rests the origin of the significate. And an evidence of this is seen in the fact, that all comparative sentences, whether of the noun, adjective, pronoun, or adverb, require the same parts of speech to follow the *contrasting significate*, that precede it; and in whatever case these preceding nouns or pronouns are, the following ones have the same; and if the preceding sensentence collates an adjective or an adverb, the succeeding one will and must be in the positive degree; for the comparison is made with regard, either to the unlike amount of the *same* thing in *different* beings, or to the unlike amount of *different* things in the *same* being. Therefore, comparative or contrasted *amount* gave birth to the significate.

Moreover it has been shewn, that the comparison of adjectives, adverbs and exponents, rests in the *indefiniteness* of their *amount*. That, contrast or comparison of results gave birth to the significate, is clearly shewn in the meaning of the words, but, although, yet, nevertheless, neither nor, either or, notwithstanding, &c.

A full development has now been given of the origin, nature, office and duty of each and all the parts of speech used in forming sentences. Reasons also have been given why, when, and where one part of speech assumes the office and duty of another.

The definite limits of each part of speech being clearly set forth, it now remains for the reader to use his own judgment in choosing words to fill these offices, when he forms sentences himself, taking care to give his nouns, pronouns and verbs, their proper inflections with regard to form, tense, number, person, gender, and case. And when he has made himself familiar with these inflections, which are very few in English, he will be able not only to form sentences himself, but to resolve those framed by others, and to judge of their *accordance* with, or violation of grammatical construction, and syntactical arrangement. And here let it be remembered, that there is a great difference between the grammatical construction of words in a sentence, and the syntactical construction of it. There is just the same difference between these two operations, that there is between equipping soldiers for the engagement, and drawing them up in their proper lines of battle array. Those sentences hitherto given us as examples of false *syntax*, are neither more nor less, than examples of false *grammar;* for in them the noun, pronoun and verb, have not been written or spelled as they should have been, to suit their office and relation. But the direct object of syntactical construction is the proper *arrangement* of words in sentences, according to their relation to, and influence over one another.

The office and duty of the several parts of speech which compose a sentence, cannot be too carefully studied; for sentential perspicuity depends on the due order of relation which words claim for themselves according to their sentential office; and this office in English is materially affected by the wrong collocation of words, as seen in the following sentence, thus: "Society has been materially affected by *their influence* of example." I cannot see why example put forth by them should have any peculiar influence over the same examples put forth by others. But the author doubtless meant, that society had been materially affected by the influence of *their* example.

In English the *collocation* of words in a sentence is of primary importance; and it may be said to constitute sentential perspicuity, inasmuch as the definite and true meaning of a sentence very much depends upon it. The following is a very palpable error, which modern writers are guilty of, in the use of the appellative word *Miss.* For example, the "*Misses Baring*," meaning two females of this name. It is like saying, the *peas-pole*, instead of, the pea-poles; or the *seas wave*, instead of, the sea waves.

Much has been said about perspicuity, and rules are laid down to guide us in this matter. But, if a writer or speaker, has not a clear and definite object before his mind, rules will be of little use; for they will be teaching colors to a blind man. Hence the reason, that many persons make a long *talk* without saying any thing; that is, without describing any definite object. But, to those who have eyes to see objects when presented, and wish to know their constituent *parts*, their relative construction and affinity to each other, a few observations on order and method may be of service.

Every general system, every particular department, every individual being, or its constituent part, whether created or propagated, has its beginning, progress, and completion. Every thing constructed has its component parts. These parts have their primary and subordinate offices assigned them; therefore, they stand related to each other either by similitude and affinity, or by association established in definite and fixed grades of order and succession. Consequently, he who treats of a subject, must treat of it either as a component part of a single one, or as a single one of many individuals. But, if he treats only of a component part of a single one, or of a single one of an association, he will give us no practical knowledge; for the *use* of a thing is rendered available only by knowing what belongs to it as a whole. Therefore, whether you speak or write, let your main subject be some definite *whole*, with regard to its subdivisions or particular parts. Hence then we discover, that perspicuity is naturally divided into two departments, viz, subject perspicuity, and sentential perspicuity. And first, of perspicuity of subject. Begin with the discussion of your subject where nature, or the artisan began in its formation, if you are treating on the physiology or science of it. But if you are discussing only its external form and appearance, begin with the most prominent parts or features of it, and follow the regular order and succession, which bind the several parts into one whole. For example, if your subject is that of an animal, let the figure and size of it first be given—next, the head, body, limbs, and extremities. This constitutes perspicuity of subject. The next is sentential perspicuity or clearness of expression. This embraces the choice of appropriate words, and their sentential arrangement according to their mutual relation and dependences.

And although the office and duty of all the parts of speech, have already been discussed, yet, in order to give the reader a more distinct and definite view of the whole matter, and to impress upon his mind the truth and importance of what has been said, I will now give a summary of the foregoing illustrations on the parts of speech. This will enable him to see more clearly the force and application of the rules appended to this lecture.

And first, the noun and the verb are the two grand naked pillars of a sentence, sharing between them the remaining eight parts of speech.

The article selects out and points to some individual or specific class of objects, which constitutes a part of the general group embraced by the entire discourse.

The adjective originated in the separate view, and special inspection of objects, with regard to what each possesses, and denotes their essential attributes and incidental qualities, whether these objects are taken as operative agents, as recipient subjects, or as subsidiary appendages.

The pronoun is a substitute for the specific noun, which is given to persons and things in either of the foregoing situations, and refers to the one which is the immediate object of attention.

The interjection selects out some specific object of the general group, with marked attention either of praise or blame, or of wonder or dread. Here we have the noun standing alone with *unqualified* decorations. But when the verb is superadded, accompanied with all its official train of modifiers, the noun and its decorations undergo a variety of changes and modifications.

The verb and its participles apply to the noun, either as an agent, as a recipient subject, or as a subsidiary appendage, designating its operative powers, passive submission, or tributary aid.

The adverb originating in relative similitude and natural affinity, qualifies, not only operative powers and adjective decorations, but even its own modifications.

The exponent originated in the necessary connection between relative existence, and duration and space; and it belongs to the verb, expressed or implied, and gives direction and locality to its intensive operations, by pointing out the place whence its power proceeds, the place where its power acts, or the place whither its power tends and finally terminates.

The significate originated in artificial contrast, and it denotes the relative amount, comparative difference, or special conclusion, arising from said comparison.

Recapitulation of the foregoing Lecture.

From what has been said on the nature of cause and effect, and also on the intimate relation subsisting between them, as being the true foundation on which the proper construction of sentences depends, the following conclusion is the natural result, that a set of rules ought to be formed, serving not only as a summary of all the arguments, but also, as a guide in directing the mind to the separate principles, on which different words are always adjusted in a piece of good composition. But, before I begin with a detailed account, in the form of rules, I will recapitulate the important items, that have been adduced as the groundwork of the entire system.

And these are first—Cause and effect, the two grand pillars, upon which the whole fabric rests. Second—Individuality of being, power and the operation of power, the three grand essential properties of being considered as a cause. Third—Time, place and number, the consequent results, that accompany primitive effects, and are the constant attendants on all secondary causes and effects. Fourth—The variously modified ingredients entering into the composition of physical beings, and belonging to them as a part of their being, are qualities, the integral adjustment of which, constitutes physical power, known by the general names of property, capacity, or faculty; and the operative energy of either and all of which, are expressed in the terms of might, ability, strength or force. Fifth—All physical beings becoming agents, or secondary causes, possess, in some limited degree the three grand requisites, that pertain to and constitute a cause. Sixth—The effects of the primogenitive cause, assume the character of second person in contradistinction to the first person, which belongs to the generator as father of his own effects. Seventh—The effects of secondary causes, acquire the character of third person, not from the relation to their own immediate cause, but from their relation to the primitive or any other cause, they being the result of a delegated or secondary power. Eighth—The effects of secondary causes, acquire the character of the three persons, whenever they become productive causes, inasmuch as every direct cause is the author of his own effects. Ninth—A single sentence may be fully expressed in two, or at most, three words, according to the nature of the verb as being intransitive or transitive; and these are its essential parts, under the terms of nominative, verb and object or effect. Tenth—When either of these essential parts, has a qualifying or an explanatory phrase accompanying it, the sentence becomes mixed or complex, in a greater or less degree, according to the number of qualifying terms, or explanatory phrases; but it is still a single sentence. Eleventh—When a sentence contains more than one of each of these essential parts, it becomes a compound one, formed by means of connecting words, called conjunctions and adverbs of time and place; or by the reflective influence of those pronouns, denominated relative.

But before this article can be fully understood, it will be necessary to explain the different properties of *conjunctions* and *adverbs;* the different ways in which they affect a sentence; and the different offices belonging to different conjunctions. Perhaps no part of grammatical economy is less understood, or at least, has been more loosely defined, than the character and office of conjunctions and adverbs. This appears to be a fair deduction, since we find grammarians talking about *disjunctive conjunctions*,—that is, a separating union. This incongruity of expression must have arisen, either from inadvertency, or from a want of discernment of the difference between the signification of a word as a term of language, and the connection it has, or the part it performs in making up a sentence. This difference however, so real, so prominent, and so necessary to be borne in mind, I have never seen even hinted at.

The word *but*, has been called a *disjunctive conjunction*, and it is said to express opposition in meaning.—Waiving the absurdity of the definition, I would ask, does *but* express *opposition* in meaning? It is true, that language recognizes the variety of circumstances and the contrasted conditions, in which beings exist and act; but its grammar never recognizes diversity of action as one of the principles, upon which its sentences are formed and combined into periods. The same agent is often represented in the same sentence, as performing acts diametrically opposite in their effects; but this has nothing to do with the joining of sentences together. That opposition, which language recognizes as affecting her sentences, is found in the terms *affirmation* and *negation.* Language declares, announces and denounces,—affirms and denies,—condemns and acquits,—either in positive or in negative strains; and consequently, it has terms of affirmation and negation—of assent and dissent. The word *but* however, belongs not to the class of negative terms. It is used both as a conjunction and as an adverb; and in either case, it is a term of specification, designation and limitation, and belongs to this class of words, which are quite numerous—such as however, only, although, yet, moreover, besides, therefore, wherefore, &c.

And here I will notice the words *therefore* and *wherefore,* inasmuch as they are of such frequent use, especially in mathematics. The definitions given to them either in dictionaries or geometry, point out no such distinctive difference as to enable the tyro to apply them understandingly, by knowing when to use the one in preference to the other. They are both short declaratory preludes to sequence or consequence, resulting from the comparison of premises or data. The essential distinctive difference between the two words is this:—*Therefore* is used, when the consequence follows from premises taken in their natural and fixed condition and relation, without any previous alteration, modification, or limitation of them. The comparison is made by presenting objects of a physical, moral, or intellectual nature, just as they exist, and as their relations to each other, are pointed out; consequently, there, in that relation and natural condition, and for that reason, or therefore, the conclusion follows. But *wherefore* is used, when the premises have undergone some previous adjustment, and been limited to a specific condition, where, whence, why, wherefore it is, that the conclusion follows. They stand related to each other in point of comparison, just as *theorem* and *problem* do in point of illustration or argumentation. The essential difference between a *theorem* and a *problem* is this, that when we compare principles in their natural habitude and condition, and theorize upon them in this natural condition, as data or premises belonging either to the material, moral, or intellectual world, and thus discern their influences over, or relations to one another, we form a deduction which is called a *theorem.* We do the same thing in a problem, after we have problemated the premises or data; that is, after we have brought the premises to certain conditions, and adjusted their relations under those conditions. So that, we really and truly *theorize* in a problem, as well as in a theorem. But to return to the subject of conjunctions.

A conjunction in its sentential or *general* application, serves to connect single sentences together; but a conjunction in its *particular* application, serves to unite or couple together two or more nominative cases, two or more verbs, or two or more objective cases; and in either instance, the sentence is compounded by it. For, when two or more agents are coupled together under distinct names, the verb belongs to each severally—making as many single sentences, as there are nominated agents. So also, if two or more verbs are united by a copulate, though there is but one agent, yet each verb expresses a distinct act, thereby predicating of the agent as many acts, as there are verbs. Consequently, each verb claims the agent; wherefore it becomes a single sentence, having all the essential parts—and therefore, full and complete. The same is the case, when there are two or more objects of the verb, or effects, which the agent has wrought through the verb.

The conjunction, which has this coupling capacity, performs a double function—one of a general and one of a peculiar nature—and will expand or contract a sentence according to the nature of the parts of speech, which are united by it. If these are epithets or qualities belonging to either of the three essential parts, the sentence is thereby lengthened by the multiplication of terms, and made a complex one; but it still preserves its singleness, there being only three essential parts. So on the contrary, if the words coupled together are nouns, or verbs, these being essential parts of a sentence, there is a contraction or suppression of the other components, thereby lessening the number of items in the composition, which must be supplied when this compound sentence is resolved into its single or component sentences.

In fine, this conjunction acts the double part of multiplication and division, just as the case may require a detailed account of particulars pertaining to an agent and his actions; or a general and combined narrative of many individuals in the same predicament. Every language has one at least. The word in English, on which this duty falls, is the conjunction *and*. The use and importance of this little word, are fully illustrated in the following sentences:

"Virtue and vice are opposite moral qualities." In this example, by uniting the two subjects *virtue* and *vice*, the sentence is curtailed one-half, and still its meaning is as clear and distinct, as it would be, if expressed at full length, thus: "As virtue is a moral quality opposite to vice, so vice is a moral quality opposite to virtue."

"James and John study geography." Here John is united to James by the coupling word *and*, thereby causing John to participate in the same course of action, that is predicated of James, in the verb *study*, which is therefore in the plural form. Now, if the conjunction *and* had no other property, than what is common to all conjunctions, that is, the office of connecting single sentences, the above example must have been twice as long,—thus: "James studies geography, and John studies geography."

The following is an example of the extending or protracting power of *and*, thereby rendering a simple sentence complex, but not compounding it: "A wise, discreet, prudent, and cautious man avoids difficulties." Or thus:— "A wise and discreet, a prudent and cautious man avoids difficulties."

Twelfth—The adjective and participle, since they appertain to cause and effect, have the same modifications of number and person, gender and case, that belong to those beings, to which they refer.

Thirteenth—The pronoun being a substitute for the noun, and consequently its representative, has of course, all the attributes of its original.

Fourteenth—Time, place and number, and the manner of action, being the concomitants of cause and effect, sustain a variety of parts. Sometimes they appear as mere contingent appendages, and then they are clothed in an adverbial dress. Sometimes they appear as part of the retinue, acting as pioneers in clearing the way and giving direction and locality to the route; and then they are clothed in their own native dignity as nouns, rendering essential service to cause and effect. For example,—

"Behold, I shew you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a *moment*, in the *twinkling* of an eye, at the last *trump:* for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed," &c.

Again: Time, place, and number, often drop their own, and assume the names of *measure*, *distance*, and *value*. Under these names they appear to have successfully eluded the observation of grammarians, if we may judge by the rules given for measure, distance, and value. These terms are nothing more than modifications of time, place, and number; and whatever rules apply to those, may with equal propriety be applied to these.

Having given a summary of cause and effect—their variously modified attributes, together with their diversified condition—I will now present a catalogue of RULES, shewing the grammatical construction of words, and their syntactical office in a sentence, with regard to their relation to, agreement with, and government of one another. But, in order that the reader may have a proper understanding of this matter, I will make a few observations on the nature of *syntax*.

Syntax teaches the respective order, rank, office and duty of words arranged in sentences and periods, under certain grammatical or orthographical forms, which they receive in consequence of their control over, agreement with, or relation to each other, corresponding to the same affections, which belong to, and exist between those realities, whose representatives words are. And the rules of syntax are specific declarations of this government, agreement, and relation, which belong severally to those grammatical forms.

Syntax appears not to have been well understood in its essential and legitimate office as applied to language. It has been represented as teaching us, *how* to dispose of an agent and his actions; *how* to construct a sentence in which are united an agent, his power, and the effects of power; *how* to arrange all these in connection with the diversified circumstances of manner, time, and place. But syntax has no such power—no such authority; neither does its office pertain to any such duties. The great First Cause has previously disposed and adjusted all these matters for it, by creating secondary causes under the head of elementary principles of mind and matter; and he has moreover, given to these uniform laws of action, whose effects result as invariably and as inseparably from their operations, as the identity of a being is inseparable from his existence. The legitimate office of syntax then, consists in announcing to us, the several items of rank and duty belonging to words in this established order, and the consequent necessity of each word conforming to its own rank by assuming its proper badge of office.

But as it happens in all human institutions, that the same individual is often required to act a double part; so in sentences syntax has a further duty to discharge, by announcing when and where, any individual word in these exhibitions, has laid aside for a moment its own official duty, to perform the part of another. Thus we see, that syntax has no power natural or acquired, to alter, change, or to adjust words in a sentence under any other arrangement whatever, different from that fixed order, rank and relation, which are established for it in the economy of nature. Therefore, its whole and entire office is confined and limited to the exercise of announcing the name, office and duty of each and all the words in a sentence, drawn up in due order of array, in their several *lines* of action.

If the following RULES on the structure of sentences, are carefully studied and strictly attended to, in their illustrations, they will be found to give *reasons* for the inflections of the verb, noun, and pronoun; and to shew that reciprocal influence, which words have over each other in forming a sentence.

These RULES moreover, will be found to contain directions, that are as applicable to the formation of sentences, as to the resolution of one already formed. They embrace the whole doctrine of the structure of sentences by the different parts of speech.

RULES OF SYNTAX,

Showing the legitimate office and duty of each of the parts of speech in forming a sentence, and also giving the reasons, why one part of speech sometimes sustains the office and performs the duty of another.

RULE 1. The articles are placed before nouns and adjectives to restrict and specify their application—as man, universal; a man, individual; the man, or the men, specific; the wise, the good, &c.

RULE 2. The subject of the verb controls it in number and in person—as I write, thou writest, he, she, or it writes, &c.

RULE 3. The verb agrees with its subject noun in number and person, because its subject controls it in these respects—as I write, thou writest, &c.

RULE 4. Adjectives, pronouns and participles, agree with their respective nouns in number, person, and gender; as high hills, deep valleys; this man, that woman; the letter is written; the trees are blooming, &c.

RULE 5. Adverbs modify verbs, participles, adjectives, and other adverbs—as he walks slowly; the cold is very piercing; the man is very well known, &c.

RULE 6. Executive verbs and their participles control the objective case—as peace rewards her followers; virtue has many charms, &c.

RULE 7. The indefinite form is controled by verbs, participles, adjectives, nouns, and pronouns—as he will learn; I intend to write; James is learning to read; we are free to act; they desired him to write, &c.

RULE 8. The exponents control the objective case—as he has a book full of pictures; they are desirous of praise; he went to church, &c.

RULE 9. Adjectives of distance, extent, capacity, magnitude, and value, control the objective case of those nouns of number, which define and specify their amount—as the city is distant 10 miles; the boat is 90 feet long; the wall is 15 feet high; the knife is worth a dollar; the floor is 12 feet square; the ice is 1 foot thick, &c.

RULE 10. Nouns and pronouns control each other in the possessive case—as man's happiness; one's poverty; another's glory; whose fault is it? &c.

RULE 11. The exponent *of* frequently controls the possessive case of personal pronouns—as this is none of mine, but it is one of his; the sheep are none of yours, but they are some of theirs, &c.

RULE 12. Many verbs control two cases—one objective and one possessive, or two objective cases—as he gave me mine, and I gave him his; the professor teaches us philosophy, &c.

RULE 13. Some verbs control the possessive case of personal pronouns—as James and I studied our lessons together; and I heard him say his, and he heard me recite mine. But differing about our books, we parted: so I gave him leave to take his, and he permitted me to keep mine.

The reason and philosophy of this rule rest in the following consideration, viz. that persons and things have mutual and reciprocal relations; consequently there is a close and intimate connection between them. Therefore, if property is expressed in its own name, it requires that of its owner too. But its owner's name, whether pronominal or proper, must be expressed, either in the objective or possessive case; because its own will be expressed in the nominative case. But the possessive case alone indicates possession; consequently, if its own name is suppressed, the possessive case of its owner must be expressed, and controled by the executive verb. Therefore, we find language following the footsteps of nature, in all her apparently devious walks. These observations will apply and point out the reasons for all the new rules introduced into this syntax, as in the case of the exponent controling the possessive case of the personal pronoun, since the property name would be in the objective case, if expressed; and so of the rest.

RULE 14. Two or more nouns refering to the same person or thing, are associated in the same case—as Paul the apostle, a Grecian by birth, made many converts to christianity, the exaltation and glory of human nature, &c.

Rule 15. The exponents *from* and *at*, followed immediately either by an adjective, adverb, another exponent, or by another exponent with its own object, control these terms and phrases in the objective case, just as they would their own legitimate nouns; for these are the *definitions* of said nouns, and stand as their representatives; consequently, they must sustain the same office, and experience the same affection or control, that their constituent nouns would do, if expressed. For example,—

"He went from *thence* to York, from *whence* he arrived *here* in two days. He came from below, from above, from afar. He ran at once, at large, at first, at last, &c. Kick the dog out, *from* under the table; draw the veil *from* before her eyes; the sound came *from* over our heads, *from* within, *from* without," &c.

These terms and phrases are used as *definitions* of time and place, or *position;* therefore, they ought to sustain the office and experience the affections, that their constituent nouns would, if expressed.

And here let the reader remember that, by these new rules with their illustrations, he has not only been taken over the *pons assinorum*, (bridge of asses,) but also, that a way has been paved solid and abiding over the many quagmires in which grammarians have hitherto stuck, or attempted to overleap.

Rule 16. Nouns and pronouns affected and controled by an executive verb, have adjectives following them, which indicate the amount of that affection, and agree with them—as pound the salt *fine;* scrape the bark smooth; draw the cord tight, &c.

Rule 17. The constituent pronouns *who*, *which* and *that*, refer to their conjugates, and agree with them in gender, number and person—as I, who speak the truth; or I am the man, who speaks the truth.

These constituent pronouns serve to define their conjugate subjects, and to form the second clause of a sentence otherwise incomplete and indefinite in sense.

Rule 18. The correlative significates associate sentences, but they do not compound them—as either he, or his brother will be here to-morrow; neither heat, nor cold seems to affect him, &c.

Rule 19. The copulate significate *and*, unites two or more adjectives to the same noun or pronoun; two or more nouns or pronouns in the same case; and two or more verbs of the same form but of different tenses, to the same subject—as a great *and* good man; a qualified, judicious *and* skilful teacher; the letter has been written *and* put into the office; he read, explained *and* commented on the law; he was anxious to see his relations, friends *and* neighbors; the real patriot consults, watches *and* defends the honor of his country, the glory of his nation, *and* the prosperity of his people; he has done it, *and* will do it again, &c.

When there are more than two words to be connected by *and*, a comma is used in its place, except between the two last words.

RULE 20. Nouns and pronouns united by the copulate *and*, have verbs, nouns and pronouns in the plural number following them, and refering to them—as James and John are good scholars; he and she were school-mates; Peter and Thomas are the ones, who caused this disturbance.

RULE 21. Nouns and pronouns used as terms of address, or as terms of designation, are in the nominative case absolute—as I am well pleased, John, with your conduct; Boston, that is a fine mercantile town; wisdom, that word has many charms. Also when they are accompanied by an interjection—as O peace! delightful guest! &c.

RULE 22. Nouns or pronouns having one, or both participles accompanying them, are in the nominative case independent, when no definite verb belongs to them—as winter being past, spring puts forth her tender leaves; the weather being cold, vegetation is checked; anger having spent its rage, the body is left languid, &c.

RULE 23. The articles placed before adjectives and participles, convert them into adjective and participial nouns; for, they give them the character of concrete terms; as the great, the good, the wise, the virtuous; the teacher gave us a *scolding;* the *teaching* of grammar is difficult; he has a *longing* after riches, &c.

RULE 24. The significate *than*, has adverbs, adjectives, nouns, pronouns and participles following it; and they correspond to those preceding words, with which they are contrasted; that is, if the preceding conjugate word is an adjective, this succeeding word will be an adjective; if a noun, this will be a noun, &c. And in whatever *case* the nent and a significate; and also, for the further purpose of illustrating the reason, that the present participle is often converted into an exponent or a significate. *Notwithstanding* in this example is thought to be an exponent, or what is called a preposition, but it is not; nor does it ever assume that office and duty. But it is always either a participle, or a significate called conjunction. In the example cited, it is a participle agreeing with inattention, as I hope to make evident in the resolution of the sentence thus:—He is quite a good scholar under apparent adverse circumstances. What are these? Why, apparent inattention; which however, does not countervail his mental powers so much, as to prevent him from becoming quite a good scholar. Therefore, *notwithstanding* is a present participle agreeing with *inattention*, whose inefficiency it designates; consequently, *inattention* is in the nominative case independent. So also in the following example it is a participle:—Notwithstanding the great confusion at first, order was soon restored; that is, the great confusion, though opposing, was not sufficient to prevent the restoration of order.

The following observations will shew the reason, that present participles ever become exponents. Although they always express power active, and operating either intensively or executively, yet sometimes they have no definite subjects expressed, to which they apply as exponents of their power. When this is the case, they express the operation of their verbs generally, and without any particular application; and then they always have a noun or pronoun following them, over which they preside as exponents, indicating or rather dictating whether or not, the following noun or pronoun shall be classed with the effects of the preceding verb. For example,—I acted *according* to your instructions. Here the exponent *according to*, claims for the verb *acted*, the noun instructions, under which the power expressed by the verb *acted*, was exercised.

Again;—This story will cause some disturbance, supposing your account to be true. Here the effects of the verb *cause* expressed by the noun *disturbance*, is qualified by the participial exponent *supposing*, and held by it in suspense, till truth shall establish its result. Once more: I succeeded in every attempt, except or excepting two. Here the effect of the verb *succeeded*, denoted by the phrase *every attempt*, is diminished in its amount, by the exponent *except* or *excepting*, which is literally and truly a controler of the adjective noun *two* in the objective case.

Now, when these participles have definite subjects expressed, whose attributes they denote, they agree with them as participles, thus maintaining their primitive character. In all cases however, where present participles have a negative particle prefixed to them, they *precede* their subjects; for they are *affirmative* declarations of *inefficient* power, and not *negative* declarations of *efficient* power. But placed after their subjects they would become *negative* expressions of *efficient* power, if no qualifying phrase intervened, such as *to the contrary* or some other, thus:—He is quite a good scholar, his apparent inattention to the contrary notwithstanding. Leave out the phrase *to the contrary*, and you have a complete contradiction in terms, thus:—He is quite a good scholar, his apparent inattention notwithstanding; as it now reads, inattention is no obstacle to his improvement.

Again:—He finally gained his point, great opposition to the contrary notwithstanding. Leave out the phrase *to the contrary*, and the two clauses of the sentence contradict each other thus:—He finally gained his point, great opposition notwithstanding; as it now reads, great *opposition not opposing*.

From the foregoing illustration, we discover the origin, definite office and duty of any exponent whatever. They indicate, expose, and point out the tendency and direction of any operative power going forth; and give locality and amount to its actions and results. They are therefore, exponents of those verbs, called intransitive or neuter. This class of words is derived directly, or indirectly from verbs, which is proved in the word *at*; since this word is neither more nor less, than the perfect participle of the verb *add* contracted, as many others are. For instance, mean, meant; send, sent; lend, lent, &c. The Latin word *ad*, means tendency, direction, &c. And our word *at* means the same thing, and is derived from add; as add, added, adt, and at. The letters D and T are interchangeable, as also the letters P and F.

The propriety of introducing the term exponent for that of preposition, and the term significate for that of conjunction, must I think, appear manifest to every one after reading what has been said on the subject. But, if it should be asked, why I changed the word *and*, seeing it is a conjunction in every sense of the word? To this I answer, that *and* has a peculiar claim to the term, since it is a *copulate* significate; for the word is properly a verb in the imperative mode or *form*, and literally means—add, yield, concede, allow, permit, &c.; as in this example,—James and (add, concede) John study their lessons.

Therefore, that mixed and motley brood of words, (hitherto called *insignificant*, or without meaning by themselves,) can be distinctly and intelligibly arranged under the names of *adverb*, *exponent*, and *significate;* and they will moreover, be found to *signify* much, and to add much to the order, symmetry, strength, force, import, harmony, and beauty of their primitive heads, or parent stock,—much I say, in all these respects to each severally, and to both jointly.

In order to illustrate more forcibly the nature and office of each part of speech in a sentence, I will give a few examples more; inasmuch as "*practice* makes perfect."

Since the noun and the verb are the Adam and Eve of all the other parts of speech, they are severally affected by these members or progeny. As I have said before, the noun embraces existence of every kind, whether visible and tangible, or invisible and essential; and whether these nouns refer to primary, or secondary causes, or to the products of said causes. So the verb, as its name signifies, embraces the operating energy of these causes; consequently, it is the general term for power of every kind,—which I have classed under the two grand heads of *intensive* verb and *executive* verb.

All words, that in any way affect the noun in form, shape, size, appearance, force, or beauty, belong to it as adjectives or participles. These may be divided into two kinds—primitive *attributes*, and accidental qualities. The essential adjectives, which are the attributes or constituent properties of a being, are different from those accidental qualities, which arise from time, place, number, and the operation of the being's own power. These qualities however, are often expressed by nouns in the possessive case, or by nouns in the objective case preceded by an exponent thus: His virtue, or the virtue of him; man's virtue, or the virtue of man. An old man, or a man of years; a wise man, or a man of wisdom, &c.

These accidental qualities moreover, are sometimes signified by *adverbs* and exponents, which are then called adjectives, thus: The *above* considerations; the under floor; the *hither* post, &c. The whole family of adverbs, exponents, and significates, are more intimately connected with the verb, than they are with the noun; inasmuch as the verb is directly or indirectly the mother of them. Consequently, as a family distinction, a large portion of them bear her name,—to wit: Adverb, meaning, added to the verb. Now power, that is, the verb, acts in time and place, and the verb makes and unmakes in time and place; the verb increases and diminishes in time and place; enlarges and lessens, changes and modifies in time and place, whatever comes within its influence.

All those words then, retain the name of adverb, which have direct reference to the verb exercising its energies in the production of these changes and results, in time and place.

Therefore, all those words bearing the name of adverb, denote either the *manner*, in which the verb exercises its power, or the abstract qualities of duration and space, in which the verb has operated, is operating, and will operate; as now and then; here and there; heretofore and hereafter. Now, all those adverbs which express the *manner* of the verb's operating power (the verb itself expresses the kind of power,) ought to be placed next to the verb, either immediately before, or immediately after it. The importance of this truth will appear in the correction of the following sentence:—"Tell your father, that I would like to see him very much." Here the adverbs *very much*, are carried as far as possible from their mothers. I say mothers, for, in this sentence there are two verbs, that share these adverbs between them; and these verbs are *would* and *like*. To be sure, we like very much, and we see very much; but we *will* very much both these results. In the first place, I will share them between the verbs *like* and *see*, thus:—Tell your father, that I would like very much to see him. Now, the sight of his friend would not create a liking, but would satisfy that desire already existing; therefore, the phrase ***very much*** should be placed between the verbs ***would*** and ***like***, to indicate the ***amount*** of satisfaction, that would arise from gratifying a desire now existing,—as tell your father, that I would very much like to see him.

From what has been shewn, I think it very possible to fix on some rules, which will guide us in determining on the distinction, that exists between adverbs, significates and exponents; or rather, rules, which will direct us in classifying words belonging to this common family under their proper heads.

And first, a rule for adverbs. If the word or words have a direct reference by their signification (and there was never a word without one) to the ***manner*** in which power operates, it is an adverb,—as slowly, swiftly; weakly, strongly, &c.

Or, if they are the abstract names of time and place, as here and there, now and then, they belong to this class.

Secondly, a rule for significates. If the word or words have direct reference by their signification to contingent, relative, or concomitant circumstances, arising from possibility, change, chance, or from the contrasted similitude in quantity, quality, or in relationship of any kind, they belong to the class of significates,—as but, nevertheless, though, although, moreover, seeing that, provided that, supposing that, considering that, neither nor, either or, than, ***that***, taken in the sense of, to wit—as I said, that he would come; that is, he would come, I said ***that***. The word ***that*** is used in two senses, to wit: it refers either to preceding matter, and then it is a pronoun; or it refers to succeeding matter, and then it is a significate. And first, as a pronoun,—You have missed your aim by your own rashness; and I told you so, or I told you that. Secondly, as significate,—I desire, that you should desist from your importunities. Here ***that*** refers to the sentence, which follows it.

LECTURE 6.

THE PARSING OR RESOLUTION OF SENTENCES.

Having shown the formation or construction of sentences, the next question is, what is meant by parsing a sentence? The answer to this question is, that, to parse a sentence means, to resolve it into its elementary parts of speech, and to account for its *construction;* or in other words, to parse a sentence means, to take each word in order, beginning at the first; tell what class it belongs to; give its sentential inflection, if it has any; and show its office and duty; that is, its relation to, agreement with, or government of some other word in the sentence. Reasons for this relation, agreement and government, are specified in a set of rules, called Rules of Syntax, or putting together. Thus it appears, that the phrase "parsing grammar," includes in it, analysis and synthesis, or taking to pieces and putting together again.

A clear understanding of the nature of a sentence, considered in the character of cause and effect—its two grand pillars—will now be attempted. The names of the several parts of speech are these, to wit: The article, noun, adjective, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, exponent, significate, and interjection. A description of the nature, office, and duty of each of these parts of speech, has already been given. They will now be discussed in their several inflections and sentential arrangement. The names and definitions of some of these parts of speech, will be found to differ from those generally given by grammarians. This however, has not been done for the sake of novelty or singularity, but solely for the benefit of the learner. A clear and appropriate definition of its elements, is of primary importance in the study of every science or art. More perplexity is experienced by students from the vagueness of definitions given to the elements of science, than in the abstruseness of their application and use. It is in science and art, as it is in every thing else. When we become acquainted with the several component parts of a piece of complicated machinery, the mystery of its construction is dissolved. And the very use of language is to describe to others, not merely what they already know, but also to convey to them a knowledge of what they do not know, or at least, have a very faint conception of; and this is one of its primary objects. Consequently, by the means of language oral and written, we come to the knowledge of persons and things, that are absent, precisely as we should do, if they were present before our eyes.

In English there are two articles, *a* or *an* and *the*. The article *a* becomes *an*, placed before words beginning with a vowel or silent consonant,—as an hour, an honest man. It has been called the *indefinite* article, but very improperly; for it is as limited in its application, as it possibly can be; since it only appears before nouns in the singular number, or before words representing one entire object,—as a score, a thousand. Therefore, I call it the restrictive article, because it restricts the noun to the singular form. The notion that, it is indefinite because it applies to any single object indiscriminately, is a false notion of its true office; for it is not more indiscriminate in its application, than the article *the* is, and not half so general and unlimited. The article *the* is the *specific* article, because it points out a single object, or a class of objects, that have either been considered, or are now desired to be considered or noticed,—as *the* men fought like cats and dogs; but *the* women were more civil.

A noun is the name of any object of thought, person, place, or thing,—as hope, fear, man, tree, Wheeling, penknife, &c. Any word or part of speech becomes a noun, when we make it a subject of conversation or discussion. To nouns belong number and person, gender and case. Properly speaking, they are all of the third person; but when a person or thing is addressed by name, he is said to be in the second person by apostrophe, or address.

There are three relative considerations of persons and things, under which they are said to be in the first, second, or third person; that is, when a person speaks of himself, he uses the capital letter *I*, called a pronoun, which means, for the noun: when he speaks *to* another person, he uses the word *thou*, second person; but when he speaks of persons and things under their general or proper names, or under the words *he*, *she*, or *it*, they are said to be in the third person. These five words then, *I*, *thou*, *he*, *she* and *it*, are called personal pronouns, because they are used to denote those three relations, which beings stand in to one another in conversation. *He*, *she* and *it*, are used to denote the genders of persons, animals, &c.

Nouns have two numbers, singular and plural. The singular number refers to one object, but the plural form embraces more than one. Such nouns, as form the plural number by adding *s* to the singular, are called regular nouns; those, that form their plural differently, are called irregular,—as *man*, singular, and *men*, plural; but *tree*, *trees*,—*house*, *houses*, &c. are regular. All nouns or names, that belong to individual persons, places, or things, are called proper,—such as James, Wheeling, Ohio, &c.; but those, that apply to one or many of the same kind, are called common,—as hand, feet, hills and valleys.

Person has been described above, as consisting of first, second and third, according to the relations of beings in conversation. Gender is the distinction of sex. Nouns applied to male beings, are called masculine gender; nouns applied to female beings, are called feminine gender; nouns applied to things having neither of the two, are called neuter gender; that is, neither male nor female.

When we speak however, of things having communicant energies, we give them the masculine gender,—as of the sun, we say, *he* is setting; and when we speak of things, that are recipients, we give them the feminine gender,—as of a ship, *she* sails well, &c. The numbers and genders of nouns, are readily distinguished in the signification of words themselves. *Case* has been defined as applying to three distinct positions or situations, in which nouns are placed with respect to government in a sentence, founded on the reciprocal relations existing between beings. These are the nominative, possessive, and objective cases. The nominative case applies to the person or thing named or mentioned as doing something, or as being affected by, or suffering the influence of some power, belonging either to himself, or to some other person or thing,—as John writes, or John is writing, or John does write, or John is loved; the letter is written, &c.

When the person or thing is represented as related to, or possessing something, *he*, *she* or *it*, is put in the possessive case—as man's happiness, virtue's reward, &c. Thus, *man* and *virtue* are in the possessive case, which is denoted by the letter *s* and a comma before it. But if the noun is plural, or ends with an *s*, the comma only is used; as foxes' holes. These are readily changed, and put into the objective case,—as the happiness of man; the reward of virtue; the holes of foxes. These again can be put in the nominative case,—as man has happiness; virtue has a reward; foxes have holes.

The nouns in each of the above sentences, have been reciprocally put into each of the three cases, or situations. In the first instance, *man*, *virtue* and *foxes*, are in the possessive case; and happiness, reward, &c. in the nominative case. In the second instance, *man*, *virtue* and *foxes*, are in the objective case. And in the third instance, *man*, *virtue* and *foxes*, are in the nominative case; and happiness, &c. in the objective case. These reciprocal changes however, have not affected the sense or meaning of the sentences. Thus, the different cases give scope for variety of expression, or differently constructed sentences, and still convey much the same sentiment.

Various examples of the inflection of the noun, are seen in the following declensions of nouns, common and proper:

Singular number, nom. Man, poss. man's, obj. man.
Plural number, nom. Men, poss. men's, obj. men.
Sing. num. nom. Tree, poss. tree's, obj. tree.
Plur. num. nom. Trees, poss. trees', obj. trees.
Sing. num. nom. Father, poss. father's, obj. father.
Plur. num. nom. Fathers, poss. fathers', obj. fathers.
Sing. num. nom. Mother, poss. mother's, obj. mother.
Plur. num. nom. Mothers, poss. mothers', obj. mothers.

Proper nouns have only the singular number, except when several individuals are taken collectively under a particular name,—as the Cæsars, the Barings, &c.

An adjective is a word added to a noun or pronoun, and is so called, because it expresses some quality or attribute of persons, places, and things. A philosophical discussion of the nature and office of adjectives, will be found under the head of adjectives in the preceding lectures. It has a much more important office in the construction of sentences, than is generally assigned to it.

There are three degrees of value attached to adjectives, called the positive, the comparative, and the superlative. When any quality is spoken of in reference to two beings, with regard to this quality, it is put in the comparative degree; but when it is spoken of with reference to three or more beings, it is put in the superlative degree. Now this quality may be spoken of, in the ascending or descending series of value, as more or less; for example,—good, better, best, in the ascending or advancing series; or little, less, least, in the descending or lessening series. The particular *amount* of its value in the positive degree, is often ascertained by nouns in the objective case, placed either immediately before, or after it; especially such adjectives as belong to distance, extent, capacity, magnitude and value,—as the boat is 90 feet *long;* the wall is 20 feet *high;* or the knife is *worth* a dollar, &c. These adjectives control the nouns, that define their amount or value; for the very cogent reason, that the *definition* of a word is the exponent of its *significancy*, or the nature of the object, for which it is a representative. Therefore, these nouns being the *definitions* of the amount or value of those adjectives, have been affected, or constructed in accordance with that amount or value; precisely on the same principle, that the verb is constructed in number and person in accordance with its nominative case. And this is all, that is meant by syntactical government. Syntactical government is a social and reciprocal government of *affections*, like that of domestic government, and not that arbitrary and despotic rule, exercised by tyrants. Each word in a sentence has its reciprocal relations and *affections*, dependences and connections, like the several members in the domestic circle.

To shew that adjectives of extent, capacity, &c. control those specific nouns of extent, capacity, &c. which estimate them, I will change the above adjectives into their corresponding nouns of admeasurement and value. The boat is the *length* of 90 feet; the wall is the *height* of 20 feet; the knife is the *worth* of a dollar. In these instances the nominative subject is compared with the nouns of extent, &c. and said to be equal to them. Specific nouns of valuation have an exponent before them, to shew their relation to the nouns of extent, &c. valued by them. Thus we find, that all adjectives of distance, extent, capacity, magnitude and value, are estimated by the tables of money, weights and measures; and that, they naturally and properly control those nouns, by which they are valued or estimated.

In the foregoing illustration, the young beginner will be saved from a host of difficulties with regard to parsing nouns, which estimate those adjectives of distance, extent, &c. hitherto said to be governed by *something* understood; whereas this very *something* really exists in the nature of the adjectives themselves, and exercises its relative and official duty over them.

The adjective is next in importance to the noun and verb; because it is that, which gives strength, symmetry, order and beauty, to the structure of a sentence; but a further development of its true character, will be found in another place.

In the following examples is exhibited the comparison of adjectives, which are both regular and irregular. Those, that terminate their comparative degree in *er*, and their superlative degree in *est*, are called regular; but those, that form their degrees of comparison by different words, or by the adverbs *more* and *most*, are called irregular, thus:

Positive Good, comparative better, superlative best.
Positive Bad, ill, or evil, comparative worse, superlative worst.
Positive Great, comparative greater, superlative greatest.
Positive Wise, comparative wiser, superlative wisest.
Positive Beautiful, comparative more beautiful, superlative most beautiful.
Positive Cautious, comparative more cautious, superlative most cautious, &c.

From what has been said concerning the *indefinite amount* of adjectives, it will readily be seen why, the superlative degree admits of another comparison,—as.

Supreme, supremer, supremest.
Extreme, extremer, extremest.
Almighty, almightier, almightiest, &c.

I have already shewn you something concerning the pronoun, in my observations on the noun; but I will now proceed to give a further definition of it. As the name signifies, it is used instead of a noun, and has number, person, gender and case. Its number, person and gender, correspond to the nouns, for which they stand; but its case varies according to its relative situation and office in the sentence. Pronouns may be arranged under five general heads, which will be sufficiently exact to distinguish them from each other, and give them a classification.

First. The personal pronouns are, *I*, *thou*, *he*, *she*, *it*; with their plurals, *we*, *ye* or *you*, and *they*.

Secondly. The constituent pronouns are, *who*, *which* and *that*. These three comprise the whole class; and I call them constituent, for the very cogent reason, that they are the only ones in the language, which introduce the component or second clause of a compound sentence, compounded in the true sense of the term. For, sentences connected by the copulate significate *and*—for example, Knowledge and virtue lead to honor and wealth,—are a very different composition, from those formed by these constituent pronouns,—as he who acts wisely, deserves praise; those who seek their own praise, are seldom gratified. If chemical affinity produces a compound different from that of adhesion, so these pronouns constitute a compound altogether different from that of association. They are constituent, because they introduce matter, that is necessary to complete the sense of the sentence, and make it intelligible; and they compound it, beccuse they express and define the main subject, or what belongs to it, under distinct terms, requiring two verbs, and two nominative cases in one sentence, in order to make it an entire and finished sentence, as in the above examples, viz: He who acts wisely, deserves praise; that is, he deserves praise, because he acts wisely. They refer to a preceding noun or pronoun, which I call a *conjugate;* for they are inseparably connected with said conjugate; which must be distinctly refered to, before the sentence can be resolved, or even understood.

Thirdly. There are relative pronouns, or such as have indefinite reference to beings in general,—as *all*, *some*, *any*, *much*, *many*, *such*, &c.

Fourthly. There are specific pronouns, as ***each***, ***every***, ***either***, ***this***, ***that***, ***these***, ***those***, ***one***, ***other***, ***neither***, ***another***, &c. Fifthly. The compound pronouns are *what*, *whatever*, *whoever*, *whichever*. These are both indicative and interrogative. *What* is compounded of *who* and *that;* and the three have the adverb *ever* affixed to them, which enables them to embrace the conjugate, and imply it in their own constituency. The pronoun *what* however, when followed by a noun, drops its compound character and becomes specific—as, What man is there among you, who acts prudently? Whatever motive he had in doing the act, he is not justified in it.

The pronouns are declined in the following table. The first and second have no gender; but the third has three distinct words to denote the genders, as ***he***, masculine; ***she***, feminine; and *it*, the neuter gender. The constituent pronoun *who* is used for male or female; *which* is used for inanimate things; and *that* is used for all genders.

Declension of the Pronouns.

FIRST PERSON.

SINGULAR.		PLURAL.	
Nominative	I,	*Nom.*	We,
Possessive	My or mine,	*Poss.*	Our or our's,
Objective	Me.	*Obj.*	Us.

SECOND PERSON.

SINGULAR.		PLURAL.	
Nom.	Thou,	*Nom.*	Ye or you,
Poss.	Thy or thine,	*Poss.*	Your or your's,
Obj.	Thee.	*Obj.*	You.

THIRD PERSON.

SINGULAR.		PLURAL.	
Nom.	He, she, it,	*Nom.*	They,
Poss.	His, her or her's, its,	*Poss.*	Their or their's,
Obj.	Him, her, it.	*Obj.*	Them.

Constituent Pronouns—Singular and Plural.

Nom.	Who, which, that.
Poss.	Whose, whose, whose.
Obj.	Whom, which, that.

The compound pronouns ***whatever***, ***whoever*** and ***whichever***, are declined like their simples. We find also, ***whatsoever***, ***whosoever*** and ***whichsoever***. Some of the specific pronouns, are declined like nouns—as ***one***, ***other***, ***another***, ***neither***, &c.

SINGULAR.	PLURAL.
Nom. One,	***Nom.*** Ones,
Poss. One's,	***Poss.*** Ones',
Obj. One.	***Obj.*** Ones.

SINGULAR.	PLURAL.
Nom. Other,	***Nom.*** Others,
Poss. Other's,	***Poss.*** Others',
Obj. Other.	***Obj.*** Others, &c.

This and ***that*** have been called demonstrative pronouns. They refer to definite and distinct objects, which have been previously nominated or discussed; but it is not ***demonstration***, to advert to something previously said, or to an object previously announced. Therefore, ***this*** and ***that*** are ***not*** demonstrative pronouns; but they are both specific and definite pronouns. ***These*** is the plural of ***this***, and ***those*** is the plural of ***that***. When they apply to nouns, that succeed them, they are ***specific;*** but when they refer to something already named, they are specific and definite; because they are specifiers and definers of what has been said; that is, they direct our attention back to definite and distinct matter.

LECTURE 7.

INFLECTION OF VERBS.

I have said, that no part of speech appears to have been less understood in its nature and office in a sentence, than the verb; because we find it stigmatized with such hard names as *neuter*, *auxiliary*, &c. To call a verb neuter is like calling a live man dead; and to call it auxiliary is like saying, that a feeble man has no power to act of himself. But to say, that power has no energy, is denying its existence; and to say, that it acts without any energy, is no better; for it is saying, that it acts without acting. These sayings however, are much in accordance with the "*vis inertiæ*" of the ancients,—viz. The *power* of inactivity. What a murder of language and an insult to common sense! Every verb in any language necessarily implies the existence of something, if it has any meaning at all. But, if it has no meaning attached to it, language must be far less significant, than the whistling winds, which are very significant.

Be not deceived. It is only the want of a moment's reflection, that has given rise to such expressions with regard to the verb. All verbs are necessarily active either in latent or apparent operative power. Even the verb *is*, called substantive, implies more power in it, than any other in the language; for it refers directly to the potency of God, and is derived to us from that name Jah, which is his greatest and best name. Verbs are said to be words, which signify to be, to do, to suffer, &c. Very well then,—they signify the operative energy of power existent, that is, standing forth in some quarter. Therefore, they are all *active* and never *passive* in any possible sense of the word. Persons and things are spoken of, as being the communicants or the recipients of power, or of its influence. This is what is meant by the active and passive voice,—to wit:

The *manner*, in which we speak of persons and things, as agents putting forth power, or as recipients experiencing its influence coming from another quarter. Verbs then, are communicant and recipient as applied to beings—therefore, they are *executive;* otherwise, nobody could affect and influence another, or be affected and influenced by another. They are also *intensive*, when they are applied to the mental and physical *condition* of beings, or to mind and matter. Verbs then, are all actively intensive, or actively executive. Therefore, they may be classed under these two heads. And under these two heads I shall discuss them in their forms and tenses, giving an account of five verbs in the language, that are always intensive, and apply directly to man, as an intelligent being. These constitute the foundation of that peculiarity of our language in the formation of its tenses.

Mode belongs to the *action* of verbs in their various kinds of operation, and *not* to their different sentential inflections. Consequently, language has certain fixed and established forms of the verb, in which we announce the various modes of action signified by the different verbs. So that we have *forms* of expression, and *modes* of action; but *not* modes of expression, and forms of action.

Therefore, the word *form*, as a general term of classification, under which we express the operative power of the verb, is much more appropriate, and vastly more definite and significant of the real matter of fact.

And although we have different modes of utterance, and different manners of articulation and gesticulation, yet these are not the attributes of language in its *construction*, or scheme of communication; but they are the attributes of language in its *persuasion*, the common property of all languages, under whatever scheme of articulate sounds, or pictorial characters.

And every language has fixed forms of the verb, either sentential, or inflected, to express the various modes of action designated by the different verbs. The English language uses both the inflected and the sentential form to express the different periods of time, in which the action or event takes place. Therefore, mode is improperly applied to the *grammar*, that is, to the writing or spelling of the verb in its sentential construction. In English, there are three ways or forms of expressing the operation of a verb; and,

First. The indefinite form, having no person or number,—as to think, to read, to write, &c.

Secondly. The definite form, under its own inflection,—as I write, I wrote, &c.; or by combination, which unites the inflected with the indefinite form; and which also unites these two forms with the present and perfect participles, thus: I desire to write, I desire to be writing, I desire to have been writing, or I desire to have written, &c.

Thirdly. The imperative form,—as, singular, think thou, read thou, write thou; and plural, think ye, read ye, write ye, &c.

The elective form, called the subjunctive mode, is expressed in English, by a significate preceding the definite form; for the verb has no peculiar inflection of its own, nor combination, which constitutes this form. Therefore, this election, choice, condition, or hypothesis is expressed by the definite form, with an elective, conditional, or hypothetical significate placed before it, as introductory to, and indicating this election, &c. under which the action is to be performed. I call it the *elective form of expression;* for the term subjunctive, is no definition of the real nature of the fact. We might call one day subjunctive to another with the same propriety, instead of designating it by Monday or Tuesday. The reader will find these severally discussed in their places.

OF TENSE OR TIME.

The doctrine of *tense* or *time*, as taught in grammars, is a mass of incongruity. When we are told, that an act is *done, perfectly done*, and more than perfectly done, we are led to the conclusion, that power can act and not perform; perform and not finish; and finally, more than finish its operations. Language has not built its tenses on the doctrine of supererogation; but on the two natural and common sense views, in which power presents itself to our notice. And first, it presents itself in its operative and productive energies, with their resulting effects; and secondly, in its executed action or finished operation, as matter of fact or event.

We speak of power, both in its executive energies and resulting products; and also in its finished operation, as an act done or transpired event; for we have the words action, operation, and a host of verbal nouns, to express simply, the finished exercise of that power designated by the verb. Every exercise of power must be in present time, while its action is in *transitu*, or *evenient* with the speaker's declaring time. Consequently, when we speak of power operating, there is necessarily included in the expression, *present* or *current* time. So also, when we speak of power operated in productive effects, there is necessarily included in the expression, *past time*, or *time prior* to the declaration; but the consideration of *time* as such, either present or past, is no part of the design or object, which we have in view in making the declaration. Our sole object is to announce, that power is, or is not in present exercise, producing its effects; or that it has, or has not exercised its productive energies in effects, at the time of utterance. Or that some specified power is, or is not going to exercise its energies in the production of effects.

Therefore, the two first tenses of the verb, viz: the *present* and *past*, have *direct* reference to the intensive, or executive *results* or *effects* of the verb, as an operative power, either intensive or executive, according to the nature of that power; and the next two tenses of the verb, *perfect* and *pluperfect*, have as direct reference to the *executive action* of the verb, as an *act* done and finished. The first, called the *perfect tense*, speaks of this action in its *absolute* character—as an act done, and belonging to its proper author or cause, without reference to any other period of time, than the speaker's time; but the second form, called the *pluperfect tense*, speaks of this action or finished operation, in its *relative* character, as a matter of fact prior to the speaker's time.

Thus we see, that language follows the footsteps of nature, in the economy of its tenses, and gives no intimation of mutilated *action*, or incomplete *action;* neither of supererogation or over *action;* that is, action more than acted. Therefore, the *present* and *past* tenses of the verb *represent* intensive and executive *power* in its resulting, or resulted effects; while the next two tenses *represent* the finished action of that *power*, as a matter of fact or event, existing in its absolute character, at the time the declaration is made; or as a matter of fact or event existing prior to that time, compared with succeeding events.

There are three forms of expression for the present tense, although only one of them indicates the power in actual exercise at the time the declaration is made, except the verb is of that class of verbs, whose power is in constant exercise. In the sentences—I write, I do write, or I am writing—the last only, represents the power of the verb in actual exercise at the time of declaration. The two former only indicate or declare such a present habitude of the agent as the verb signifies; and this is the case with every other executive verb. The past tense, on the contrary, represents the power of the verb, as having actually exercised its energy and produced its effects. Herein rests the philosophy of the Hebrew language in placing the root of the verb in the past tense, and forming its present tense by the present participle, which always represents the power of the verb in actual exercise. If the present tense then, only represents the present *habitude* of the agent, so also do the perfect and pluperfect tenses only represent his present and past habituated and finished action as an event.

I said, that the English verb has no form of its own to express future action, or to represent power, as going to act hereafter. But by combination of verbs in the definite and indefinite forms with the present or past participle, the English is extremely copious and exact in its *foresight* and reference to future events; for it has no less than eight sentential forms to express four considerations of future results. The first four of these forms are built on the present and past tenses of an intensive verb in its own definite and inflected form of expression, succeeded by another verb in its indefinite form, which is future in its nature, together with the present or perfect participle of an executive verb, thus: I will write, or, I will be writing; I would write, or, I would be writing. Either of these four forms, has a direct reference to the future operative power of the verb *write*. But each of the four succeeding forms, has as direct reference to the future *finished action* of the verb *write*, as a matter of fact or event, thus: I will have written, or, I will have been writing; I would have written, or, I would have been writing. And here let it be remembered, that the active and passive voice of verbs in any language, is no more nor less, than forms of the verb, or forms of sentential expressions used to indicate the nominative subject, either as the *author* of its power, or as the recipient of its power, thus: I love, do love, or am loving; I loved, did love, or was loving. These are so many different forms, inflected or sentential, in which the pronoun *I*, is made the *author* of the power or affection expressed by the verb *love*—operating, or operated as to its effects on some object which may refer either to the first, second, or third person,—as *me myself; thee, him or Peter*.

These all, I say, refer to a communicant agent, putting forth the energies of the verb *love*, in its productive effects. This verb then, is in the communicant voice; and not only so, but there is another item brought into view, which is this—the productive effects of the verb in its operation. These effects are indicated, under the inflection of the verb alone in its definite form—in its present participle preceded by the intensive verb *am* or *was*, or in its indefinite form preceded by the intensive verb *do*. Now we speak of power in its subsident action, as an event or matter of fact at the time of speaking, or prior to that time.

Here then, come in the perfect and pluperfect forms of our grammars, which are properly the present and past tenses of finished results or events, thus: I have loved, or, I have been loving; I had loved, or, I had been loving. The perfect and pluperfect tenses of our grammars, are neither more nor less, than the present and past tenses or expressions, which indicate the finished or settled results of the power of the verb, as an event or matter of fact. But the present and past tenses or real inflections of the verb, refer directly to the effect produced by its operative power; as I write, or wrote a letter, &c. I said, that the definite form of an intensive verb followed by the indefinite form of an executive verb, expresses future time with regard to the effects of this executive verb,—as I desire to write a letter, &c. Why then, it may be asked, have I put *I do love* in the definite form, present tense? To this I answer, that the verb *do*, when used intensively, is a mere affirmation or asseveration, that the power of the verb, which follows it, is in actual exercise,—as I *do* do my duty, &c.; therefore, it is no exception to the principle above laid down.

In order to change a communicant expression into a recipient one, called passive voice, nothing is required except to introduce the verb *be* or *am*, and its perfect participle, before the participle *loved;* and change *loving* into *loved*, thus: I am loved, instead of, I loved; and I was loved, instead of, I was loving. These constitute the present and past recipient times of the operative *effect* of the verb *love;* and by substituting the perfect participle *loved* for the present participle *loving* in the other two examples, we have the present and past tenses of the finished action or executed results of the verb in its recipient voice called passive, thus: I have been loved, instead of, I have been loving; and I had been loved, instead of, I had been loving; and so of all other executive verbs. This same economy in the use of the verb *be* or *am*, and its perfect participle *been*, applies to the combined forms of the future tenses, thus: I will be loved, instead of, I will be loving; I would be loved, instead of, I would be loving; I will have been loved, instead of, I will have been loving; and, I would have been loved, instead of, I would have been loving, &c.

With what ease and facility communicant expressions are changed into recipient ones! Nothing can exceed its shortness, simplicity and plainness. And having accidentally omitted a rule for nouns following verbs in the recipient voice, I will supply it here.

Rule 29. All intensive verbs, and recipient expressions have the same case after them, that they have before them,—as I am Peter, who is called Simon; or, I am Peter, who am called Simon. The disease is called cholera, &c.

There is no variation in the elective form, from the definite form. Whatever kind of election or choice there may be in the *condition* of beings, there is no election nor choice as to the power itself. Consequently, what objection can there be to the economy of the English language for expressing this *condition* of the agent by a significate? The variety of *condition*, whether contingent, hypothetical, or of whatever nature it may be, can be pointed out much more definitely by some distinct term, than it possibly can be by a peculiar termination of the verb, since this can never indicate a variety of *condition;* but different and significant terms can shew every possible variety. Therefore, the rigid and inflexible character of our verb in this respect, is an ornament, rather than a defect in the language. In exhibiting the combined form which is made up of the definite and indefinite forms, I have taken one of those five intensive verbs, which are these, viz, *will*, *shall*, *can*, *may*, and *must*. These have only the definite form, present and past tense, and want the participles except the verb *will*, which has the present participle *willing*. The verb *ought* however, is in the same predicament; but it is entirely distinct from the verb *must*. The grand distinction between the two verbs is this—the verb *must* applies to our native and personal responsibility, but *ought* refers to our acquired obligations; for it comes from the verb *owe*, and is properly the perfect participle of it,—as *owed*, *owt* or *ought*. I have chosen the verb *will*, because it refers directly to that mental intensive power, which is never dormant nor inoperative; also, because it holds the highest rank among the five, inasmuch as it is the eldest birth of mental economy. Any other verb which applies to the mind, besides these five, will take their place, and maintain the same forms through the whole scheme; except the verb in its indefinite form assumes the particle *to* before it, being its proper characteristic.

These five intensive mental verbs are the only ones in the language, except *dare* and *do*, that receive the indefinite form without this particle *to* before it, in forming this combination,—as I intend to write; I wish to write; I desire to write; I dare write, &c.

I will now illustrate the nature of these five verbs by showing to what each severally and directly applies.

I said, that these five verbs are the only ones in the language, except *dare*, that admit a verb in the indefinite form after them, without the particle *to* before this verb. Now, there must be some cause or reason for this, existing in these verbs, since wherever we find an effect produced, we may rest assured, that its *cause* is intimately connected with it: therefore, we will here endeavor to search out that cause. But where else shall we look for it, or where else ought we to look for it, except in the nature of these verbs themselves, or rather, in the nature of those realities which they represent? The cause evidently rests in the nature of these verbs; consequently we will examine them, in order to find out their true meaning and application; and by so doing we shall doubtless discover the real and efficient cause.

Each of these verbs is always intensive, never executive; and this truth arises from the nature of those realities, which they severally represent. For, they represent the five *fountains* or *sources* of moral sentiment, which belong to intelligent and accountable beings. Therefore,

1st. The verb *will* represents the attribute of *elective* mental power, or free choice,—as I will, thou wilt, he will, &c.

2d. The verb *shall* represents the natural and inherent authority, or personal and social government, which sapience or wisdom gives to man,—as I shall, thou shalt, he shall, &c.

3d. The verb *can* represents the native ability, or operative mental energy, which belongs to intelligent beings,—as I can, thou canst, he can, &c.

4th. The verb *may* represents the personal and social liberty and freedom, which intelligent beings possess,—as I may, thou mayest, he may, &c.

5th. The verb *must* represents the consequent obligation, or moral responsibility, which results from these four attributes of intelligence,—as I must, thou must, he must, &c.; and which is claimed by, and due to Him who bestows the gift.

Consequently, these five verbs represent the five primary attributes of man just enumerated. Therefore, man is a being "under authority, having soldiers under him." These moreover, are "the five wise virgins having oil in their lamps," &c.

Thus we find, that these five verbs embrace the five primary attributes of intelligence; and that, when we wish to describe our executive and overt actions and social conduct, as proceeding from either of these fountains, we must use one of these verbs to *indicate* and define them, which will of course precede the executive verb. Consequently, each of these intensive verbs must always be in the definite form, present or past tense; and this is just what we find belonging to them, and nothing more, except the participle *willing*, generally used as an adjective, and very appropriately applied to the mind itself. We always find, I say, these verbs in the *definite* form, present or past tense; consequently, the verb following it must be in the *indefinite* form,—as I will, shall, can, may, or must do my duty, &c. Therefore, the indefinite verb being the executive verb, must have its work yet to do, and of course future or successive to the time indicated in the definite verb. Thus, in the examples—I will write, I will be writing, or, I am willing to write—the verb *will* is in the definite form, present tense; and the verb *write* is in the indefinite form, future tense, and controled by the verb *will*. So also the verb *be*, in the second example, is in the indefinite form, and controled by the verb *will* and the present participle *writing*, agrees with the pronoun *I*. This combination corresponds with the Greek and Latin indicative future, which is expressed by the inflection of the verb itself.

Again: I would write, I would be writing, or I was willing to write, are relative past, and comparative future expressions. In relation to its conjugate will, *would* is the past inflection of it; but compared with the executive verb write as to its products, the expressions are future, no executive operations as yet having taken place. Here then, seems to be a manifest contradiction in terms,—that the past tense should indicate future action. This is the rock, on which English grammarians have made shipwreck, and which has given rise to the various schemes of *auxiliary forms* of modes and tenses. But, when the true nature of the expression is understood, the mystery is solved, and the apparent contradiction with all its difficulties, vanishes at once. The whole economy of the inflected tenses, is built on the order of succession in the routine of events; and when we speak or write, we have a constant eye to this order of succession, and use verbs in their primary or inflected forms, in compliance with this order.

But as I have before stated, the present moment alone is our's; that is, we always act in present time; and speaking is acting. Therefore, we speak or write of events, as present, past or future, with reference to our own acting time. But this standard of ours, is constantly floating along on the current stream, which brings us forward to scenes once future, but now present; and carrying us away from these again, makes them past, fixed and stationary; because, having once happened, they become ***dead certainties;*** that is, fixed results by their eventuation. But we are passing on to future ones, that will also become present, fixed and stationary, the moment we arrive at their resulting birth. Consequently, we are continually carried from present scenes to their comparative future ones, which have now become our present scenes. These too have their own future ones, which the next moment makes our present, and the next moment turns this present into past. Thus, we become familiar and eye-witnesses, not only of new, living, visible and tangible effects, but also of new, real, finished and stationary actions, or *dead certainties*, being the subsident or settled throws of executive power. But we speak of these actions, as we do of other things, viz.: that they are *coming*, *come*, or *gone*. In the order of succeeding events then, each throw of power which brings them forth, ceases after their birth, and becomes a finished and stationary act, while time bears us onward to witness the young offspring of a second and succeeding throw. Thus we are borne along, witnessing successive operations and their effects, till time lands us in eternity.

Now, we not only act ourselves, and produce *visible* effects, and talk about them along with the actions and effects of others, while on our journey; but we have many secret and mental *views*, designs and intentions, known only to ourselves, until we divulge them. But this disclosure is made with due regard to their own order of succession, as well as to the relative succession which belongs to their social connection with surrounding events, thus: I will write, I will be writing, and I am willing to write, are indications of a present intention or operating cause, to perform hereafter an executive or overt act; but, I would write, I would be writing, and I was willing to write, are only indications of past *time*, and not a *subsident* cause, to perform hereafter an executive or overt act. And this is not all. I said, we speak of actions as we speak of other things, viz: that they are coming, come, or gone. So these mental views, designs and intentions, are spoken of not only in their absolute character, as going to exist, existing, and having existed, but also in their relative character or connection with surrounding events, in the order of succession. In this absolute or relative character only one of the three correlative forms of expression, indicate the actual exercise of the mind—to wit: I am willing to write, or I was willing to write. The other two forms—to wit: I will write, I will be writing; or I would write, or I would be writing—indicate the succession of time belonging to the order of events with regard to the speaker's time, as posterior or anterior to it. So that, I would write, or I would be writing, does not indicate, that any mental exercise has as yet taken place. Why then, is the past tense of *will* used to represent future intention, or future mental action? For one of the best reasons in nature, since the declaration in the past tense clearly shows, that an event must intervene and become past before this intention or operating cause can exist or become real. Therefore, the intention must be successive to the embraced event, and consequently, relatively future to it, both in the order of time and in the order of existence. But the past *tense* implies the past *time* of the intervening result; consequently, so much of the relative *time* of this future intention has passed with it. Therefore, the expression is natural, philosophical and proper. This illustration applies with more than equal force to the other four verbs—to wit, *shall*, *can*, *may* and *must;* for these verbs refer more directly to social relations than the verb *will* does.

In the following examples will be found the entire scheme of our verbs, both in their own inflection as to present and past tense, number and person; and also in their combination as to the perfect, pluperfect and future tenses.

Conjugation of the verb *be* or *am*, viz:

Present be or am—Past was.

Participles,—Being, been, having been.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I am, thou art, he, she or it, is.
Plur. We are, ye or you are, they are.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I was, thou wast, he, she or it, was.
Plur. We were, ye or you were, they were.

Before we can proceed any farther in this example, we must conjugate and inflect the verbs have, will, shall, can, may and must, and then we shall be in possession of all the items, which constitute the entire scheme or whole economy of the English combination of verbs. No verb in the English language goes beyond the present and past tense by its own inflection; consequently, those forms heretofore called perfect, pluperfect, and first and second future tenses, are expressed by combination—that is, by uniting the inflected form of one verb with the participles or indefinite form of another verb. This arrangement holds true, except in the verb *have*, which takes its own perfect participle.—Conjugation of the verb *have*, viz:

Present have—Past had.
Participles,—Having, had, having had.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I have, thou hast, he, she or it, has.
Plur. We have, ye or you have, they have.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I had, thou hadst, he, she or it, had.
Plur. We had, ye or you had, they had.

Definite form of finished action, as an event—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I have had, thou hast had, he, she or it, has had.
Plur. We have had, ye or you have had, they have had.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I had had, thou hadst had, he, she or it, had had.
Plur. We had had, ye or you had had, they had had.

Indefinite form of operative power—*to have.*
Indefinite form of finished action, as an event—*to have had.*

Conjugation of the verb *will*, viz:

Present will—Past would.
Participle,—Willing. The perfect is wanting.

And here let it be remembered, that the verbs *will*,

shall*, *can*, *may and ***must***, are all defective in the participles, and in the indefinite and the imperative forms.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I will, thou wilt, he, she or it, will.
Plur. We will, ye or you will, they will.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I would, thou wouldst, he, she or it, would.
Plur. We would, ye or you would, they would.

Conjugation of the verb *shall*, viz:
Present shall—Past should.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I shall, thou shalt, he, she or it, shall.
Plur. We shall, ye or you shall, they shall.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I should, thou shouldst, he, she or it, should.
Plur. We should, ye or you should, they should.

Conjugation of the verb *can*, viz:
Present can—Past could.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I can, thou canst, he, she or it, can.
Plur. We can, ye or you can, they can.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I could, thou couldst, he she or it, could.
Plur. We could, ye or you could, they could.

Conjugation of the verb ***may***, viz:
Present may—Past might.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I may, thou mayest, he, she or it, may.
Plur. We may, ye or you may, they may.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I might, thou mightest, he, she or it, might.
Plur. We might, ye or you might, they might.

Conjugation of the verb ***must***, viz:
Present must—Past must.

Definite form of operative power,—Present tense:

Sing. I must, thou must, he, she or it, must.
Plur. We must, ye or you must, they must.

Its past tense has the same inflection.

Conjugation of the verb *do*—Present do, past did. Participles doing, done, having done.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I do, thou doest, he, she or it, does.
Plur. We do, ye or you do, they do.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I did, thou didst, he, she or it, did.
Plur. We did, ye or you did, they did.

Indefinite form of operative power—*to do.*

Indefinite form of finished action, as an event—*to have done.*

Combination of the verb *do* taken intensively, united with *do* taken executively.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I do do, thou doest do, he, she or it, does do.
Plur. We do do, ye or you do do, they do do.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I did do, thou didst do, he, she or it, did do.
Plur. We did do, ye or you did do, they did do.

Conjugation of the irregular executive verb *write:*—Present write—Past wrote. Participles writing, written, having written.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I write, thou writest, he, she or it, writes or writeth.
Plur. We write, ye or you write, they write.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I wrote, thou wrotest, he, she or it, wrote.
Plur. We wrote, ye or you wrote, they wrote.

Indefinite form of operative power—to write.

Imperative form,—Sing. Write, or write thou. Plur. Write, or write ye.

The imperative form of all our verbs, is taken from the first person of the definite form—present tense. And any verb is put into its imperative form by dropping the nominative pronoun, singular and plural, in the first person, present tense of the definite form; and having the second person, implied or expressed, after the verb, as in write.

Conjugation of the regular executive verb *learn*,—Present learn—Past learned. Participles learning, learned, having learned.

Definite form of operative power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I learn, thou learnest, he, she or it, learns or learneth.

Plur. We learn, ye or you learn, they learn.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I learned, thou learnedst, he, she or it, learned.

Plur. We learned, ye or you learned, they learned.

Indefinite form of operative power—to learn.

Imperative form,—Sing. Learn, or learn thou. Plur. Learn, or learn ye.

Having given the inflected forms of all those intensive verbs, which are used in making up the combined forms, and also the inflected forms of two executive verbs, I will now exhibit the entire scheme of all the combined forms used to express both intensive and executive operations.

And first, of the intensive forms terminating with the indefinite form *to be*, or its perfect participle *been*. The definite form of the verb *be* or *am*, in intensive power, has already been given in the present and past tenses of its own inflection.

Combined form of finished intensive action, as an event.

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I have been, thou hast been, he, &c. has been.

Plur. We have been, ye or you have been, they have been.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I had been, thou hadst been, he, &c. had been.

Plur. We had been, ye or you had been, they had been.

Combined form of future intensive power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I will be, thou wilt be, he, &c. will be.

Plur. We will be, ye or you will be, they will be.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I would be, thou wouldst be, he, &c. would be.

Plur. We would be, ye or you would be, they would be.

Combined form of future finished intensive action, &c.

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I will have been, thou wilt have been, he, &c. will have been.

Plur. We will have been, ye will have been, they will have been.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I would have been, thou wouldst have been, he would have been.

Plur. We would have been, ye would have been, they would have been.

The verbs ***shall***, ***can***, ***may*** and ***must***, receive precisely the same forms. Therefore, we will now present the above forms, having the executive verb ***write*** or its present and perfect participles affixed to each.

Combined form of future executive power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I will write, or will be writing.
Thou wilt write, or wilt be writing.
He, &c. will write, or will be writing.

Plur. We will write, or will be writing.
Ye or you will write, or will be writing.
They will write, or will be writing.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I would write, or would be writing.
Thou wouldst write, or wouldst be writing.
He, &c. would write, or would be writing.

Plur. We would write, or would be writing.
Ye would write, or would be writing.
They would write, or would be writing.

Combined form of future finished executive action, &c.

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I will have written, or I will have been writing.
Thou wilt have written, or wilt have been writing.
He, &c. will have written, or will have been writing.

Plur. We will have written, or will have been writing.
Ye will have written, or will have been writing.
They will have written, or will have been writing.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I would have written, or would have been writing.
Thou wouldst have written, or wouldst have been writing.
He, &c. would have written, or would have been writing.
Plur. We would have written, or would have been writing.
Ye would have written, or would have been writing.
They would have written, or would have been writing.

Combined imperative form—Communicant voice.

Sing. Be thou writing. *Plur.* Be ye writing.

Combined imperative form—Recipient voice.

Sing. Be thou written. *Plur.* Be ye written.

Combined indefinite form of finished action—Communicant voice—To have written, or to have been writing.

Recipient voice—To have been written.

In order to familiarize the pupil with these forms, and to convince him of their unvarying uniformity and universal application, I will substitute the verb ***shall*** for ***will***, and the verb ***learn*** for ***write***, thus:

Combined form of future executive power—

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I shall learn, or shall be learning.
Thou shalt learn, or shalt be learning.
He, &c. shall learn, or shall be learning.
Plur. We shall learn, or shall be learning.
Ye or you shall learn, or shall be learning.
They shall learn, or shall be learning.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I should learn, or should be learning.
Thou shouldst learn, or shouldst be learning.
He, &c. should learn, or should be learning.
Plur. We should learn, or should be learning.
Ye or you should learn, or should be learning.
They should learn, or should be learning.

Combined form of future finished executive action, &c.

PRESENT TENSE.

Sing. I shall have learned, or shall have been learning.
Thou shalt have learned, or shalt have been learning.
He, &c. shall have learned, or shall have been learning.
Plur. We shall have learned, or shall have been learning.
Ye shall have learned, or shall have been learning.
They shall have learned, or shall have been learning.

PAST TENSE.

Sing. I should have learned, or should have been learning.
Thou shouldst have learned, or shouldst have been learning.
He, &c. should have learned, or should have been learning.
Plur. We should have learned, or should have been learning.
Ye or you should have learned, or should have been learning.
They should have learned, or should have been learning.

Imperative form—Communicant voice.

Sing. Be thou learning. *Plur.* Be ye learning.

Imperative form—Recipient voice.

Sing. Be thou learned. *Plur.* Be ye learned.

Combined indefinite form of finished action, &c.

Communicant voice—To have learned, or to have been learning.

Recipient voice—To have been learned; that is, taught.

The foregoing forms exhibit the entire scheme of our English verbs in their inflections and combinations, with regard either to their intensive or executive effects; and also with regard to their finished and subsident results, as matters of fact or events. These forms are all expressed in the communicant voice, except where notice is given in a few of the last; and by substituting the perfect participle of the executive verb, for its present participle, they are turned into the recipient voice, thus: I am learning; changed, I am learned; that is, taught. I was learning; changed, I was learned. I have been learning—changed, I have been learned; that is, taught. I had been learning; changed, I had been learned, &c.

This principle holds true in every executive verb, without exception; and nothing can exceed its simplicity.

I will now resolve or parse one line in each of the foregoing forms, and apply its proper rule to each word, leaving the pupil to use his own judgment in parsing the rest; for they vary in nothing except number and person. And first—"I write, do write, or am writing."

I is a personal pronoun, first person, singular number—declined as seen in the table; and it is the nominative case to the verb write, according to Rule 2d. The nominative subject controls the verb in number and person, &c.

Write is an irregular executive verb, conjugated thus: Present write, past wrote; participles writing, written—in combination, having written, having been written. It is in the definite form of operative power—present tense—first person—singular number; and it agrees with its nominative I, according to Rule 3d. Here repeat the rule. If your sentence is like the second example, "I do write,"—in that case, parse the pronoun I, as in the first instance. Then say, *do* is an irregular verb, intensive or executive—intensive here, because followed by another verb, conjugated thus: Present do, past did; participles doing, done—in combination, having done, having been done. It is in the definite form,—present tense,—first person,—singular number—and agrees with its nominative I, according to Rule 3d, &c.

Write is a verb, and it is to be conjugated as in the first instance, but it is in the indefinite form, and controled by the verb *do*, according to Rule 7th. The indefinite form is controled by verbs, adjectives, participles, &c.

In the third example, "I am writing," the pronoun I is parsed as before; and the verb *am* is conjugated thus: Present be or am, past was; participles being, been,—in combination, having been. It is in the definite form,—present tense—first person, &c. and agrees with I, according to Rule 2d.

Writing is a present participle from the verb write, and agrees with the pronoun I, according to Rule 4th. The adjective, pronoun and participle, agree with their nouns and pronouns, &c.

Each verb of the definite form in the present and past tenses, is parsed in the same way; only the persons and numbers of the nominative and verb are singular or plural, to suit each other; and the time is present or past, as the case may be. Every word in a sentence is parsed by itself, which consists in calling it by its proper characteristic name, and showing its office and duty, as in the following example:

"John wrote a letter, or John learned his lesson." *John* is a proper noun, third person, singular number, nominative case, and controls *wrote*, or *learned*, by Rule 2d. Repeat the Rule. *Learned* is a regular executive verb from *learn*, conjugated—present learn, past learned—participles learning, learned; in combination, having learned, having been learning, having been learned; which last is in the recipient voice. It is in the definite form of operative power, past tense, third person, singular number, and agrees with its nominative subject *John*, by Rule 3d. *His* is a personal pronoun, third person, singular number, possessive case of *lesson*, and controled by it under Rule 10th. Repeat the Rule. *Lesson* is a common noun, third person, singular number, objective case; and controled by the executive verb *learned*, according to Rule 6th. Repeat the Rule.

Again. "John has learned his lesson, or had learned his lesson." The noun *John* has already been parsed. *Has* is an irregular verb intensive or executive; but intensive in this instance, and whenever another verb or participle follows it. It is from the verb *have*, conjugated thus: Present have, past had—participles, having, had; in combination, having had, and having been had. It is in the combined form of finished action, &c. present tense, third person, singular number, and agrees with its nominative *John*, according to Rule 2d. *Had*, in the second clause of the example, is parsed precisely like *has*, except its tense is past, instead of present. *Learned* is a perfect participle from the verb *learn*, conjugated thus: Present, learn, past learned—participles learning, learned; here we have it then: In combination—having learned, having been learning, and having been learned, which last is the recipient expression. *Learned* then, is a perfect participle, third person, singular number, and agrees with John, according to Rule 4th. Adjectives, pronouns and participles, agree with their nouns, pronouns, &c. The words *his* and *lesson* are parsed precisely as they were before.

Once more: "John has been learning his lesson, or had been learning his lesson." In these sentences the participles *been learning* are used instead of the participle learned. But the time and result are the same as in the former, except the latter do not fully indicate, that the entire *amount* of the object was obtained by the effort made in the enterprise. Lastly: John will, shall, can, may, or must write a letter; or John will, &c. learn his lesson. These are all in the combined form of future operative power, present tense. But John would, should, could, or might write a letter; or John would, should, could, or might learn his lesson, are in the same form, past tense. *Will* is a defective intensive verb, conjugated thus: present will, past would; participle willing; the rest is wanting. It is in the combined form of future operative power, present tense, third person, singular number, and agrees with its nominative John, according to Rule 2d.

The other four, viz: shall, can, may and must, are parsed exactly in the same way. The verbs write and learn have already been conjugated. In these examples they are in the indefinite form without its characteristic *to* before them; and they are controled by will, would, &c. according to Rule 7th. The vowel *a* is a restrictive article placed before the noun *letter*, in the singular number, according to Rule 1st, which repeat.

Letter and lesson are parsed thus: *Letter* is a noun common, third person, singular number, neuter gender, objective case, and declined thus: Nom. letter, poss. letter's, obj. letter; plural, nom. letters, poss. letters', obj. letters. Therefore, it is in the singular number, and controled by the verb write, according to Rule 6th. *Lesson* is parsed precisely in the same manner.

"John had a great inclination to learn the art of letter-writing." Here I have introduced new matter. But, having parsed the noun *John*, the verb *had*, and the article *a*, as before, you come to the adjective *great*. Now, great is a regular adjective, in the positive degree, compared thus: Pos. great, comp. greater, super. greatest; third person, singular number, and agrees with inclination, according to Rule 4th—which repeat.

Note. Some grammarians have said, that adjectives have no positive degree, but that they have a positive state. In this they err, not discerning the true nature of adjectives. For, adjectives have no ***state***, as these philosophers maintain; inasmuch as they are either partial components of state, or are the ***accidental qualities*** of said component. Seeing therefore, that it requires the ***union*** of components to make a ***state***, and that these components have their individual ***amount*** of efficiency or ***degrees*** of compounding energy, this energy, whatever it is, must exist in ***degree*** of ***amount***, and not in ***state*** of ***amount***, because this amount may be in various ***degrees***, in one and the same ***state*** or union of a definite number of components. Therefore, the adjective has a positive degree. The noun ***inclination*** is parsed like the noun ***letter***, and controled by the executive verb ***had***, according to Rule 4th. The verb ***to learn*** is conjugated as in the former examples; but it is in the indefinite form, and controled by the noun ***inclination***, according to Rule 7th.

The is a specific article placed before nouns in the singular and plural number. ***Art*** is parsed in every respect like ***inclination***. ***Letter-writing*** is a participial noun, in the objective case, and controled by the exponent ***of***, according to Rule 8th. Exponents control the objective case.

"This book is none of yours." ***This*** is a specific ***adjective*** pronoun in this example, because it agrees with the noun ***book*** expressed. It is not however, called an ***adjective*** pronoun, because it has the degrees of comparison in certain or uncertain ***amount*** of ***value;*** but because it has the qualities of number, which does not admit of comparison. ***Book*** is a noun declined like the noun ***inclination***, and nominative to the verb ***is***. ***Is*** is an irregular intensive verb, conjugated thus: Present be or am, past was—participles, being, been; in combination, having been. It is in the definite form, present tense, third person, singular number, and agrees with ***book*** by Rule 2d. ***None*** is a specific pronoun, agreeing with ***book*** by Rule 4th. ***Yours*** is a personal pronoun, second person, plural number, in the possessive case, and controled by the exponent *of*, according to Rule 11th. Repeat the Rule.

"Peter must have possessed the gift of the Holy Spirit; otherwise he could not have described so philosophically, the seven cardinal virtues."

After I have parsed this paragraph, I will leave the pupil to the exercise of his own judgment, believing, that he will be able to discern the mutual connection, which words have with one another, arising out of their relation to, dependence upon, and influence over each other in the construction of sentences.

When the several parts of a piece of mechanism are well understood in their *position*, *connection*, application, use and importance, the mystery of its construction is dissolved; and the wisdom, foresight and ingenuity of the inventor made manifest, from the utility and advantage which it affords the possessor, by extending his means, and enlarging his sphere of operations. Ten thousand other machines constructed on the same plan, and brought into operation by the same principles, will be readily comprehended by him, who has made himself acquainted with the general economy of any one, on which they all depend, although there may be a slight modification in the size, form, and even *materials* of some of the parts. So in language, when the general economy of sentential construction is well understood in the relation of the several parts to each other, the main difficulty is surmounted; and the pupil will feel himself in possession of the means, whereby he can dispose of, and satisfactorily account for any variation, which sentences undergo by being interspersed now and then, by a greater or less number of qualifying terms or words, which are applied to the two grand pillars, viz. the subject noun communicant or recipient, and the verb intensive or executive, and even both taken together. Adjectives being the terms to express the properties and qualities of persons and things, they are therefore, both essential and accidental; and I have already given examples, in which we see, that they may be changed into nouns put in the objective case,—as a virtuous man, or a man of virtue. You see this *essential* and accidental economy of adjectives manifested even in their different terminations, thus: ***Virtual***, an essential, inherent and personal attribute;

virtuous, a social and accidental quality. *Harmonical* applies to the component accordance of parts, taken as a whole; but *harmonious* applies to the concord which different individuals maintain among each other in their intercommunion. And these adjectives apply both to music and society, in these two considerations. All adjectives then, which end in *al*, have an individual and particular meaning; but all adjectives which end in *ous*, have a general and social application. So all adjectives which end in *ive*, *ant*, *ent*, *ate*, *ete*, *ite*, and *ute*, have reference to, and designate some inherent and communicative energy, going forth in productive operations: they are therefore, communicant adjectives. But all adjectives which end in *able*, or *ible*, are recipient; that is, they represent the person or thing in his social condition, as liable to, and susceptible of impressions from abroad, or from surrounding objects. And all adjectives, which end in *ful*, or *less*, designate them to be in contrast of plenty and paucity of those qualities which they severally denote.

All nouns that end in *ion*, are from the Latin verbal nouns, which end in *io*, and which represent the finished action, and the kind of action, which the power of the verb puts forth. These nouns are called *verbal*, because they are direct from the verbs, whose *modus operandi* they designate.

Here then, we have a host of nouns which are the names severally, of the kinds of power put forth by their verbs. I said, that every being has his *state* and *condition;* consequently, we have nouns, which represent this state and condition in their communicant and recipient considerations. Therefore, we have a class of nouns, which represent the communicant state of beings possessing the communicant energies of the powers, which are designated by the verbs from whence these communicant nouns are derived,—as from *constitute* is derived *constituency;* from *profligate* is derived *profligacy*, and from *penetrate* comes *penetrancy*, &c. Whenever a verb expresses a power, that produces an effect upon another being distinct and apart from the one, in whom the power resides, we have nouns ending in *ability*, or *ibility*,—as from the verb *prove* is derived indirectly, *probability;* though directly coming from *probable*, which is immediately from *prove*, by changing *v* into *b*, and adding *able*, being the Latin *abilis*, or *habilis*,—as liable, liability; affable, affability, &c. Thus we perceive, that language has recognized the *state* of beings, in which they either possess communicant energies, or are liable to receive their influences. State then, is viewed in diametrical contrast, as applied to different beings, or to the same being on different occasions. Nouns ending in *ance*, *ence*, and *cy*, express the communicant state; that is, they apply to beings possessing efficient and productive energies. Nouns ending in *ability* or *ibility*, express the recipient state; that is, they apply to beings liable to receive the effects of another's power.

Moreover, *state*, in each of these respects, has its corresponding *condition*, which is denoted by *ness*, which means literally existence, coming as it does, from *in esse;* that is, being. All adjectives ending in *ive*, as *creative*, are made nouns by *ness*, expressing communicant condition. All adjectives ending in *ble*, are made nouns by *ness*, expressing recipient condition. Thus, we have five fountains from which our nouns have flowed; so that, by the penetrativeness of its penetrancy, the mind is able to penetrate the penetrability of all penetrable things, that have a condition of penetrableness.

Now you may analyze the foregoing paragraph, to wit: "Peter must have possessed," &c.

The noun *Peter* is parsed by giving all the particulars that belong to it; and which are implied and expressed in Rule 2d. The intensive verb *must* is parsed by giving its conjugation, form and tense, all of which are implied and expressed in Rule 3d. The intensive verb *have*, (have is always intensive when followed by another verb or participle,) is parsed by giving its conjugation and form, implied and expressed in Rule 7th. The executive perfect participle *possessed* agrees with *Peter*, and is parsed by conjugating its verb *possess*, and thereby arriving at it, as implied and expressed in Rule 4th. The article *the* is parsed by giving what is implied and expressed in Rule 1st. The noun *gift* is parsed by giving its declension, &c. as implied and expressed in Rule 6th. The exponent *of* is parsed by giving its definition, which is implied in Rule 8th, and which is the foundation of the rule. The adjective *holy* is parsed by giving its degree, comparing it, and announcing its relation, as expressed in Rule 4th. The noun *Spirit* is parsed every way like the noun *gift*, except its relation is shewn in Rule 8th. The significate *otherwise*, is parsed by naming it, shewing its relation to the preceding sentence, and by giving Rule 18, which ought to have been noted, so as to apply to all significates not otherwise disposed of. The personal pronoun *he* is parsed by giving its declension, &c. as implied and expressed in Rule 2d. The adverb *not* is parsed by naming it, and giving its office and duty, as in Rule 5th. The executive participle *described* is parsed every way like *possessed*, and its relation to the pronoun *he*, is expressed in Rule 4th. The adverb *so*, is parsed by naming it, and shewing its relation to *philosophically*, by giving Rule 5th. The adverb *philosophically*, is parsed in the same manner, by shewing its relation to the participle *described*, as in Rule 5th. The numeral adjective *seven*, and the essential adjective *cardinal*, are both disposed of, as belonging to the noun *virtue*, in Rule 4th.

Therefore, every word in a sentence has its distinct and separate office and duty assigned it; so that each participle, whether present or perfect, agrees with its noun in one of the three cases. Though it sometimes happens, that a present participle is immediately succeeded by two perfect participles, thus: The letter having been written by him, &c. Each of these participles is parsed by itself, and has the noun *letter* for its subject, to which it applies by Rule 4th. Every verb too, is parsed by itself, and is either in the definite, indefinite, or imperative form, agreeing with its subject, or controled according to Rule 7th; and so of the rest.

ON LOGIC.

Logic as hitherto presented to us, is rather a dry, insipid and indigestible dish of mental food. But the fault lies more in the cookery, than in any want or deficiency of flavor in the article itself; for, instead of serving it up in its own native and vinous juices, and thereby rendering it a mental repast, not only inviting and agreeable to the taste, but also nutritious and healthful—yielding strength and vigor to the recipient, and bringing him forward to a noble and manly maturity—logicians have seathed it in the milk of its mother, *Logos*—taken in the sense of reason—and thereby rendered it unsavory and consequently, loathsome and unhealthy. Whereas, Logic, in the true meaning and proper application of the term, is one of the most edifying and profitable studies, that belong to the department of letters.

It has always been considered as pertaining entirely to syllogistic, or comparative reasoning; and consequently, nothing more than an art; although, wherever we find an art or practice of any kind, there must of necessity exist a science, on which the art or practice is built. Instead of defining it "the art of right reasoning, or of *using* reason well in our inquiries after truth," it ought to be defined the science of *truth itself* in its certainty, as developed in the realities presented to the mind through the medium of our corporeal senses, and the intuitive energies of the mind's own essence. And the art of it, is the practical use of the elements of truth, in *declaring* or examining what is manifested in those realities, through either or both of the above mediums.

Logic then, in its science and art, yields us the "*logikon* *adolon gala;*" that is, "the genuine historical milk," whereby we grow and increase to literary and scientific manhood. And whoever well understands the science and art of Logic, will possess those elements of truth whereby he can readily detect the errors, falsehoods and fallacies of oral or written composition or speech.

I said, that the science of Logic is the science of truth in its certainty. What is the nature then, or principles of this science or logic of truth? Its nature with regard to its principles and their application, is different from any other science known; and this is the *rock* on which logical writers have split. For, it has a duplex or two-fold nature, which embraces the truth of realities themselves, and the truth of expressions in words, as their true representatives. There is a very happy and peculiar propriety in the word itself; for the neuter adjective *to logikon* taken as a noun, signifies the *rationale*, nature or reason of a thing; but the attributive adjective *logikos;* that is, logical, refers to an account rendered in words, as "*logikon adalon gala,*" the "genuine historical milk." Therefore, the word *Logic*, in its full definition, embraces precisely what the science itself does, to wit, the truth of things, and the truth of words or the representatives of things.

The principles of Logic then, apply to realities existent and non-existent, and also to the sentences or propositions in words, in which those realities are published. This science then, is not the science of the mind, having mental powers and capacities for its elements, as many apprehend it to be; although the mind, like any other subject, may be discussed and tested by its principles, and any *question* respecting it settled by them, as we do that of any other subject. From the duplex nature of this science however, it possesses a superior claim to every other, and renders to the mind a two-fold advantage in the acquisition of knowledge. For, by applying its principles and practising on them, the mind not only gains a more distinct knowledge of itself, but acquires a wonderful and happy facility in arriving at and gaining a clearer knowledge of every thing else. From this fact, I apprehend, has arisen the grand mistake of logical writers in treating of it as pertaining directly to the mind itself. In acquiring the knowledge of any science or art whatever, the mind receives a stimulus and an impetus, which it did not possess before; for, like every other propelent power, if you increase the force, you quicken the action and accelerate the movement. But as I said before, this science, by its two-fold nature and the universal application of its principles to every other science or art, gives facilities to the mind, which cannot be found in any other science. Therefore, make yourself thoroughly acquainted with the principles of the Logic, which is here laid down, and whose principles are explained and applied in various examples, and my word for it, you will be in possession of the grand secret which many men possess, without knowing it, and which gives them such wonderful advantage over their fellows.

I said, that Logic as a system, has a duplex nature; that is, it embraces the economy of realities, and the economy of definitions, or the significancy of language. Consequently, we might naturally suppose, that it had two distinct sets of elementary principles—one for each department. But it is not the fact, and the manifest reason is this, that truth in principle and truth in fact being the ultimate object of all our mental pursuits, the types and symbols must assume whatever belongs to their originals or archetypes. Consequently, by whatever tests, or in whatever manner the originals are recognized by the mind, when under its direct and immediate inspection through any of the bodily senses, or through the mind's own intuitive energies; by the same tests, and in the same manner, must these originals be recognized by it, in the definitions of these types and symbols. Therefore, when these originals are absent, or not in the field of the mind's vision through the medium of sense, (which may be the case with all material objects,) their symbolical definitions or names being presented through articulate sounds or written characters, are the direct objects, from which the mind pencils in the dexterity of thought, and sketches out images of its own.

Here then, with regard to the material kingdom, we have images substantial or pictorial, for the objects of the mind's notice. Now let us inquire into the particulars, that belong to images natural or artificial. These are, personal presentation, properties, qualities and relations; all of which are as varied and diversified, as the images themselves are.

Therefore, presentation, properties, qualities, and relations, are the four grand elements or primary principles of Logic, as a science, *on* which, not *by* nor *with* which—for the mind reasons by and with its own powers—but *on* which, I say, the mind reasons, that is, casts it flowing rays of intellectual light, and (*oide*) sees, knows, and understands what is before it. These four elements or primary principles, are included in the two generic words or terms, *state* and *condition*. State embraces presentation and properties, and condition embraces qualities and relations. Herein you see the force and propriety of such expressions as these—that such or such is the *state* of the question, case or subject; and that such or such is the *condition* of it. So also, of these expressions—*state* the proposition, *state* the question, *state* the case or subject, and let us know the *conditions*, on which the issue rests.

Every subject then, both general and particular, of whatever description, for consideration and discussion, has its *state* and *condition* in time and place; so that, every species of composition or speech, embraces in each and all its sentences, the full and entire elements of Logic, under the two general heads of *state* and *condition* in time and place; each, and all of which will be more fully discussed and explained hereafter.

Whoever therefore, speaks or writes with credit or advantage to himself, and with usefulness and profit to the world, must discuss his subject in that order and arrangement, which Nature has prescribed and pointed out; and the above four particulars, taken in the order in which they stand, viz presentation, properties, qualities and relations, constitute precisely the order and arrangement, which she maintains through all her works. And when the footsteps of Nature are traced out, and displayed before us in their due order of succession, we are not less attracted, engaged, edified and benefited, than when the real objects stand directly before us. Order and method then, are her two first laws; and those who conform strictly to them, will merit and obtain the approbation of their fellows.

Having shewn what the science of Logic is in its elements, we will now endeavor to shew what the art of it is in its practice.

I said, that the art of any science, consists in the actual practice or exercise of using its elements as the instrumental means, whereby we obtain certain results flowing from their regular and proper adjustment.. What then, is the art of Logic, since the mere elements of its science appear to be the very results themselves, at which we aim as the sole object of all our pursuits and inquiries? Here is the mystery. In every other science, we use the elements of it as the instrumental means, under the control and direction of the mind's sapience; by which means thus directed, we arrive at certain results, decisions, or conclusions in that science. But this is not the fact with the art of Logic; for, instead of using the elements of it as the instrumental means, by which certain results are obtained, the mind uses *upon* these elements its own instrumental means, which are its own executive powers and faculties, under the same control and direction of its sapience—the mind; I say, uses its own instrumental means *upon* these elements, *out of* which—not *by* which—but *out of* which, flow certain results, decisions or conclusions.

In every other science the elements of it are known, both in their names and in their *efficiency*, or definite value, by which the truth is obtained; but in Logic the elements are known only in name, and their *efficiency* is the truth itself, as the ultimate end and aim of the whole pursuit and inquiry. And when this efficiency is known in its truth, all is known, that can be known, about men and things; and all that belongs to Logic, in the entire extent and application of its science and art.

The truth of this position with regard to Logic, if not already manifest to the mind of my reader, will be made doubly manifest in the illustrations and examples, that follow in their order. Herein rests the true secret, both in the theory and practice of Logic; and it constitutes the essential difference, which separates this from every other science in theory and in practice.

The practice or art of Logic then, consists in the mind's viewing the elements of its science, in their efficiency, as they actually do exist in and pertain to the images standing before it, either through physical sense, or its own inventive and creative power; and these images must belong to the material kingdom, either in substance or in pictorial emblem formed by the mind from definitions or the significancy of language. I here speak of the material kingdom alone; but the immaterial and abstract kingdoms will be discussed and explained in their order, with regard to the manner, in which we obtain a knowledge of their realities. View your subject then, first, in all its personal presentations; and every subject, whether general or particular, has its own in distinct degrees of variety and number. Secondly: View your subject in all its properties and qualities, which are discovered, either in the beings themselves, or in the definitions of them, signified by the words, which compose a sentence or proposition. Thirdly: View your subject in all its relations—personal or social, private or public.

These three views or considerations fully made, embrace the entire state and condition of beings in time and place. And whoever takes these views of his subject, whether a single object, or a group of objects composing a scenery or prospect, will have a distinct perception, a vivid idea, a full conception, a clear evidence, a positive proof, and a cogent argument; that is, he will have a complete and genuine historical account or logic of his subject, to be used, both as a matter of record and a settled axiom, or a well defined premise in the illustration and establishment of some other matter more remote and difficult of access.

Having pointed out the elements or primary principles of Logic as a science, and the practice of it as an art, I will here illustrate the beauty and facility of their application to any proposition or question, that belongs to the department of letters or science.

I will first begin with a few examples taken from mathematics, which are as foreign in the nature of their theory and practice, from Logic, as any other science. I said, that the *state* of a being, in its own person, or the subject of a sentence, proposition, or question, embraces presentation and properties; and that the *condition* of it, embraces its qualities and relations.

Under these two heads then, let us examine a few mathematical questions. And first: "What number is that, to which if you add two-thirds of itself, the sum will be 30?" The state of this question is first presented in some unknown quantity, affected or increased by a definite number of its own aliquot parts denominated *thirds;* which sum or union constitutes its final state of specific properties. But this final state or union of properties, is presented in the qualified condition of *five* equal parts; and in this qualified condition of *five* parts, it has a relation of equality to the number 30. The number 30 then, can now be assumed as its definitely known state, possessing the same equivalent properties in the same qualified condition of 5 equal parts. Strip 30 then, of its affected or increased aliquot parts, and the remaining parts must constitute the number sought. Consequently, divide 30 by 5, and the quotient will be 6, which is one of those aliquot parts, and they have been denominated *thirds;* therefore, 3 times 6 or 18, is the number sought. Now, let us prove this result or answer by the state and condition of the question. There are 3 thirds in 18, each of which is 6; then 2 thirds are equal to 12—and 18 added, are equal to 30. Therefore, 18 is the true result or answer to the question.

Again: What number is that, from which, if you take three-tenths, the remainder will be equal to 49? The state of this question is presented in an unknown quantity, with denominated properties of aliquot parts in tenths; and this state being affected in the qualified condition of three-tenths loss, possesses seven-tenths only, as the sum of its properties or aliquot parts. But this state in this qualified condition, has a relation of equality to the number 49. Forty-nine then, may now be assumed as the state of the question in the same qualified condition of three-tenths loss, possessing seven-tenths only, as the sum of its properties or aliquot parts. Resolve or divide 49 by 7, and you have a quotient 7, equal to one of those aliquot parts. Consequently, 7 times the whole number of aliquot parts, viz. 10, are equal to that number. Therefore 70 is the true answer to the question. Now let us prove this answer by the state and condition of the question. One-tenth of 70 is equal to 7, and 3 times 7 are equal to 21; but 21 substracted from 70, leaves 49. Q. E. D.

Again: There is a fish whose head is 9 inches long, and his tail is as long as his head and half of his body; but his body is as long as his head and tail both; how long is the fish? The state of this question is presented in that of a fish, whose properties are specified in the order, and under the names of head, tail, and body; and the qualified condition of this state consists in the relative and compared degrees of length, belonging to these essential properties or parts. And first, the head is 9 inches long, and the tail is as long as the head and half of the body; consequently, in this comparison one part of the tail, is known to be 9 inches. But the body is as long as the head and tail together. In this comparison 18 inches of the body are now known; for the head being 9 and one part of the tail 9, their sum is 18 inches. Now the balance of the body consists in the other part of the tail, which is declared to be half of the body; consequently, this balance of the body must be its half. Therefore, 18 inches are the other half of it. But 2 times 18 are 36, equal to the whole body; and 18 added to 9 make 27, equal to the tail. Therefore, $9+27+36=72$ inches or 6 feet, make the length of the whole fish.

The nature of this question is such, that it carries the proof along with the result or answer; and the reason is this, the question is given synthetically, that is, the state of its subject is one entire being with implied properties. But in declaring its qualified and relative condition, this state is analyzed; so that, in putting together again these relative and compared parts, the question has undergone analysis and synthesis, which are all that any question can undergo, both in illustration and proof. But more of this hereafter. Once more: An old market woman bought eggs, and sold them at a loss. She bought them in parcels—3 for a penny, and as many, 2 for a penny—but sold them all—5 for 2 pence, and lost 4 pence in the bargain. How many eggs did she buy?

The state of this question is presented in the duplex conduct, or reciprocal actions of a person in traffic, having the duplex qualified condition expressed in the manner of the conduct, and its relative and comparative results. The first presentation of this duplex state of the question, is made in the purchase of 3 eggs for a penny, and as many, viz. 3 for a penny half-penny—making 6 eggs for two pence half-penny, or 2.5 pence. The second presentation of it, is the sale of eggs, 5 for 2 pence; and a loss of 4 pence in the sale of the whole purchase. Now let us see what 6 eggs sold for, at the rate of 5 for 2 pence: 6 is one-fifth more than 5; consequently, 6 eggs sold for 2 pence and one-fifth of 2 pence, or two-fifths of 1, equal to four-tenths. Therefore, 6 eggs sold for 2.4 pence; but they cost 2.5 pence—making a loss of one-tenth on 6 eggs. But the whole loss is 4 pence; consequently, there are 40 tenths loss on the entire sale. But one-tenth loss belongs to 6 eggs; consequently, forty-tenths loss belongs to 40 times 6, or 240 eggs, which is the whole purchase and sale, and the true answer to the question.

Now let us prove the question. The sum of 240 eggs is now first presented as the duplex state of the question, in the duplex qualified condition of halves or two equal parts of 120 each—one part bought at the rate of 3 for a penny, amounting to 40 pence; and the other part bought at the rate of 2 for a penny, amounting to 60 pence—equal to 100 pence for the 240 eggs. The second presentation of said state, is the same 240 eggs in the qualified condition expressed in their sale of 5 for 2 pence, and a loss of 4 pence in the sale; consequently, 2 times the quotient of 240 divided by 5=96, is the amount of sale. But 96 taken from 100 leaves a remainder of 4 pence, the ultimate condition of the question.

These are a few of the thousand questions and propositions in mathematics, which may be solved by the proper application of the elementary principles laid down in this system of Logic; and any political, civil, moral, religious, or metaphysical question, can be solved by them, resulting in the same definite and positive answers, that belong to mathematical questions or propositions, if these four elements herein laid down, are clearly discerned and strictly followed in the entire course of discussion. But I said, that Logic in its science and art, has a duplex nature, possessing elements equally applicable to the realities themselves, and to their definitions or the significancy of language; and that its elements, with reference to the science as a system, are known only in their names, and not in their efficiency, or fixed and definite value, as *instrumental means*, by which results are produced. But this is not all of their peculiarity; for, when they are applied to mere declaration or expressed sentences, as in the case of syllogisms, they then are known, both in their names and their efficiency or definite value, like the elements of other sciences. Consequently, when they are applied to sentences as granted and admitted premises, they are used as the *instrumental means*, by which the conclusions are adduced. And in this sense alone, and in this view of its elements—that is, in view of their efficiency being known—have syllogisms been introduced into Logic, and considered its true and only legitimate office, as asserted by a modern logician. But make the elements of Logic consist in what you please, I care not what, whenever you use them as the *instrumental means*, you do and must use them as the *efficient means*, by which certain results are produced; for it is the immediate or mediate efficiency of a thing, that constitutes it an agent or instrumental means, by which any effect is produced; as is the case with the elements of numbers and geometry, whose efficiencies or fixed and definite values are all known, as well as their names. And such sciences are called abstract, because their elements are all fixed and known in a definite amount or value; and therefore, any hypothesis or proposition laid down, is conducted in its resolution or development by these fixed and definite elementary principles, without regard or application to any particular order or class of beings.

But, when any such science is applied in its practice to existent beings, for the purpose of ascertaining their definite value and capacity, these beings must first undergo an actual survey in their elementary character, and be tested by these scientific principles applied in their elementary character, before any certain, definite and ultimate result or conclusion can be formed and pronounced upon them.

Thus we see, that whenever beings themselves as they exist, are the direct and immediate objects of our inquiry, no elements of any science, will definitely attach to them, until the very beings have undergone a critical examination in their own elementary character; and this character is presentation and properties, under the general head of *state* or standing out; and qualities and relations under the general head of *condition*, which is the constant and inseparable companion of *state*, and which is as variable and diversified, as the vicissitudes of this world.

Thus we see, that the state of different individuals may be precisely similar or alike, while their conditions are as various and distinct as the colors of the rainbow, or as the painted flowers of the field. The elements of Logic then, do in fact become fully known in their efficiency or definite and individual force, when applied in practice to existent beings. So that the real difference between the elements of Logic and the elements of abstract science, is simply this—that the former are definitely known in their names only, (except when taken in the sense of express declaration or admitted premises,) until they are practically applied and attached to existent beings; while the latter are fully known, both in name and efficiency, in their abstract consideration.

The reason of this difference is very manifest, since the science of Logic is literally in theory and practice, as its name signifies, the science of historical or descriptive accounts rendered of men and things. But as there can be no account rendered before there is an account *taken* or made out, so, (as to the real state and *condition* of those accounts with regard to the truth of their rendition,) no correct judgment can be formed, before they are examined and proved with regard to the justice of their claims, by comparing the account of the things with the things themselves. To receive and admit accounts just as they are rendered in, which is evidently the case in syllogistic reasoning, does very little towards establishing the justice of their claims. And this is the reason that a question may be raised against the conclusion of any syllogism; not against the legitimacy of the deduction flowing from the premises, but against the legality of the claim contained in the conclusion itself.

Therefore, genuine logical reason, and incontrovertible logical truth, consist not in deductions or conclusions regularly drawn from granted or admitted premisės, but in the exact correspondence of the declaration, that is, the affirmation or negation contained in the premises, sentences or propositions separately or singly considered, to the fact, or actual state and condition of those realities, about which the declaration is made. All that syllogistic reasoning can do, is simply, to draw comparative deductions or conclusions of this kind, viz: that whatever belongs to a class of beings, must belong also to the individuals of whom it is composed; and this is manifest from the nature, composition, and meaning of the word syllogism. It constitutes a species of generalization on particulars under a characteristic of their genus, species, class or kind. Therefore, whatever a syllogism affirms or denies in its conclusion, is simply a result, that has flowed from relationship of some sort or other. And this is the very nature of all comparative reasoning or comparison; and the very object we have in view, when we resort to it, is merely to ascertain the relation of likeness or unlikeness, agreement or disagreement existing between beings of any kind.

From what has been said, it must be manifest, both from the nature of the process, and meaning of the word, that a syllogism does nothing more, than show a result founded and predicated on relationship alone, which embraces only one of the elements of Logic, as laid down in the above system. But in further illustration of the nature and extent of a syllogism, I shall presently examine some of the most approved examples.

Now let us examine the real difference existing between Logic and Rhetoric. The art or practice of Logic, has reference to the *reading* of the mind; that is, it refers to the flowing energies of the mind exercised in recognizing what belongs to, and is resident in some real object standing before it, either in its own native form, or in the pictorial image of it presented through the significancy of language, or the definitions of words; and this operation of the mind is called *reasoning*. It is in the art of Logic then, that any direct reference is made to the mind; for the elements of Logic apply to the mind just as they apply to any other being, and in no other way; but the art or practice of it necessarily refers to the process or operation of the mind employed in the practice, as in the art of any other science. The art of Logic then, applies first to the process of the mind; that is, to the orderly and methodical course under the name of reasoning, which it takes in gaining a knowledge of realities, and which it pursues through physical means, viz. the senses, with the objects presented before it. This is true with regard to all physical objects; for whether the object is presented in its own person, or in the definition of language, the presentation is made through some one or more of the senses; as seeing, hearing, &c. I here speak of the material universe alone; for, objects of the moral and spiritual kingdom, are surveyed through other means, being presented through the medium of the mind's own effulgence, whereby they are rendered cognizable to it; for these objects are truths in principle and truths in fact; that is, efficient powers, and their actions or doings.

Herein consists the duplex nature of the elements of Logic mentioned above; because presentation, properties, &c. apply both to realities themselves in their naked forms, and to their pictorial definitions in the significancy of language. In this duplex nature of the elements of Logic, is also seen the reason, why Logic and grammar have no necessary connection; inasmuch as grammar refers only to the modifications or changes that words undergo in the construction of sentences, without regard to their meaning; whereas Logic refers directly to the meaning or definition of words, and to the significancy of those sentences, which are composed of them. Grammar then, has reference to the *construction* of language, while Logic has reference to the *significancy* of it, as the second essential branch of its duty. Rhetoric however, is said to hold this office of deciding on the significancy of language, but this is a grand mistake; for it does no such thing. All that rhetoric does or can do, is to judge of, and choose out the kind of artificial dress that the subject is capable of wearing, without doing violence to its nature. And as mankind are very fond of tawdry show and splendid drapery, Rhetoric keeps a fancy shop, where she deals in the gaudy mimicry of silks, lace and ribbons, to attract attention, and to gain admirers; while Logic has a large and well assorted wardrobe of her own selecting, where she keeps for her own use a full and constant supply of articles composed of good, strong, and comely texture, fited for the use and service of all ranks, and adapted to the character and wants of every individual in the diversified circumstances of time and place.

Thus it appears, that one of the primary duties of Logic, is to judge of, and to determine on the significancy of language wrought into sentences; and to choose out and clothe her subjects with such suitable and appropriate garbs, as their characters, spheres and stations in life severally demand. Therefore, it is the science of Logic, that teaches the nature, force, propriety and application of the terms or essential parts of a sentence; and the nature of, and what the abstract considerations are belonging to those realities, about which sentences treat; and its art teaches how to view those realities in their elementary considerations, and how to choose out proper symbols, in order to *form* a true conception, and give a true representation of them. A sentence may conform to all the requirements of grammatical exactness, and yet contain perfect nonsense, a manifest falsehood, or a direct contradiction, the detection and correction of which belong to the province of Logic.

Language and Logic then, are separate and distinct, both in their science and art. The one in its science and art, furnishes the materials and manufactures words, and gives them their form, cut and cue in a sentence; while the other in its science and art, furnishes the subjects for, teaches the nature and texture of those fabrics of language, and shews what kind of garment is necessary and proper for the subject to wear, in order to appear in its true character. The art of Logic, like the merchant tailor, chooses the proper materials and measures his subject for a dress; and the art of language, like his journeyman, makes it up and puts it on.

The art of Logic then, in its full extent, embraces a *process* of reasoning, which the mind employs in the exercise of its own powers, on *viewing* the *state* and *condition* of those realities, which are presented before it, either in their own naked forms, or in those images which are furnished through, and clothed in the livery of language. In order more fully to comprehend and distinctly to understand the entire economy of the system, and to feel the force and utility of its practical results, I will now explain all the terms used in this economy; thereby shewing the propriety of each term, and the connection and harmony, that breathe through the whole.

I said, that the elements of Logic are, first, presentation; secondly, properties and qualities; and thirdly, relations personal and social.

And 1st. What is meant by presentation? It means some form, shape, figure, or aspect, which every being or reality, whether material or spiritual, concrete or abstract, existent or non-existent, must assume in order to be an object of, or cognizable to the mind. Presentation then, necessarily implies some peculiar state, which every object of the mind must possess, and which must be fixed and uniform in some definite adjustment, or union of property or properties; of power or powers; or in degree or degrees of energy. In what state must this presentation be made? It must be made in one of three states,—either standing forth as an actor, agent, or communicant subject, doing something and affecting others; or in the state of a recipient subject affected by, and sustaining the effects of others; or in that state which nature gives it, and which every subject possesses in the enjoyment of its native rights and privileges.

2ndly. What is meant by properties? Property means some peculiar gift, grant, power, faculty, or capacity, which all realities must possess in their natural, artificial, or modified state. Quality means, first, some particular movement, ability, force, degree, mode or affection, in which properties individually considered are put, possessed and enjoyed in their union or state, called natural, primitive and inherent, or artificial and modified qualities. Secondly: Quality means some particular effect, change or alteration, produced by the operations of those properties, and, if a sentient being, affecting his condition and position in weal or wo; but if not, affecting his primitive state. Here is a very important distinction to be noticed, and a proper discrimination to be made between state and condition. All finite, sentient beings, whether angelic or human, brutal or otherwise, affect, not their state by their own actions, but that concomitant condition, which belongs to their state. That condition, in which state is constituted and subsists, and exists, is vastly different and distinct from that condition, which accompanies every state; which is also liable to great changes by the conduct or operations of the beings that possess it, and out of which those beings draw all their enjoyment or misery, and not from their state. Sentient beings then, especially intelligent, affect not their state by their conduct, but the concomitant condition of some sort, which always accompanies their existent state. The above distinction between state and condition is a very important one; the truth of which is established, both by the laws of nature and the express revelation of God; but the neglect of which, has induced many learned men to say things, that are not only untrue, but very unphilosophical. State and condition then, when they are applied to sentient beings, refer to their structure, or established union of properties, by exercising which, they can change their concomitant condition for better or for worse, without affecting their state in the least; since they derive all their enjoyment or misery direct from their condition, and not from their state. The reason is this, that joy and misery are the *fruits* of *labor*, or the *results* of actions, and not the actions themselves, which flow from, and are the product of the properties, or powers. Therefore, the condition of a being may undergo ten thousand changes, while his state remains the same; but the moment the state is changed, or the constituency destroyed, he is no longer the same being, but another, or nothing at all, according as he is mortal or immortal in his nature. Moreover, the properties, that compose this state, may undergo various modifications in their individual capacities, as strong or weak, active or sluggish, bright or dim, &c. without affecting the constituency in its arrangement; and therefore, not affecting the state of the being.

From what has been said with regard to properties and qualities, it is very manifest, that the term *attribute* cannot be applied with any degree of propriety to properties; but that it belongs exclusively to qualities, which indicate either some modification of properties with respect to their efficiency, or their capacity individually considered; or they indicate the operations of those properties. Thus adjectives, verbs, participles and all words expressive of affection of any kind, are qualities or attributes, belonging to properties, and consequently included under the general term *condition*. As properties have their various degrees and modifications of qualities or attributes, so these qualities or attributes themselves have their degrees of amount or value qualified by a class of words called adverbs,—as very good, very bad, strongly marked, &c.

Again: Since adjectives are the qualities of beings as applied to their properties, or powers and capacities, and denote the *condition*, in which beings exist; and since this condition is affected, changed, or altered by the influence of actions alone, as communicant or recipient; so also, adjectives denote the amount of action, that is requisite to be performed, in order to bring a condition to that grade, which they indicate,—as pound the salt *fine*, saw the board *short*, drive the hoop *tight*, scrape the bark *smooth*, &c.

Once more: Adjectives denote the *condition*, and not the *manner*, in which beings exist and act; therefore, grammarians murder the adjective in the following and like sentences, when they call it an adverb: "*Remote* from cities lived a swain," &c. Here *remote* shews the *condition*, in which the swain lived, and not the *manner* of his living, either plentifully or sparingly.

3dly. What is meant by relations private and social? Private or personal relations have reference to the interchangeable and mutual connection, or the participation and community, which naturally subsist, or which may be formed between the several properties themselves, and their author; and social relations have reference to the connections, obligations, &c. which a being has with his fellow-beings in some particular intercommunion, or more general intercourse with the world. All relations then, private or public, are included under the general term *condition;* so that we have, properly speaking, only two generic heads, to one or to the other of which, we may readily and understandingly refer any question, declaration, consideration, suggestion, or hypothesis, that can be raised or made, concerning a being or subject of discussion, of whatever nature, order, rank, character and pursuit.

Here then, we have *state* and *condition*, to be taken together, or alone, as a universal theme, upon which all authors have treated, and must treat, whenever they add their labors to the almost infinite variety of works already in the archives of literature and science. Those who write on the state of their subject, discussing its constituent parts, and the power, force, capacity and movement of each, are called philosophers and theorists, who hold a place in the department of science; but those who write on the condition of their subject only, discussing the plans, schemes, manœuvres, events, and vicissitudes of life, are enroled on the long list of names posted up in the department of literature.

Now let us see, if language has not recognized this very system of Logic, as explained above, in the terminations of her adjectives and nouns. Take for instance, the verb *penetrate*, with its derivatives in adjectives and nouns,—as penetrant, penetrative, and penetrable; penetration, penetrancy, penetrability, penetrativeness, and penetrableness, five nouns. *Penetration*, and every other noun of this termination, is a verbal noun, expressing the manner, in which the power of the verb operates; that is, it is the name of the action of the verb. *Penetrancy*, and every other word with this termination, has reference either to the adjustment of communicant properties and capacities, or to the state in which they exist. *Penetrability*, and all other words of this termination, have reference to the recipient state, in which beings or their properties are, as subject to the influence and control of others. *Penetrativeness* has reference to the *condition*, that accompanies *penetrancy*. And all other abstract nouns of this derivation and termination refer to the condition of beings possessing operative and executive properties or powers; for example: "The *productiveness* of a *productive* soil." Here the adjective *productive* shews the energy belonging to the state or constituency of the soil, as opposed to steril or barren; and the abstract noun *productiveness* refers to the results, that flow from such a state; for the termination *ness*, means the same as the Latin phrase *in esse*, and is a contraction of it. So *goodness* means, *good in esse*, or in being; and *righteousness* means *righteous doing*. *Penetrableness*, and all nouns of this termination, has reference to the *condition*, that accompanies *penetrability*, and that belong to beings, whose state is liable to be affected by others,—as "He feels the liableness of his liability."

What is the difference then, between adjectives ending in *ant*, *ent*, and *ive*, and those ending in *ble?* All adjectives that have the three first terminations, viz. *ant, ent*, and *ive*, are communicant adjectives; that is, they express the qualities or functions of properties or powers, as operative and executive—putting forth their energies and producing effects, as causes. But all adjectives that end in *ble*, are recipient adjectives, to wit: they are attributes of properties and relations, which are subject to, and liable to be affected by the influence and control of others.

Both *state* and *condition* then, are communicant and recipient, even when the being is in possession of, and enjoying all his inherent rights and privileges. Therefore, in *state* and *condition*, created beings have their *relations*, from which are formed thousands of adjectives and nouns. By his *state*, the creature is related to his Creator, as the author of what he possesses; by his *condition* he is related to his fellow-creature in the ties of reciprocal duties.

The foregoing explanations shew us what a wonderful definiteness there is in the economy of language, which, with a moderate share of attention, and a little *inquisitiveness*, is readily seen—supplying us with a touch-stone, whereby we are able to select out, and determine on the signification, force, extent, and proper application of words in sentences.

O Logic! if thy votaries would but follow thee into thy sequestered abode, thou wouldst feed them with thy rich and pure historical milk, whereby they would grow up to literary manhood. Thus we have *state* multifarious in the number and kind of its properties, with their various shades and grades of communicant energies, or of susceptibilities, under the names of primitive, inherent, natural, artificial, accidental, and modified qualities or attributes; and this *state* is also accompanied by a necessary and inseparable *condition*, diversified with all the vicissitudes of time and place, and chequered over with endless relations and concatenations. Under the general and comprehensive heads of *state* and *condition*, we may bring any subject-matter, or matter of any subject, (*quod rei est*,) to a definite and decisive issue, termination, conclusion, or judgment, which we shall have and possess, as absolute knowledge, as moral certainty—as the assurance of faith, or as the confidence of hope—according as the subject is one, that stands before the mind in its own native and essential form, through mental light and organic sense, or in the pictorial image formed by the mind, through human testimony written or spoken.

The next inquiry seems to be, on what foundation does this conclusion or judgment rest, or by what means is the mind brought to this conclusion or judgment? The name of this foundation is *argument*, (*argutum mentis*,) which is made up or composed of proofs or evidences, woven by the mind into a web, or texture, on which its judgment is *stamped* by its own radiant beams of *light*.

We will now explain, and give the milk and honey of the terms *proof* or *evidence*, *argument* and *judgment*. The English verb *prove*, from which the noun *proof* is derived, comes to us from the Latin verb *probo*, which again is from the Greek compound verb *probaino*, signifying to go before one, or to come into his presence: therefore, *proof* refers to that testimony, which the mind gains by its own light, or through the medium of the senses. *Evidence* is from the Latin preposition, *ex* or *e*, and the verb *video*, signifying to see or discern clearly, or to have a prominent view of an object. Both these terms are very strong and definite, refering to the mind's own knowledge, by whatever means acquired. The only difference between the two words is the *manner* in which the object presents itself. *Proof* represents the object, as *coming* before the mind and shewing itself; while *evidence* represents the object, as *standing* before the mind, and shewing itself.

Argument comes to us from the Latin noun *argumentum*, compounded of *argutum* and *mentis;* but the Latins took their verb *arquo*, from the Hebrew verb *arg*, signifying to weave, to entwine, to link or unite together: therefore, the noun means a web, texture or fabric. But in the word *judgment*, we find that which gives beauty, order, simplicity, strength, and unity to the whole structure; for, our noun *idea*, which is the same in Greek—the Greek verb *eido* or *eideo*, and Latin verb *judico*, are all from one and the same origin or root, namely, from the Hebrew verb *idaa*, signifying to see with the organic eye, or with the mind's eye; that is, to know, understand, &c. So that our word *judgment*, (*judicium mentis*,) the Latin *judicium*, the Greek and English *idea*, literally mean a form or image, which the mind beholds, like that presented through the natural eye.

Thus we have proof or evidence, argument, and judgment, the three grand pillars on which rests the broad and extensive platform of judicial economy; and three pillars are requisite to support a platform of any kind. The demands or claims then, charges or predications set forth in questions, sentences, propositions or declarations, are all tried, and found to be *true* or *false*, by one and the same process of the mind; whether they are brought before it seated on the tribunal of public justice, or sitting in the private *chair* of its own chancellor dignity. A *declaration* is first made, in which some demand, claim, or charge is set forth as TRUE, in favor or against some person or thing, matter or cause; the *truth* of which is *attested* or *denied* by the several *proofs* or *evidences* standing by as witnesses; and "by the mouth of *two* or *three* witnesses every thing is established." Therefore, upon the *argument* or texture of these *proofs*, the declaration or charge will stand or fall as this contains, *yea* or *nay*, on which judgment is rendered and stamped accordingly.

Having pointed out the peculiar appearances of the different dishes containing mental food, and shewn their order and arrangement; and having also illustrated the various nutritive properties and qualities of their several contents, I will here present the reader with a *course* according to that order and arrangement, before I proceed to explain the peculiar mode, called *reasoning*, in which the mind is *said* to act in satisfying itself with its proper element. And this I shall do with the greater cheerfulness; because I believe, that the mind will, without knowing or even caring why it acts, and how it acts, seize upon its proper food, when presented, and satisfy its appetite as eagerly, as willingly, and as naturally and actively, as the hungry man will seize upon the food, and satisfy his wants, when seated at a table loaded with such viands as his appetite craves, without knowing or even caring, how it is, or why it is, that he is able to use his hands and wag his jaws. For, I am fully persuaded, that the first and greatest difficulty with the mind, is the not knowing in what its proper food consists, nor even how or where to find it; at least, not knowing where to find the porous part of that envelope which conceals the solid meat, so as to come at the real substance with the greater ease. Because, I have seen many, very many, who seem to have nibbled away a large portion of the crust or outside, without ever coming to the meat; and after their teeth had become blunt, and their eyes dim with age, they were about to *depart* with exhausted strength and famished appetite.

We will now examine some of the most approved syllogisms. And first,—

"All tyrants deserve death.
Cæsar was a tyrant;
Therefore, Cæsar deserved death."

The question, which this syllogism pretends to answer and settle, arises out of the predicate or declaration about Cæsar, viz: "He deserved death."

The argument used to establish this charge, is contained in the first or major proposition, viz: "All tyrants deserve death." But an *objection* to the charge of death upon tyrants, is as weighty, and merits our attention as justly, as the one made to the same charge prefered against Cæsar. By transfering the charge to tyrants, we substitute one subject for another, which substitute is now made to bear the burden imposed on the first. This is changing subjects, instead of proving the charge to be just and true; unless the premises be granted, that all tyrants deserve death. But allowing this to be true, it does not prove that Cæsar was a tyrant, which needs proving as much as the charge, that he deserved death, and even more so; not only because the latter will not attach until the former is proved, but also, because the proofs that he was a tyrant, lie more concealed than the proofs, that tyrants deserve death. And the reason is this, that the latter proofs are the general principles of our nature, as self-preservation and the common rights of man; but the former are obtained from human testimony, which can only prove *actions* and not *principles.* Therefore, any allegation, charge or *elenchus*, brought forward, or any declaration made concerning beings, must refer either to their state, or to their condition; that is, either to the constituent principles of their nature, or to their actions and relations. Consequently, when the declaration pertains to the nature of beings, setting forth something belonging to its economy, the truth or falsity of it is settled by bringing forward the very items of this economy, against which the charges lie.

These items constitute the only proper witnesses to confront and answer to the charges; and their testimony is the only argument, by which the charges stand or fall. But when the declaration pertains to the actions of beings, the charges are sustained or overcome by human testimony, as the only argument in the cause. But the declaration, "Cæsar was a tyrant, and therefore deserved death," contains charges that pertain both to the economy of our nature, and to the actions of an individual of our race. Therefore, we must have two distinct sets of witnesses, in order to sustain or overcome all the charges contained in the declaration. One set must be brought from the factories of nature, and the other from the abodes of distress. Thus we find, that all questions and inquiries must relate, either to the economy of nature with regard to its elementary principles, in their adjustment, or to the actions of beings with their concomitant effects; or to both together.

We will now attempt to settle the question contained in the foregoing syllogism, by our own mode of reasoning.

"Cæsar deserved death." Why? Because he was a tyrant. But how do you know that? And if he was, why do tyrants deserve death?

In answer to the first of these questions, I offer Cæsar's self in the history of his conduct, sanctioned by human testimony; which amounts to moral certainty, that he was a tyrant. And in answer to the last question, I offer self-preservation, the first law of our nature; and the common rights of man, sanctioned by divine authority. Therefore, Cæsar was a tyrant by human testimony; and consequently, deserved death by the laws of God and man. Here I have been followed up with question after question, until I retreated into the entrenchments of the laws and economy both of God and man; where I am protected by their impregnable ramparts, which defy all opposition. And unless we do retreat into these strong holds, no answer can be given, that will stand incontrovertible. Again:

"Every wicked man is truly miserable.
All tyrants are wicked men; therefore,
All tyrants are truly miserable."

The conclusion in this syllogism professes to settle the question of misery charged upon tyrants in the minor proposition; and the argument adduced is the predicate of the major proposition, viz. "truly miserable," as attributable to all wicked men; and tyrants being *men*, must bear the charge. In order to sustain the charge of the major proposition, we must retreat over the stream of time into the regions of futurity; that is, we must resort to divine revelation, and the special interposition of God, in arresting the mad career of infatuated mortals. For, Belshazzar and all his court were as merry as crickets, and as happy as hilarity could make them, until the king saw the mystic hand penciling out his doom in visible, though unknown characters.

Moreover: "And Abraham said to the rich man, Son, remember, that in thy lifetime thou receivedst thy *good things*, and likewise," that is, in his lifetime, "Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented." Therefore, the charge in the declaration cannot be sustained by any testimony taken, either from the economy of our nature, or from human witnesses; but it must come from the world of spirits, and the time of its rendition is not yet. Consequently, with respect to the present life, the charge is not *true*, and therefore, the conclusion is *false*.

The following is said to be the celebrated syllogism, by which Aristotle so forcibly proved, that the virtues are inseparable, and which is this:

"He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue;
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence.
Therefore, he who possesses one, possesses all."

If this syllogism is a faithful translation of the original, couched in terms corresponding in their extent, to those used by the author, I must confess, that I am not a little surprised at the oversight of its inventor, and the duplicity of its admirers. For, it is the first time I ever found a man seriously endeavoring to prove, that a *part* contains the *whole*, or that a particular term was more universal than a general one; which is evidently the fact in this instance. Prudence, which is made to contain virtue, is a mere appendage of it, if entitled to *any* fellowship with it. There is only one word in any language, that is more generic or universal, than *virtue*, (*aretee*,) or that contains virtue; and this is faith, (*pistis*,) which, as St. Peter most judiciously, philosophically and beautifully illustrates, includes the seven cardinal virtues; making the term virtue (*aretee*) embrace or comprehend the other six, and including it with them under the term *faith*. Faith then, to be complete, comprehends the seven *virtues*, separate and distinct in themselves, with which *prudence* is not allowed to share a part, unless you interpret *encrateia* to be *prudence*; but it is far better translated into *temperance*, or *moderation*. And even then, it would be nothing more, than a *class* or *kind*, of which *virtue* is the generic head, being three degrees more universal. The fact is, *prudence*, in modern ethics, or in the ethics of the Apostles, is *not* a virtue; and for a very good reason arising from the origin or composition of the word—whether you take our English *prudence*, the Latin *prudentia*, or any of the Greek words, that have a relation to it.

No property or power of the mind or body, can be called a virtue, that is, praise-worthy and approvable conduct. For, that is not a *virtue*, which we possess as a natural gift, and *prudence* is one of them; for it refers directly to a mental acuteness or mental foresight, as seen in the very composition of the word, coming as it does from the Greek preposition *pro*, and the verb *eido*, to see, and therefore signifying foresight, mental discernment, cunning, &c. But each and all the *virtues* have a direct reference to the actions of the mind, or to so many separate and distinct mental operations, as are manifested in the discharge of our social duties, each producing its own good effects, or pleasing and approved results. For, take *aretee* (virtue) from either of the two Greek verbs, (and from one or the other, it must come,) the meaning ultimates in the one given above.

The fact is, that the term *virtue* has no direct *reference* to property or power, much less a direct *application* to them; but it has both a direct reference and a direct application to *actions* or *mental operations*, as manifested in the effects produced by the discharge of our social relations. That the term *virtue* is applied directly to the *effects* or *results* of operative powers, is further shewn by its application to inanimate nature, as the *virtue* of medicine, meaning the *effect*, which it is able to produce.

And here I will further add, that all we know, or ever can know in this world, about the *abstract principles* of things, as efficient causes, is obtained through the medium of their effects. And the names, that we give to these principles, are in fact derived or abstracted from the names originally applied to the effects produced by some indefinable *cause*. I say, *indefinable* in itself, and known no farther, than in its uniform effects, which are classified under some general head, as a *term*, and applied, properly speaking, to an *unknown* cause; that is, *unknown* in itself with regard to its essence, but known with regard to its existence by its effects, it being literally the potency of God, clearly seen in the *things* that are made; "for in Him we live, move and have our being." All the terms, such as electricity, caloric, magnetism, fear, hope, joy, anger, muscular strength, &c. which refer to the elementary operative principles of physical nature, organic or not, are derived from nouns denoting the effects of the action of some cause performing its operative agency.

These terms then, are the names given to causes or principles, as efficient powers, if they are active agents, producing effects; but if not, they are names given to certain definite and fixed relations or proportional ratios of difference between beings with regard to numeral amount of extent, capacity, magnitude, or velocity. Any science, that has direct reference to the *relations* of beings with one another in any of the above respects, that is, to their comparative amounts in extent, capacity, magnitude, or velocity, is called an *abstract* science; for the reason, that these several definite and relative proportions can be variously affected in their intercommunion, and true results can be ascertained apart from any particular class of beings whatever. But that science, which has the properties, or operative powers of animate beings for its elementary principles, must discuss the *modes* of action of those beings possessing particular powers, &c.

Therefore man, in the full and extensive consideration of his nature, has a personal interest, and participation in all the sciences and arts. But ethics treat of the merit or demerit of his actions or conduct, with regard to his personal and social relations, out of which arise certain obligations and duties, to be discharged and performed. And the very notion of obligation and duty presupposes a superior and an inferior; and the very idea of superior and inferior presupposes liability, and therefore, accountability, under the characters of *giver* and *receiver;* but accountability presupposes ability to account to, and something to account for; wherefore, the very idea of *ability* presupposes liberty, freedom of action and choice, which last are the qualities and attributes of intellectual power, or divine light, lighting every man that comes into the world; which light, by the very term, includes immortality, liberty or freedom, accountability, superior and inferior, or grantor and grantee; and consequently, obligation and duty. These all constitute the elements or principles of moral and intellectual science.

Why then, has a single science been divided into two—one under the name of moral science or ethics, and the other under the name of intellectual science—when in fact, there is but one? In this case, the art or practice of a science, has been called a science. For the ethics or conduct of men, is the art or practice of their intellectual powers, (*to energein*) working and toiling, not only in the discharge of obligations or relative duties, but also in surveying the regions of abstract relations of things, and those of futurity. So that, whatever a man does, in the whole routine of his conduct, he must account to his Creator for the use or abuse of his gifts. Consequently, the above operations of the mind, whether manifested in bodily actions, or in mental results, are all human, and belong to a single being, or to his whole race under the term *man*.

Therefore, since the principle is one and active, but the actions are many and diverse, there cannot be a greater affinity between the virtues, than there is between the vices; because the virtues are approvable and approved results of action, even our thoughts; and the vices are condemnable and condemned results of action, even our thoughts. Therefore, the bond of union between the virtues, and between the vices, is one and the same thing; that is, similitude of classified effects, resulting from the multifarious actions of one and the same principle or power.

I have pursued the examination of the above syllogism, more for the sake of shewing my reader the economy of language in its definitions and the significancy of its terms, than for any other purpose. But, that he may see more clearly the falsity of the syllogism, I will substitute the term *money* in the place of *prudence*, and the term *wealth* in the place of *virtue;* and then the falsity will stand fully exposed; because *money* is a specific term for physical property, and stands related to *wealth* a general term for all desirable physical things, in the same manner that *prudence* stands related to *virtue;* since *prudence* is a *specific* term for mental property, and *virtue* is a *general* term for all desirable mental things.

He who possesses money, possesses all wealth.

He who possesses one wealth, must possess money. Therefore,—

He who possesses one, possesses all wealth; although I have seen many men very wealthy in real and personal estate, yet quite destitute of *cash.*

It appears, that Logic writers have one very important lesson yet to learn, which is this—that logical reasoning is not conducted on the doctrine of geometrical proportions in numeral *amount;* nor even in numeral *account* any farther, than in relation to the order of classification of beings under general heads, more or less extensive in their application to those beings,—as animal, man, tree, beast, bird, fish, insect; or sheep, swine, horse, dog, cat, &c. These terms of classification of individuals include a greater or less number of them according as they are more or less general in their signification. Therefore, any individual, that possesses the essential property or properties signified by either of these terms, may be classed under that common head. So also, similar consequences of actions however different, may be classed under some general term indicative of those consequences. Therefore, whatever is said of one being with respect to this common property, may be said in the same respect of all those, that possess it. But this is a sort of abstract generalization or analogical comparative reasoning, which is well enough in its place. But in order to pass through life with ease and credit to ourselves, we want some more tangible means; that is, we want the truths and facts of experience and experiment on things, as they are and have been, either of our own, or of well attested authority; whereby we are able to make the past serve us as a guide through the present, and point out our proper way into the future.

The abstract process of comparative reasoning is only a *branch* of logical reasoning; and no very important one either, since it proves nothing more, when properly conducted, than a mere abstract result flowing from admitted premises. But is this the "*logicon adolon gala,*" the "genuine historical milk," whereby we grow and increase to literary manhood? I leave the question to the decision of common sense. But further: that writers on Logic should confine logical reasoning to this mode alone, is still more surprising; inasmuch as the word itself, in its origin, application and use, designates the movements of mental power, as various and as diversified, as the operations of our physical powers, or as the devious rovings of our organic eye. Each and all the senses of the body are avenues, through which the mind peeps forth, not only into the several departments of its own dwelling, but looks abroad on the varied scenes around it, both in their general and particular aspects, as they stand displayed before it. And not only so, but it brings external objects to the very entrance of these avenues, takes a nearer view, and makes a more critical examination of what belongs to them severally. These are movements of the mind, which no one will deny; and what other name shall we give them but reasoning?—meaning thereby the flowing energies of mental light thrown upon those objects, which are brought into the field of its vision through these avenues. The very nature of the action itself demands it, as well as the original application of the word, before it was transfered from matter to mind; for which similitude of action alone it was transfered.

Reasoning then, in its true and legitimate sense, means the full and entire action of the mind in pouring forth its radiant beams in the recognition and inspection of those objects presented to it through the senses, or by the *inventive* power of its own nature.

What does the word *reason* then necessarily embrace in its definition, not only from the mind's actions, but also from the original meaning and application of the word itself? It necessarily embraces all the following terms, viz. perception, idea, apprehension, conception, proof, evidence, argument, sentiment, decision, sentence and judgment. For, *idea* and *judgment* have a common origin, one coming to us through the Greek, and the other through the Latin language; but the origin of both is the Hebrew *idaa*, signifying to see, to know, &c. So also, *perception* and *conception* have a common origin, as well as *sentiment* and *sentence*. All the above eleven terms in their originals, were first applied and used to denote the different *manners*, in which we acquire possession, or gain the knowledge of objects, through the means of the bodily limbs and the senses. If the mind has continued its flowing energies (*to energein*) or busy workings on the object long enough to gain a distinct notion or definite knowledge of it, this flowing or reasoning process must have gone on, till the mind has viewed said object, in all its presentations, properties and qualities, and relations. And these three views or considerations include the entire object; therefore, they include all the above eleven terms—since sentiment, decision, sentence and judgment are only different words to express a final result.

Logical reasoning then, implies a process of reasoning carried on through the medium of *words* arranged in sentences, each of which must contain a definite object or subject, that has something affirmed or denied of it; and a sufficient number of such sentences, constitutes a discourse, treatise, or piece of composition good or bad in Logic, just as the terms used do convey or not, a true representation of that, for which they were employed.

Now let us inquire into the origin of the word *reason*, and into the meaning and application of its original. It will be proper however, first to notify the reader, that in the transition of this original, from its primitive meaning to human operations, it was extended and applied both to the operations of the mind, and to the operations of organic adjustment. And the want of attention to this fact, has led logicians and rhetoricians into an error, and induced them to say and discuss many things foreign to each separate subject. Therefore, we find in their writings much unconnected matter, and of course, much unphilosophic, unintelligible, uninteresting, and consequently unprofitable matter. Etymologists derive our word *reason* from the French *raison*, and this from the Latin *ratio*, which is from the Latin verb *reor;* and this again is from the Greek verb *reo.* In tracing our word *reason* back, if we stop even at the Latin *ratio*, we get all that we want or claim respecting the word *reason* applying to the entire operations of the mind. For *reor*, from which *ratio* is derived, embraces all the operations of the mind in our daily pursuits. But when the Latins refered to that close and connected train of mental operation required in demonstrations and illustrations, they used their verb *ratiocinor*, compounded of *ratio* and *cano*, which latter signifies to *sing*, as in music, and also to *sing* or *talk* like a poet or prophet; that is, to divine or divulge *secrets* and *things* not commonly known, but requiring a close and uniform train of reasoning on the abstruse and hidden *relations* and *ratios* of things; that is, on the connections, purposes, designs and intentions of things.

Thus it appears, that our logicians, admitting the word to come from the Latin *reor*, have denied and withholden from our word *reason*, its usual, extensive and legitimate application, and restricted it to that particular mode of mental operation, for which the Latins have another word, or rather the same word extended in its signification and application, by the assistance of another, viz. *cano;* as *ratiocinor*. Therefore, our word *reason* applies properly and legitimately to the entire movement of the mind through all its varied operations, from the simplest perception to the most abstract speculation; first, by its Latin descent, and secondly, by what our logicians claim for it. But, in order to give the reader a full view of the beauty, force and propriety of this application of the word, and shew him the similarity and uniformity of order and arrangement, called *relation*, subsisting among beings in the entire universe, I will explain the whole pedigree of our word *reason*. The Hebrew noun *roue* signifies the Spirit of God, the human mind, wind, air, breath, &c.; and the verb *roe* represents their operating motions, or moving energies. This is the root of the Greek verb *reo*, signifying the flowing motion of a stream or liquid, and also that of the breath in talking or making articulate sounds in speech. The transfer is very natural and easy; since there is a very striking similarity between the motion of a gliding stream, and the breath flowing from the lungs and producing articulate sounds in speech. And do we not say, "a fluent speech?"

Our word *reason* then, comes from the Greek *reo*, and is the participle *reason* in the Ionic dialect. The Greeks conjugate the verb two ways, in order to determine its signification. One conjugation applies to the signification for water, &c., and the other to that for the breath, &c. But inasmuch as speech means something more than mere sounds of words, therefore, when we talk we *reason* also.

Here is the precise difference between ***reason*** and ***rhetoric***, as manifested in the different spelling of the two words. ***Reason*** applies directly to the mind, while ***rhetoric*** applies as directly to ***talk*** or ***speech***. If reason and rhetoric then, have a common origin, how are they to be separated and distinguished from each other? In the same manner that the calm and noiseless flow of the gliding stream is separate and distinct, from the loud and deafening roar of the leaping cataract. For, if the soft and silent movements of the flowing stream, can be changed into the rough and tumultuous roar of a tumbling waterfall, so the mute and busy movements of mental energies, may be expressed in the quavering notes of the human voice. Thus it seems, that while the active mind is busily employed in viewing its subject in all its parts, the tuneful voice, or fluttering quill is as busily engaged in dressing up its capering thoughts in persuasive sounds, or significant characters.

Reason then, has direct reference to the flowing energies of the mind, while rhetoric has as direct reference to flowing words written or spoken. Here is a very cogent reason for the difference in the spelling of the two words. The movements of the mind in its attention to a proposition of any kind, consist in casting its intellectual rays upon the objects that are before it, in order to discover who they are, and what they are.

This is the case even in an axiom, or what is called a self-evident proposition. For, every axiom in its simplest form, has two objects called extremes or ***termini;*** and every proposition of whatever kind, must have these two at least, and as many more, as the complexity of the proposition demands. In the simplest axiom there are only these two extremes, which stand before the mind in ***juxta*** or contiguous position; and both being in the mind's vision, their likeness, or unlikeness—agreement, or disagreement is intuitively discovered; that is, discovered in the objects themselves being in the mind's view, and not by ***substitute***, as is the case in all comparative reasoning, where the real objects of inquiry are segregated from each other so far, that the mind is not able to embrace them at once. But, as I said before, the simplest axiom has two objects, and only two, standing directly before the mind's eye; for instance, the whole is greater than a part—all the parts compose the whole; and the whole contains all the parts. In these examples the terms *whole* and *parts* contain the two extremes; and they stand in contiguous position to each other; and are both embraced at once by the mind.

The truth is seen in the above cases, just as readily, and in the same manner, as it is seen in viewing two sticks of different lengths lying side by side. But in a complex axiom, there are three or more objects before the mind. There are two extremes or ultimate objects of the comparison, and one, at least, intermediate object, which is the standard of comparison; for example:

Things, that are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another; things, that are double of the same thing, are equal to one another.

In the foregoing examples, the two extremes or ultimate objects of comparison, are contained in the plural noun *things*, and the standard of comparison in the singular noun *thing*.

Again: two and two are equal to four. Here the first *two* is the standard of comparison; and two and two being the double of two, and four being instinctively seen to be the double of two, therefore, two and two and four are instinctively seen to be equal.

But when these intermediate objects or standards of comparison, are so multiplied, that the mind cannot intuitively, that is, at a single flowing glance catch and retain their intimate and concatenated relations to each other, and also to the two extremes, the proposition is not an axiom, but one, that requires demonstration; that is, one that requires contemplation and meditation upon the entire train of objects, until the concatenation or chain of relations, as cause and effect, can be perceived and embraced at once by the mind.

Thus we perceive, that what may be considered as a mere axiom to those more vigorous and penetrating minds, requires to be demonstrated; that is, contemplated and meditated upon by those, that are less active and discerning. Thus too, we perceive the true nature and genius of language in its specific and generic construction. Reasoning includes demonstration—demonstration includes contemplation and meditation; but *theorizing* includes the whole four. For, to theorize means, to see as God sees;

that is, to know and understand, &c. I said, that ***reasoning*** signifies, and embraces the entire operations of mental energies, from the simplest perception to the most abstract speculation; and that, itself is included in the term ***theorize***, which means to see as God sees. Here we discover by the extension of terms, the dividing line between the human mind and the brutal mind; which lies in the word ***theorize***. No one says, nor can say, that a brute theorizes; because this word includes the abstract ***relations*** of order and arrangement, which belong to the ***oeconomy*** (***oikou nomee;***) that is, to the distributed household of God, in its physical and spiritual apartments. And, "In my Father's house there are many mansions."

Now let us see what demonstration, contemplation and meditation, ***literally*** and ***definitely*** mean. ***Demonstration*** is direct from the Latin ***demonstratio***, which is compounded of ***de***, a preposition; ***mons***, a noun; and the verb ***sterno***, whose supine is ***stratum***, and from which our word ***strew*** or ***strow*** comes. The verb ***demonstrate*** then, literally and definitely means, to strew, spread, or scatter the mountain; that is, the physical or mental obstruction, so that the organic or mental eye can discern objects, that were concealed behind it.

Contemplation is derived from three Latin words, viz. ***con*** or ***cum***, signifying with, or in company; ***tempus***, signifying time; and the verb ***pleo***, signifying to fill up, to finish, end, &c. Therefore, to ***contemplate*** an object, is to fill up or pass away time with it, in our inspection of what belongs to it.

Meditation comes from two Latin words, viz. ***medius***, signifying in the midst, or among, &c. and the verb ***ito***, signifying to frequent, or to go often to, &c. Therefore, to ***meditate*** is to go often to and be conversant with things, in order to know them.

Thus, ***contemplation*** has reference to a single object, or to a group of objects taken as a whole; while ***meditation*** has reference to many objects receiving our attention in their turn.

In order to complete the list of words, which apply directly to mental operations, or to the ***objects*** of mental action, considered in their most abstract or essential and universal sense, I will explain a few more terms of universality, the first of which is the word *reality*. The doctrine of *Realism* seems to have puzzled the philosophic and speculative world. O fools! blind, and dull of understanding, not to perceive what *Logic* has done, and *reason* taught in the very composition of the word. The word is compounded of two Latin words, viz: *res* or *re*, a universal term applied to any being, fact or truth, like our word *thing;* and *sal*, *salis*, or *als*, *alis*, signifying salt; and *realis* literally means the essence of salt or the savour of salt, which, if it has lost, what is it good for? Therefore, *reality* signifies the essence or savour of a thing; that is, either the savour of a being existent, which is his essential property or nature, or the savour of a fact or act done, which is the action or effect of the power, that wrought it. Consequently, there are *existent* realities; that is, beings standing out as active agents, or affected subjects; and non-existent realities; that is, not standing out in any *efficiency*, but only real as an act done.

The next term is *truth—truth* in principle and *truth* in fact. *Truth* in principle is power supreme and uncreated; and *truths* in fact are the evidences of it, which constitute our *truths* in principle, or elements of the sciences. The elements of any science then, are existent realities or secondary causes efficient in the production of effects, which are *truths* in fact, both in the modification of old, and the formation of new structures, and in the actions done and passed out of time. All finite beings then, are existent, having their state with its concomitant condition, differing from state in this, that their state can never be affected or altered without changing their being; while their condition may undergo a variety of modifications and changes without affecting their state in the least. For, their state consists in an unaltered union of essential properties; while its concomitant *condition* consists in the different *degrees* of operative energy in those properties,—as more or less, strong or weak, *good* or *bad*, swift or slow, bright or dim, &c.; and also in that sphere of action for which and in which that state or union of properties was adjusted and located. In whatever shape, form, or manner then, a sentence or proposition is presented, a declaration made, a query started, or a question asked concerning any reality, they each and all must relate to one or both of the above general heads, viz. *state* and *condition*. And all the logical axioms and premises as logical data for developing truth and fact, consist in the proofs and evidences obtained from the *subject itself*, viewed in all its presentations, properties and qualities, and relations personal and social. And when the mind has bestowed its flowing energies or reasoning labors upon the subject in viewing it in the above respects, it has obtained its proofs woven into an argument or texture, on which it stamps its judgment with regard to the matter, as true or false. Thus it appears, that every simple sentence or proposition has a subject and its matter, which consists in an affirmation or negation of something pertaining to the subject, either in its presentation, its properties and qualities, or in its relations private or public.

Subject and matter then, (*quod rei est?*) are the two grand objects of the mind's attention in view of the judgment to be formed; so that, the *yes* or *no* to the matter alleged, as belonging to the subject in the manner specified, constitutes the proposition *true* or *false;* therefore, the subject and the matter alleged are viewed together, whereby the mind obtains a knowledge, whether it has been alleged in truth or falsehood. If the matter alleged has a personal application to the subject alone, the process of reasoning or mental operation (call it what you please,) is similar to that exercised in a geometrical axiom, being confined to a single subject and what belongs to it, as in the following axioms: The whole is equal to all its parts; all the parts compose the whole, &c.

This process of the mind constitutes the principal part of logical reasoning, as seen in all examples like the following: the weather is fine; the trees are blooming; the streets are paved; business is dull; man is social, moral and religious, &c. But, if the matter alleged has reference to the social relations of the subject, arising from whatever source, the reasoning necessarily becomes comparative, and therefore two or more subjects are introduced and viewed together; because the matter alleged in this case, contains a subject,—as John is a fiddler; Will sneaks a scrivener; honesty is the best policy; virtue and vice are opposite qualities, &c. The predicate of the subject always contains the matter, or rather constitutes the matter itself; for the predicate consists in what is said of the subject; that is, in what is affirmed or denied of it. And inasmuch as every created being is either made unique, or constituted of parts, he has his personal and social relations; for he has his fellow-creatures in a general and particular sense—general with regard to the world at large, and particular with regard to his own class or kind. His personal relations are those existing between himself and his Creator. Now something in *truth* may be said of him, with regard to his own endowments as a being—with regard to his own actions, and with regard to his social relations too. But whatever is said of him with regard to his endowments and his actions, must relate to him personally and individually; therefore, all predicates relating to these, must contain his private matters, such as his properties, qualities or attributes, and his actions.

Comparison then, rests not in private matters; consequently, comparative or syllogistic reasoning must belong to our social relations alone, general or particular. But, before we can know any thing certain of a being in his social capacity; that is, before we can know what his social relations are, we must first know who he is as a being, and what belongs to him as such; that is, we must first know his private matters, and knowing these, we necessarily know his class, species, and genus; that is, his social relations. And this doctrine will apply to all beings; therefore, he, who would reason closely and with the conviction of truth, must discuss the private matters of his subject; and in doing so, he discloses his social relations too, to wit, his classification. This is the very mode adopted in mathematics, and the mode adopted in Butler's Analogy. The author reasons on the private matters of man, as an individual being; and these, as I said before, include his divine relations. Therefore, whatever can be said of one in these respects, may be said of all his class.

Thus it appears, that every simple sentence or proposition, consists of two parts; the first of which is a subject or object, presented to the mind's notice, under some term or phrase, about which something has been said; and this *something* includes the verb with what follows it, and constitutes the matter or predicate of said subject, and belongs to it as a charge or *elenchus*. It also appears, that the verb sometimes contains the whole matter, as in the following examples: John writes; the birds fly; the wind blows, &c. The verb is also accompanied by an adjective or attribute, which adverts to the subject,—as the winds are boisterous; the man is happy; wisdom is profitable to direct, &c. So also it may have a noun following it,—as John reads his lesson; beauty has many admirers, &c. Sometimes a sentence intervenes between the subject and the predicate or matter of it,—as he, who guards against dangers, acts wisely; he, who desires learning, desires a good thing, &c. These last are compound sentences, and the intervening sentence does not affect the charge or matter of the subject, but makes a part of the definition of the subject. So that, in judging of the *truth* or *falsity* of the matter alleged, this intervening sentence must be viewed in connection with the subject, as one of its qualities or attributes.

There are also several other important particulars in the economy of language, pertaining to the construction and definition of the subject part of a sentence, which, though important, I have never seen touched nor hinted by writers on Logic and Rhetoric. Much however, has been said about ambiguous terms; though what I am going to disclose, constitutes the sanative of literary health, and a cure for ambiguity.

There are three modes of nominating a subject without changing the meaning of its definition, or affecting the subject in the least. In this economy of language, its pliancy and copiousness are beautifully and strikingly displayed.

1st. The nominated subject may be clothed with its attributes or qualities, by nouns joined to the subject by a hyphen,—as sea-weed, eye-water, &c.; as well as by adjectives,—as a prudent man, a wise child, a cunning animal, a considerate person, &c. These adjectives and the like, are all *communicant;* that is, they clothe the subject, or rather his properties, with efficient or operative qualities, representing the subject acting as an agent, as in the above examples, a *prudent* man, &c.; representing the man, child, animal and person, as possessing efficient and operative powers, whereby they perform certain things.

2d. The nominated subject may have the same attributes defined by the nouns of the same adjectives,—as a man of prudence; a child of wisdom; an animal of cunningness; a person of consideration in its active sense.

3d. The nominated subject may be defined in his attributes, by the pronoun compounded of the personal and relative, or by the relative separate, with a verb and the same noun, as in the last cases; for example: Whoever has or possesses prudence, does so and so; or he, who possesses prudence, does so and so; whoever possesses wisdom, possesses a treasure more precious than gold; or he, who possesses, &c.

The definition of the subject remains the same in either of the above forms of expression. But in the following examples, the definition of the subject with regard to his attributes, is changed in three ways, affecting the subject or his definition in three distinct *manners.* We discover in the economy of nature three kinds of contrast with regard to the attributes of finite beings, or with regard to the qualities of their essential gifts.

1st. The qualities of their essential gifts or properties, are expressed in communicant and recipient adjectives; that is, any finite being may be spoken of as an active agent producing something, or giving something; or he may be spoken of as a recipient subject acted upon by another, or receiving something.

2d. He may be spoken of with his properties holding intercommunion with themselves—as harmonical, ceremonial, virtual, &c.; or he may be spoken of with his properties holding social intercourse with other beings,—as harmonious, ceremonious, virtuous, vicious, &c.

3d. He may be spoken of as possessing a full treasury of properties and qualities,—as graceful, pitiful, merciful, &c.; or he may be spoken of with an empty and exhausted treasury,—as graceless, pitiless, merciless, &c.

By giving strict attention to the above explanations with regard to the economy of language in the construction of her adjectives, so as to meet the exigencies of the case, and portray our individual and social relations, whereby the definition and condition of the subject and predicate, (for they apply equally to both,) are affected; and also, by attending to the three forms in which the subject and predicate are not affected, but remain the same in the essentials of their definition; I say, a particular attention to these things, both in their theory and practice, whether they are found in the subject, or in the predicate or matter of it, will enable any one to discern the true state and condition of the subject in any sentence, and of the general subject in any discussion or matter of controversy. Whoever reads or writes, having a familiar acquaintance with the foregoing rules and explanations, will readily perceive, whether the terms or words have been used in their proper and legitimate sense or not; and he will also be able to distinguish and choose out such terms and phrases, as will represent his subject in its true features, both in its general and detailed account. Therefore, with a few more explanations, which disclose the secrets of sophistry, and lay open the Pandora box of her delusive and bewildering charms, the attentive and inquisitive reader will be furnished with ample means to judge of the correctness of composition, and estimate its value; and moreover, be fortified against the fallacy and imposition of plausible phrases, so often and so successfully employed in smoothing over, and hiding the defects of a bad or lame *argument*. He will be in possession of the nostrums, that destroy the magic of plausibility, and dissipate the mists and fogs of *ambiguity;* thereby striping Sophistry of her entire armor.

As I said before, there is no new *matter* in that part of a compound sentence, which consists of the relative or constituent pronoun with its predicate; because this constituent and its predicate make a part of the definition of the nominated subject,—as he, who practices all the virtues, possesses a perfect character; he, who offendeth in one point, is guilty of the whole law; for the law is a simple principle, and therefore, fully embraced in each and all the points or specifications of the law, which are ten.

In such examples, the constituent and its predicate define the properties and qualities of the subject *he*. The subject then, is the same, both in a simple and compound sentence, and its own predicate declares something to be the matter with it, and *quod rei est*, what is the matter? And where shall we look for this matter, if not in the subject itself; or where else shall we seek for its truth or falsity? Surely, the truth or falsity of the declaration is to be found in what pertains to the subject itself, in its presentations, properties, qualities and relations, discovered either by our own observations, or admitted by human and divine testimony. Our own observations and critical research into the nature and conduct of men and things, and the testimony of others with regard to the same matters, are the only means whereby we gain our knowledge of, and arrive at the certainty of truth, and the detection of error contained in the writings and speeches of authors.

And here I will notice a very important consideration, which ought always to be kept in view by the reader or hearer. It is this: the vast difference there is between truth in *principle* and truth in *fact;* and upon this difference is built the distinction between *instruction* and *information.* Truths in principle or elements of science, include all operative powers, together with all the various *proportions* of their own degrees of energy, or of the extent, magnitude and capacity, which belong to them as they exist in their individual or personal relations of aliquot parts to the whole; or as they exist in their social relations and intercommunion with each other. Truths in fact include all the actions or movements of these operative powers, whether these actions are in *transitu,* or finished, together with all the effects, which they have produced, and which remain as existent beings operative or not. Whatever relates therefore, to the events of this world, arising from the *actions* of men and things, is *information* general or particular; but whatever relates to the elementary principles of men and things, in their practical operations, and to their *modus operandi,* is *instruction.* Whoever instructs us then, acquaints us with the elements of a science, and its art; that is, imparts to us a knowledge of the laws and economy of some part of the universe, in its science and art, as mental food.

The chief business then, of instructors or those, who teach or write on science and art, is to unfold the economy or system of that science or art, by describing the elements of which it is composed, and the manner in which they uniformly operate. But, is this what we get from many of those, who profess to be our instructors? Far from it. Much of this pretended *instruction,* is mere *information* of what has taken place among men and things, rather than a development of the cause or causes, that produced it.

Thus we see, that *instruction* pertains to truths in principle, with regard to the laws and economy, both of God and man; but, that *information* relates to what has transpired or happened in the world.

Error and falsehood then, rest not in the subjects themselves, but in the declarations made about them. Therefore, in order to detect error, discover falsehood, and establish truth, we must set the predicate and its subject directly before our mind's eye; and then we shall see, whether the *matter* of the predicate is found on, with, or about the subject, or in any of his personal or social relations. And this we must do with regard to all truths in principle, if we wish to possess knowledge *understandingly*, and acquire the ready means of duly appreciating whatever *information* we gain by our own observations, and the accounts rendered by others.

In judging of the predicate as true or false, we must consider the nature of the subject, and see whether we can find in it the matter alleged in the predicate. In order therefore, to put the reader in the way of readily doing this, and to shew him the supreme importance of the exercise, as well as to illustrate the certainty of detecting error and establishing the truth, I will give a few examples, whose subjects are couched in pure abstract terms, like the following:

"Purity is the sole school of domestic fidelity; and domestic fidelity is the only nursery of the affections between parents and children," &c.

This is an extract from one of our standard authors on moral philosophy, and received as sound didactic reasoning and logical exactness; but I hope to shew the reader in the sequel, that it contains a direct falsehood; and that the whole is mere sophistry and delusion. In several parts of this treatise I have spoken of *cause* and *effect;* but perhaps they are not, as yet, so distinctly defined, as to give the reader a clear conception of the terms when applied to abstract realities. The great First Cause is the beginning of the descending series; and his sapient or scient and potent powers are manifest in all his works, as operating and efficient causes. In the physical universe his potent power is distributed into a variety of functionary departments, under the general term of *the elements*, which are all efficient primary causes, producing their respective effects; and these effects again, may or may not become secondary causes in their turn. This however, depends entirely upon the nature of the effects produced; since in the animal and vegetable kingdoms *like* produces *like*, but in the intellectual kingdom there is no increase or multiplication of numbers by propagation; but all accession of numbers is the direct result of the primogenitive cause. So also the physical nature of man in its workmanship and organic operations, is under the direct guidance and control of God's potent power. But the supervision of his animal frame in supplying it with food, on which the organs act and maintain the economy of the system, and the protection of the same from surrounding dangers, are entrusted to an active and intelligent principle called the *human mind.* I say, to an *active* and *intelligent* principle, thereby distinguishing it from that mental economy of brutes, which never rises above putrescent matter and its relations to earth; while the human intellect, not only performs the drudgery of the other, but is also able to rise above its present confines, and revel in abstract speculation and thought; thereby reflecting the image of its Creator, from whence proceed its moral attributes of consciousness and moral responsibility. Consequently, the language of man has terms of moral qualities, such as purity, impurity, confidence, distrust, &c.

The terms *purity* and *impurity* then in moral economy, apply to the *effects* produced on himself and others, by an active and operating principle or intelligent and designing being. Therefore, *purity* cannot be a school, or place of instruction. The term *fidelity* applies to the strong and tenacious grasp or hold, which one intelligent being maintains upon another, thereby constituting it an active and operating cause, or efficient principle. Consequently, it cannot be a *nursery* or place of domestic training; inasmuch as it refers to the acting power or very nurse herself, who administers the "*logicon adolon gala*," or pure genuine milk to her pupils, the affections, whereby they grow to noble maturity. The above sentences then, are a crude and illogical strain of verbial jargon.

Again: "There must be primary pleasures, pains, and even appetites, which arise from no prior state of mind, and which, if explained at all, can be derived only from bodily organization; for, if there were not, there could be no secondary desires. What the number of the underived principles may be, is a question, to which the answers of philosophers have been extremely various, and of which the consideration is not necessary to our present purpose. The rules of philosophizing however, require, that *causes* should not be multiplied without necessity. Of two explanations therefore, which give an equally satisfactory account of appearances, *that theory* is manifestly to be prefered, which *supposes* the smaller number of ultimate and inexplicable principles. This maxim, it is true, is subject to three indispensable conditions. 1st. That the principles employed in the explanation should be known really to exist. 2d. That these principles should be known to produce effects, like those ascribed to them in the theory. 3d. That it should correspond, if not with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority of them, as to render it highly probable, that means will in time be found of reconciling it to all.

A theory may be just before it is complete. In the application of these canons to the theory, which derives most of the principles of human actions from the *transfer* of a small number of pleasures, perhaps organic, by the law of association, to a vast variety of new objects, it cannot be denied—1st. That it satisfies the first of the above conditions; inasmuch as association is really one of the laws of human nature. 2d. That it also satisfies the second; for association certainly *produces effects* like those which are refered to by its theory; otherwise there would be no secondary desires, no acquired relishes and dislikes; facts universally acknowledged, which are and can be explained only by the principles, called mental discourse, association, translation, or suggestion."

The above extract contains the *materials*, which compose a theory of the human mind, slightly modified by different writers. Upon this theory they profess to explain all the phenomena of human conduct, by refering them to their respective and appropriate *causes*, which, as they say, are fully established and satisfactorily pointed out. But, looking into the nature of these choice materials, selected and converted into *causes* by these wise heads, and professing christian heads too, I cannot suppress feelings of surprise and indignation at the persevering reluctance and wilful obstinacy, which human nature has always manifested and still manifests against the accounts given of it, and the truths respecting it revealed to us in the scriptures. The scriptures contain a full development of the *principles* or direct *causes*, illustrated as to their nature and character by their known effects. They do not first assume or theorize into a system a set of *supposable* causes, and then endeavor to establish their actual existence by attributing to each, such actions as may seem to comport best with their relative dignity. But they begin with known and acknowledged effects, the only true mode of sound and convicting reasoning; and these effects too, are no less than the very free and voluntary actions of the very being to be convicted, which actions are acknowledged by the actor himself to be his, that is, voluntary; inasmuch as he assigns the motive that stimulated him to their performance. And, although we might suppose, that the Creator knows as well what belongs to his creature, as the creature himself does; yet in the aforesaid theory it appears otherwise; since it contains an assumption of motives for human actions altogether different from those assigned in scripture. Is it possible that the christian era is now entering the zenith of its nineteenth century, and we find the pretended champions of the faith once delivered to us, together with the expositors and conservators of moral rectitude, still seeking and searching among the stupid, filthy and corruptible attributes *of flesh and blood*, for the immortal principle of our nature, called *conscience?* Are they not told directly and explicitly, that the mind of the flesh is not subject to the law of God; that is, not subject to intellectual light, neither indeed can be? But surprising as it may seem, it is no less true, that we find these moral abstractionists returning, like the dog and the sow, to their own filth, and endeavoring, by *association*, translation, or some other nostrum, to derive from animal organization the intellectual and imperishable attributes of a sentient and immortal spirit. Is this the scriptural account and theory of that noble part of human nature, or of that active, designing and working spiritual power, which is sentient and discriminating, inquisitive and inventive, scheming and devising, restive and unsatisfied, choosing and refusing, hoping and

and uniform, while that of the body is complex and diversified. But in the foregoing quotation, pleasures, pains and appetites, are assumed, as operative and efficient principles or acting *causes*, when in fact and in any proper application of the terms, they are neither more nor less, than the names of effects produced by, and are the mere results of operating and efficient agents, as distinct from these effects, as the genial rays of the sun are distinct from the teeming verdure of the spring, or as the scathing thunderbolt is distinct from the blighted trees of the forest, that are riven and withered by its electric fire.

But the scheme appears still more absurd when we find, that these pleasures, pains and appetites constituting the elements of this moral theory, originate in flesh and blood; whose mind or principle of excitement, is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. And notwithstanding all this, modern ethical alchemy by association or some other sublimate, readily transmutes them into moral sentiments; that is, into approbation and disapprobation, which alone are the primary attributes of an intellectual sentient principle. Therefore, to make that peaceful serenity, which the mind enjoys in the contemplation of its own actions put forth in the discharge of acknowledged duty, and that gloomy horror resulting from the conscious guilt of violated justice; I say, to make these affections pertain to, and flow from organic movements, is an idea so gross and so indignant to human nature even in its wild and savage culture, that I cannot excuse the rudeness of the speculation.

But further: Let even the terms *mental discourse*, *association*, *translation* or *suggestion*, apply direct to the mind itself, what more or less can they be made to signify, than the mere *mode* of action pursued by some agent or efficient principle, instead of being the names, that denote the operating principle itself? All such verbal nouns have direct reference to the *mode* of action expressed by their verbs, and not to the *agent* that performs it. And by this license, or rather licentious practice, Sophistry is able to attract attention, and to lull her auditors into the acquiescence and assurance of faith, that they hear the voice of Wisdom pouring out her lofty strains of inspiration.

Therefore, keep a watchful eye upon, and a listening ear to the termination of words, which belong to the class of nouns or adjectives; and especially to those verbal nouns ending in *ion*. They can never be made to personate a being with any correctness, unless they come from such verbs, as represent the generic actions of the being, performed in his integral or entire capacity,—as "Speculation sold his farm—cent per cent. advance." All adjectives ending in *ate*, *ete*, *ite*, *ute*, *ant*, *ent*, and *ive*, are communicant; that is, they represent the subject with efficient or executive qualities. But all adjectives ending in *ble*, and perfect participles taken as adjectives, represent their subject in a recipient or affected condition,—as passable road; wrought nails; written letter; pampered goose, &c.

Again: There is another very *wise* distinction, or rather a very *distinct* wisdom, in modern ethics,—such as theoretical, or *pure reason*, and *practical reason*. This distinction, I suppose, applies to the radiant energies of the mind's eye on moral scenes, in the same manner, that common light applies to the organic eye. As, when we view a landscape at a proper distance, we have a clear perception of all the objects in their distinct forms of rising hills and verdant lawns—of tufted trees and waving grain—of winding streams and skirting hedges; but when the eye retires beyond the focal distance of its converging lens, the diversified scene melts into one unmixed and azure blue, so pure and so serene, that the eye dwells upon it with calm delight and balmy rapture at beholding—*nothing* at all.

This, I suppose, is analogous to pure reason, so soothing and so sublime. O pure Reason! delightful guest—come and make thy downy nest in this poor aching head of mine! But, ye sons of christian light, blush at this, and turn aside from such unholy profanation; since you are told, that, "what is born of flesh, is flesh; and what is born of spirit, is spirit;" and again—that "he who soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; and he who soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." Therefore, whatever is human reason in any sense, is human reason in all its sense, no matter what difference there may be in the *degrees* of mental light, when the term is applied to different individuals of the human family. For, the term includes self-applause and self-reproof, or moral responsibility in is lowest sense. All created beings in whatever rank of the descending series they may be found; from elementary principles, that is, efficient agents or causes, down to their minute and remote effects, may be viewed and must be viewed, if viewed aright and in their full extent, under six distinct heads or considerations, to wit, under *state*, *condition*, *cause*, *effect*, *time* and *place*. These are the six general heads of classification, under which God has arranged his works and taught his intelligent creatures to view them—he being the first or primogenitive cause of all.

Every subject then, or general topic of discourse, has these six considerations belonging to it as its broad outlines or extended limits. Each of these may be subdivided into lesser portions, and brought down to a single and separate sentence containing a single subject and predicate; both of which together, contain in a contracted and particular sense, the same six considerations of state, condition, cause, effect, time and place, as fully, as distinctly and as definitely, as the general subject itself does. Therefore, in order to know, whether a sentence contains a truth, or a falsehood, view these two parts together; that is, subject and predicate, in the above six considerations, and the truth or falsity of the sentence, will be made manifest at once.

We will now apply the science and art of the above system of Logic to a metaphysical question, that has engaged the attention, and exhausted the resources of the learned world, and still remains as unsettled and as indeterminate, as ever; I mean the question, whether we have innate ideas, or not. On this question the greatest geniuses, of whom the world can boast, seem to have wearied research, jaded inquiry, and puzzled invention, in order to find out arguments sufficiently cogent to settle the question and put it to rest. But the question is still afloat, and seems likely to continue to sail the rounds, unless some more lucky wight or skilful pilot, shall bring it into port and cast its anchor. In our examination of this question, we will first view the prominent features and general outlines of the subject, as presented to us under the phrase, *innate ideas.*

Inasmuch as we derive all our ideas of the external world through the medium of organic sense, our five external senses are the first and prominent objects, to which our attention ought to be directed. These are the direct channels, through which we acquire all our knowledge of the material world; though I do not admit, that we get our notions of moral obligation through any of these means; but that they come directly through the native and inherent effulgence of the mind's own essence. But more of this hereafter, in my other *little book* on the philosophy of the scriptures, and the developments therein made of human nature.

The second presentation of this subject, is the location of these external senses. Four of these organic nervous adjustments called the *senses*, have their separate, distinct and definite localities in the human system; while the fifth is diffused through and over the whole structure, and maintains an intimate communion with every organ both external and internal, that belongs to the system. And this sense is called *feeling*.

The second consideration is, what are the properties and qualities of these five senses? In one respect their properties appear to be common, all being nervous adjustment; but in another respect they are different, each having its own peculiar function allotted to it. The principle of life too is a property common to all, without which the whole family become prostrate and inactive, but with which, four may be entirely mute in their respective *official* capacities, and yet enjoy the liberal bounties, which life provides for their vigorous growth and maturity. But thirdly, in viewing their social relations we find the sense of feeling so intimately connected with the principle of life, that it appears to be rather an attribute of animal life, than any thing distinct in itself and apart from it; for, you will never find them asunder, except in some remote corner or disordered part of the system. But, when the vital principle retires to its chief citadel the heart, and all the other senses have become entirely *extinct*, we find, that the sense of feeling accompanies it here and expires with it.

Thus we see in the social relations of these senses, that four of them, to wit: *seeing*, *hearing*, *smelling* and *tasting*, may be in full communion with, and in participation of the vital principle along with *feeling*, and yet refuse to perform a single act of their own official duty; while the sense of *feeling* is so intimately connected with this principle, that the one cannot exist without the other. Consequently, wherever life exists, there must be feeling; and wherever feeling exists, there must be perception; and wherever perception exists, there must be an idea. Therefore, whatever moment the embryo being puts forth voluntary animal motions in the exercise of its own limbs, the same moment it has had feeling produced in the nervous system, which caused these voluntary movements. And even organic convulsions produce sensations in the being. Therefore, wherever animal life exists, there feeling exists also, and consequently, perception or ideas. Whenever an animal kicks and jumps under the healthful economy of nature, he feels and knows himself to be alive, and therefore, must have ideas accompanying his birth.

But all this proves not *innate knowledge*, which is quite another thing. And here is the reason, that in after life we have no *knowledge* of many objects, which must have excited our senses and produced ideas; but of which no traces remain in the memory, because the mind has not stamped its volition upon them, and made them his; that is, it has not acted upon them; which is necessary to make the mind conscious, or rather to give the mind a knowledge of them. And here is the philosophy and truth of the saying: "Seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither understand;" because the mind has not acted upon what is seen or heard, so as to unite the *idea with itself;* and this is the true meaning of the Greek *suneidesis*, or conscience, which means the cognition and recognition or personal application and decision, which the mind makes, on its voluntary movements upon those realities standing in the radiance of its vision. This *personal application* may be good or bad, just as the mind wills forth its scrutinizing energies, or shrinks back within the *shade* (*scotos*) of its own pride and obstinacy. Here is the reason why, we find the term *conscience* qualfied with the epithets *good* and *bad*. Therefore, we have this additional proof of the folly in attempting to derive conscience from our animal nature, by association or any other device.

He who becomes acquainted with the system of Logic developed in the foregoing pages, and practises upon its principles, will find himself shielded from the poisonous shafts of error and deception; and will moreover come off conqueror and more than conqueror under the direction and guidance of the radiant beams of truth.

If it be asked, how shall we be able to take those views above laid down, before we are made acquainted with the nature of mind? The answer is this: Do as the infant does in its mother's arms, whose mind is invited to notice her caresses and blandishments. Open the windows of your several senses, and allow the mind to peep forth into the world around, and take a conscious view of all the various shapes, forms, hues and odors presented to it. And this is precisely what we are obliged to do after all our scholastic and logical training, before we acquire a proper understanding of men and things.

But, before I dismiss this subject, I will make a few more remarks on the subject of Rhetoric, and further illustrate its nature. For, it is properly speaking, the ornamental branch of Logic; and whatever is truly *logical* is also *rhetorical*. Logic and Rhetoric stand in the same relation to each other, that a parable and a fable do. The *subject* of a parable, both in its proper and sentential character, is the true representative of human nature; and the actions attributed to it, are human actions. So in Logic the *subject*, whether of a general topic or of a single sentence, is the communicant or recipient being, to whom the predicate really belongs. But in a fable, the subject, whether general or particular, is *not* the *real* author of the actions and affections attributed to him in the predicate, though he is a real being. But, he is not capable of performing, nor of receiving the effects declared of him in the predicate. Therefore, the subject is fabulous, but the matter is real; for the matter consists of human actions, but the subject belongs to another species. So in rhetoric, the subject is clothed with attributes and actions, which do not properly belong to him. And when the subject is so gorgeously arrayed as to appear tawdry and fantastic, disgust is produced instead of pleasure. It is a common fault with young writers and speakers to overload the subjects of their sentences with frivolous and unnatural epithets or adjuncts. The better and safer plan is, to keep within the pale of logical exactness, until you become well acquainted with what belongs to men and things in their individual capacities; and then you will be the better able to judge, how far they may be made to throw off their natural and domestic robes, and be decorated with a foreign dress, without injury to their real character and merits. For, the sole object of rhetoric is to heighten both these beyond their true standard. There is one thing however, that belongs to composition, which I have never seen intelligibly defined, if defined at all. It is the sentimental refinement of language in the use of abstract terms, that are made to personate the beings themselves, and who have procured these attributes by their own actions; and also in the use of such terms, as denote the properties or operative powers of beings, thereby making them agents, instead of using the direct terms, that represent the beings in their individual and personal capacity. This practice, if pursued with judgment and taste, adds more to the vigor, ornament, beauty and grace of composition, than the highest flights of fancy, or the widest range of imagination. It is a species of generalization into universal theorems, and holds the same elevated rank in composition, that the generalization of theorems does in mathematics, which is the very essence of mathematical knowledge.

The following example illustrates the foregoing observations: "Though cowardice shuns the path of duty and honor, and shrinks from the earnest entreaties of reason and justice; yet he is often found in the ranks of revenge, by whom he is stimulated, secretly, to perpetrate deeds more barbarous than those of the boldest assassin." In practising on this refinement of language, full scope is given to the entire energies of the mind while viewing any part of nature, and the exercise tends to concentrate its action, and to fix its attention on definite objects; thereby giving it a clearer perception, a firmer and more lasting conviction of the certainty and nature of what it beholds.

This exercise embraces all other exercises, such as *contemplation*, *meditation*, *particular* and *comparative* or more *general reasoning*. And here let us develop the mystery of language in the universal application of the same terms to the different beings and realities in each of the three grand divisions of nature—to wit: In the material, immaterial or abstract, and in the spiritual or sentient kingdom. These three kingdoms include the universal empire of existence. It is very well known, that whatever terms we use to represent the various properties and powers, qualities and actions of physical beings, we use the same terms to represent abstract relations, ratios or capacities, &c. in mathematics, or in any other abstract consideration. We apply the same terms also to spiritual beings. To be sure, we have appellative terms, or names for individuals, for class or kind, for species, and for genus; but such terms have direct reference to, and stand for definitions of some peculiar form, shape or appearance, taken as a whole. But those terms, that have reference to, and are the names of distinct properties, powers, qualities, actions and relations, are all applied to and used as common stock, in defining beings and realities, and in describing their actions and effects, in whichsoever of these departments they may exist.

There is however, a peculiarity in the nature of verbs, which deserves particular attention, and which renders them universally applicable, and is the reason, that they are indiscriminately applied to all beings and realities whatever. The peculiarity is this,—that the constant and progressive motion, or *actual* change, going on among beings, from one position, grade, shape, form or condition, to another, is the origin and foundation of all verbs whatever. But this motion, though infinitely various, is contrasted under two grand general heads, diametrically opposite in their natures. One is direct, unchanging, forward motion; and the other is constantly changing, or circular motion. And from this classification are derived our two contrasted adjectives, *right* and *wrong*, manifested in the etymology of the two words. *Right* is the perfect participle of the verb *rig*, signifying to fit, adjust, or straighten the rope of a ship; and the participle is *rigged*, *rigt* or *right*. *Wrong* is the perfect participle of the verb *wring*, signifying to *twist*, or *turn round;* and the participle is *wrung* or *wrong*. *Right* then, has reference to motion or actions begun in a fit and proper direction, and continuing on, unchanged, *right* in that direction. But *wrong* has reference to motion or action, constantly changing its direction from its nascent existence to its final termination. Consequently, all actions or verbs whatever, must be under one of these two affections; and therefore, all verbs are necessarily either intensive—that is, stretching out, or they are executive,—that is, pursuing any and every direction, being *exsequentia*. Verbs then, apply indiscriminately to all efficient principles or beings, of whatever nature, in any department of the universe.

Beings and realities then, any where in the universe, although vastly distinct and different in their essential natures, are all represented in their general state and condition,—that is, in their properties, qualities, relations, and actions, by one common set of terms, called language. Now the question is, why or what is the reason of this triary application of the same terms? The reason is this, that an unvarying and immutable relation subsists and exists between an agent, his power, and the operations of his power or accompanying effects. Every complete sentence embraces and implies these three essential considerations, which belong to all beings whatever, who can be called agents, or made the subject of sentences. Therefore, whatever term can be made the representative of a ***subject*** communicant or ***recipient***, will stand for such a being in any of the above departments of the universe. So the verbs being terms to express reciprocated actions, will attach to the same subject, carrying their effects along with them. Therefore, pay strict attention to this illustration of the mutual and coincident economy of nature and language, which allows the same terms to apply to beings in either of the three grand divisions of the universe. In this reciprocal economy rests the secret of all rhetorical license, under whatever name of trope or figure it may be expressed. Great caution however, must be used in the choice of figures, or comparative illustrations. For, the beings in each of these departments, have their subordinate ranks of classification, or rather occupy distinct and correspondent stations, having their appropriate functions or duties of office. Therefore, in using rhetorical license or figurative expressions, strict regard must be paid to these subordinate classifications, in their collateral and contrasted relations. For, if you attempt to represent or explain any order or rank of beings in one department, by a different order or rank in the other, the comparison will fail, and the figure be a bad one, as in this example:—"The spirit of God is like lightning entering the secret recesses of the heart, and melting it into softness and love." This figure is a bad one, although admired by many; for, the spirit of God wounds not to destroy, but only to heal; but the spirit or energy of lightning wounds unto absolute and total destruction.

From what has been said of the transfer of terms to any department of nature, it will be readily seen, that personification as generally defined, properly belongs to that refined sentimental scope, which language is allowed to take in said mutual and coincident economy, above explained. For, that is not personated nor made personal, which possesses power or influence, no matter how abstract the term may be in itself; because an efficient principle is an *agent*, in whatever form it may exist. Therefore, personification is confined to those parts of creation, where beings merely existent, are made to perform the actions of operative agents; consequently, much of what has been called personification, belongs to that *refinement* of language, which consists in the use of abstract terms, and which has more beauty and value in it, in my estimation, when properly and logically conducted, than the entire wardrobe of rhetorical finery. On these subordinate and co-ordinate ranks of classification mentioned above, rest the force and beauty of the following example: "The accusing spirit flew up to heaven's chancery with the oath, blushed as she gave it in; and the recording angel, as he wrote it down, dropped a tear upon the word and blotted it out forever." The whole force and sublimity of the above sentence, consists in the general economy of co-ordinate ranks of classification existing between beings in the different parts of the universe. For, the beings are all intelligent, and therefore it is very possible, natural and allowable, that a great similarity exists between a celestial court of chancery and those among men. And the nearer this similitude approaches to exactness between such distant scenes or parts of the universe, the greater will be the force and effect, which such contrasted scenes produce. But on the contrary, the very smack in a strain of wit, consists in the greatest *dissimilarity* between the subjects compared, united with the greatest *similarity* of actions, which both naturally perform. Another source of wit is the *impossibility* of the subject performing the actions attributed to him; although the actions themselves are very familiar and common. Therefore, let the reader strictly attend to the explanations and illustrations contained in the foregoing pages, and he will doubtless have a more correct view, than he formerly had of the economy and harmony existing among this infinite variety of beings, who people the distant parts of the universe in its three grand divisions.

The whole secret and mystery of Logic and Rhetoric, used in a piece of good composition, are contained in the doctrines developed in the foregoing pages. As Logic presents the subject in its naked and native realities of male or female properties and qualities; that is, communicant or recipient; so Rhetoric clothes it in an artificial and ornamental dress male or female, according to the nature of the subject. I say, that Logic presents the subject in its native properties and qualities male or female; while Rhetoric adorns it with ornamental trappings male or female, in accordance with the *manner* in which it is brought forward and presented to our notice.

All subjects whatever, must be clothed either in a male or female dress, because there is no other kind; that is, every subject must be presented as an agent performing some act, whose effects abide in himself or fall upon others; or he must be presented as a recipient subject, laboring under the burden of his own imposing, or affected by the restrictive influences of another's power.

These are the *modes* and the only *modes*, in which realities existent or non-existent, can be discussed, and the vocabulary or dictionary of language contains terms and phrases adapted to the vast varieties of personal and social appearances, properties, qualities and relations, which are found to belong to men and things in time and place. Every language has its wardrobe, from which a suitable dress may be procured to clothe the subject in his appropriate garb, composed of articles cut and modified to correspond with the characters, which he personates.

Here then, we are furnished with abundant means; and all that is wanting on our part, is a wise, judicious and skilful dexterity in choosing out such articles, as are fit and proper for the sex and character of our subject. Is your subject a civil officer?—then he has his public duties to perform; and not only these, but his *private* and *social* ones too. Is your subject a hero or a warrior?—then he has many dangers to encounter, many battles to fight, and a wreath of laurel to win; all of which have their appropriate terms, both general and specific, in which each item must be clad and ornamented; as well as the hero himself neatly arrayed in his shining regimentals. Is your subject a private citizen following his honest occupation in the sequestered vale of domestic life?—then you are required to fit him out with the modest robes of unassuming *worth*, that loves retirement, innocence and ease. Is your personage a discreet and sober matron, attending to the necessary concerns of her household?—then, like Lucretia, she wants her own domestic robe of modest retirement, as a female subject; but all her actions must be clothed either in the girded zone of anxious toil, or in the warlike mantle of insulted innocence.

Now, we will lay aside all figurative speech, and come at once to a direct illustration of the whole matter. Verbs being the representatives of the varied operations of power intensive or executive, and common to all beings and realities, need no farther explanation, than what has already been given in the grammar part of this treatise. But those words, that are derived from them, such as agent or subject nouns, adjectives, verbal and abstract nouns, require a more particular explanation, in order to see their intimate and family connection, which gives rise and appropriateness to the appellations *male* and *female*. These terms have the same force and relative bearing to each other, that the terms *communicant* and *recipient* have; for *male* is literally communicant, and *female* recipient, through the whole economy of nature.

Beings then, must have either a communicant *state* and *condition*, or a recipient *state* and *condition*. And this arises from the reciprocal nature of power; that is, the action and reaction of power. Therefore, we have *grantor* and *grantee*, or giver and receiver; and this reciprocity obtains throughout the whole family of derivatives, like the sons and the daughters of an earthly sire. The *male* and *female* qualities of adjectives have already been described; as *considerate* for male, and *considerable* for female.

These communicant and recipient terminations of adjectives are properly arranged in the following table, which exhibits a complete list of the family connexion of several of our verbs.

The verb *consider*, taken as the root, and conjugated thus: Present consider—Past considered—Participles considering, considered, having considered in the communicant voice, and having been considered in the recipient voice.

The first derivation is of the agent and recipient nouns, viz: *Considerer*, he who considers—*Consideree*, one that is considered.

This last form is not always used, and all verbs do not admit of this form in practice, but many do.

The second derivation is of the adjectives, viz: A considerate person; that is, a person who is considerate, or is thoughtful. This adjective, as all others of the like termination, is taken in the communicant voice, or direct action of the verb.

A considerable person; that is, one who is worthy to be considered. This adjective, as all others of the like termination, is taken in the recipient voice, or reaction of the verb.

The third derivation is of the adverbs,—as considerately cautious; that is, cautious in a considerate or prudent *manner*, taken in the communicant voice of the verb. Considerably cautious; that is, cautious in a *manner* worthy of note, taken in the recipient voice of the verb.

The fourth derivation is of the verbal noun,—as consideration, the act of considering. This noun in English is used in a communicant and recipient sense; that is, it is used to denote the results of the power expressed by the verb, and applied to the agent himself, as the author of said results. Or, it is used to denote the results of the verb bestowed upon a subject, and attached to him as their recipient. The Greeks avoided this ambiguity by having two sets of nouns. But due attention to the text and context of the subject matter, will enable any one to make the proper distinction.

The fifth derivation is of the abstract nouns taken from the adjectives, or rather, the adjectives themselves made nouns by *ness*, thus: Considerateness, the operative *condition* of a considerate person.

We might have had and should have had the constituent noun *consideracy*, to express the state (*katabole* or *res condita*) of an operative cause, like *confederacy*, if the effects of the two verbs *consider* and *confederate*, had a common character; but they have not. And this difference of character in the effects of different verbs, constitutes the sole reason why, some verbs have, and others have not constituent nouns which represent the communicant and recipient state of beings.

Now the question arises, what is this difference? It is this: The effects of some verbs remain existent beings, either efficient and operative causes, or non-efficient and liable subjects; while the effects of other verbs, are mere truths in fact or dead certainties, and therefore, have neither communicant nor recipient state; for, they are non-existent realities. Nevertheless, they have a *condition;* for, they were produced or brought forth in the parturient operations of the power, that produced them. Therefore, we have *considerateness* and *considerableness*, the concomitant and recipient conditions.

The effects then of some verbs, are existent realities or operative causes, like the acts of confederation, standing forth in their efficiency; therefore, we have *confederacy*, the communicant state of the *act* of *confederating*. But, we have no *confederability*, because the state of confederacy cannot be affected in the least, without affecting some part of its essential character, and consequently, if affected at all, becomes a new confederacy by the subsequent *act* of confederation.

Through the confederative disposition of our nature, we confederate ourselves into a grand confederacy.

The verb *contemplate* is conjugated thus: Present contemplate—Past contemplated—Participles contemplating, contemplated, having contemplated, and having been contemplated.

1st. Derivation of the agent and recipient nouns: Contemplator, he who contemplates; Contemplatee, that which is contemplated.

2d. Derivation of communicant and recipient adjectives: A contemplative person; one who is thoughtful. A contemplatable subject; one that may be contemplated.

3d. Derivation of communicant and recipient adverbs:—Contemplatively, in a contemplative manner. Contemplatably, in a contemplatable manner.

4th. Derivation of verbal nouns: Contemplation, the act of contemplating. This noun is used in an active and passive sense; that is, used to denote mental results put forth by an agent subject, and belonging to him as their author; or it denotes the same results bestowed upon a subject, and attached to it as their recipient.

The verb *creation* is conjugated thus: Present create—Past created—Participles creating, created, having created, having been created.

1st. Derivation of the subject nouns: Creator, he who creates. Createe, the receiver of what is created. This noun is altogether different from the noun *creature*, which means the product of the verb *create*; but the recipient noun of any verb never means the effect produced by that verb,—as grantor, the giver of a grant; and grantee, the receiver of a grant. Here the noun *grant* means either the act of granting, or the thing granted.

There are but few verbs that carry out entire, this communicant and recipient, or reciprocal relationship through the several parts of speech, which partake of it; but some are perfect in one line or sex of the family, and others in the opposite line. And this is what we find in the vegetable and animal part of creation. Some families are deficient in one, and some in the other sexual line.

Having shewn the economy of language in its derivation, I will now shew some of its prominent features in the composition of words. Much has been said by etymologists on this subject; and they have made it appear vastly more complex and difficult, than it really is. For, some have told us, that *ate*, *ete*, *ite* and *ute*, are affixes or suffixes; but they are no such thing. They belong to such of our verbs and adjectives, as are derived from the Latin first supine, by dropping the final syllable *um*, and adding the letter *e*, in order to maintain the long sound of the antepenult vowel of this Latin supine,—as consideratum, considerate; completum, complete; eruditum, erudite. But, when the word comes from the third conjugation of the Latin verb, it has no *e* final; for, this supine has its antepenult short,—as contractum, contract; collectum, collect; conductum, conduct, &c. And here I will add, that we have taken the first person of the present tense of many Latin verbs, and made them verbs also,—as *conduce* from *conduco;* for conduct is from the first supine of this same verb. Therefore, the foregoing terminations are not a *component* part of the verbs, but a *radical* part of them. The termination *ic* of our adjectives, is said to be a component part of the word; but it is no such thing; for all our adjectives with this termination, are direct from the Greek or Latin adjectives of corresponding signification,—as logicos, logic; graphicos, graphic; lunaticus, lunatic; dogmaticus, dogmatic, &c. Therefore, this termination is a radical part of the adjective.

But they have fallen into a still greater mistake, if possible, with regard to the prefixes of our words; since some have told us, that the word *abscond* is a simple word, even in its native land, *Latium*. For, say they, take away the prefix *ab*, then remains the part, *scond*, which is not a root. But did not these wise heads know, that the Latin has a preposition *a*, *ab*, *abs*, and *ubsque*, and another preposition *cum* or *con*, and *com* in *composition*? Therefore, *abscondo* is compounded of *abs*, signifying absent or apart from, *con*, signifying in company with, and the verb *do*, signifying to give; making *abs-con-do*. Therefore, *abscondo*, from which our verb *abscond* comes, is made up of two prepositions and a verb. So our modern word *absquatulate*, is a very significant composition; although I do not suppose, that the maker had any such design or knowledge in its construction. But words have the same harmonizing economy in their association, that the notes of music have in their accordance in the composition of tunes. Thus the word *absquatulate* is composed of the preposition *absque*, the first supine of the verb *fero*, which is *latum*, and *tu*, the second personal pronoun singular; consequently, we have *absqua*, off or away, *tu*, thou, and *late*, to bear or carry; that is, *absquatulate*, away thou goest or bearest thyself. Again: our word *abuse* is compounded of *ab* and *utor*, signifying to use; therefore, to *abuse* is to use out of its proper sphere or to misapply.

The Latin preposition *cum* or *con* is variously modified, when used as a prefix, thus: *coequal* from *con* and *equalis; collate*, from *con* and *latum*, which is the first supine from *fero; command*, from *con* and *mando; correct*, from *con* and *rectum*, which is the first supine from *rego; cognition* from *cognitio*, which again is from *con* and *notio; cognate*, from *con* and *natum*, which is from the disused verb *nasco;*

but *cognize* is from the Greek; *contract*, is from *con* and *tractum;* although etymologists tell you, that it is from *contractus*, the Latin perfect participle; but this is not the fact; and for this very good reason, that all perfect participles of regular Latin verbs, are *passive*, as they are called. Therefore, if *contract* was from *contractus*, it would have the same passive sense; but our perfect participle *contracted* is used in this passive sense, that *contractus* is. Consequently, our verb *contract* is from the Latin first supine *contractum*; which supine is always of an active signification.

In further proof of the truth of my position, are the several present participles of Latin verbs of either conjugation, that have laid aside the balance of their active forms. And it is well known, that this present participle is always active in its signification.

All our words, that begin with *co*, *cog*, *col*, *com*, *con*, and *cor*, are derived directly from their corresponding Latin words, which have the preposition *cum* prefixed to some other word, and which is variously modified, as seen in our words, to suit or to harmonize with the initial vowel or consonant of that other word, as in the foregoing examples: Thus, in the word *correct*, the *n* of *con* has been changed into *r*, because *n* and *r* do not harmonize together. So, in the word *acquire*, which comes from the Latin *acquiro*, the prefix *ad* has been modified into *ac*, because *d* and *q* do not harmonize together; but *c* and *q* do, and the reason is this, that the organs of articulation are left in the same position, after sounding *c*, that is necessary to put them, in order to sound *q*.

I said in my first Lecture, that the mouth was a *hemispheroidal* cavity like an oven, with an aperture at each end. This is the orchestra of the tongue, and it uses both these apertures to modify its notes or articulations. The anterior end of the tongue, is for the use of the anterior half of its music-box; and the posterior half of the tongue, is for the use of the guttural end of its box. Therefore, the anterior half of the tongue assists in making all articulations from the lips to the centre or roof of its orchestra; and the posterior half of the tongue assists in making articulations from the epiglottis forward to the roof of its orchestra again. I say, from the epiglottis; for the roots of the tongue are employed in closing up the posterior aperture at the tonsils, in order to make nasal sounds. Each end of the tongue then, has its own definite office assigned to it, which extends from the aperture of its own half of the orchestra to the centre of it. The centre or roof of the mouth, is the point or *mi section* of this orchestra, dividing it into anterior and posterior halves. All articulations made by the tongue with the lips, teeth, &c. back to this central point or section, will flow into each other, like *fa sol la*, or *la sol fa*. And all articulations made by the tongue with the tonsils, &c. from this *mi* point or section back to the epiglotis, will also flow into each other; as seen even in *gn*, where a guttural sound and a nasal sound are united. But articulations made in front of this *mi* point or section of the mouth, will not unite and coalesce with one, that is made before them; although any one, that is made back or forward of this *mi* point or section, will flow into one, that is made at this section,—as *gr*, *gl*, *gh*, *rh*, &c. All consonants made forward or back of this section will flow into the vowels, as the word consonant signifies; meaning *con-sonans*, coalescing in sound.

Herein we see the philosophy of the fact, that the tongue is attached to the lower jaw or floor of its orchestra, at the centre or latitudinal section of it; its anterior half being left free, in order to fold over to this central section, and make articulations there, as in sounding *l*, *r*, *h*, &c. The letters *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, are called liquids, and for a very good reason; but this reason is not the one, that those, who called them such, had in view. Any letter that can be sounded, or partly so, while the tongue is in the position, necessary to begin the articulation, is a liquid or semi-vowel with a greater or less degree of truth, in proportion to the greater or less degree of space, that is allowed by the tongue, for the breath to pass by it through the mouth, while the tongue remains in this recoiled position. Nevertheless, the letters *n* and *m* are not liquids or semi-vowels on this account; but they may be called semi-vowels for the reason, that the breath passes through the nose, while the organs are fixed for articulation. Therefore, they are properly nasal vowels. The letters *f*, *s*, *v* and *y*, are as much semi-vowels, as *l*, *m*, &c. The following are the two extreme points, at and between which all the articulations both of vowels and consonants, are made, viz. the epiglottis and the lips. The vowel *i* is sounded at the epiglottis, and the vowel *u* is sounded at the lips protruded a little. The vowel *a* is sounded at the centre section; and the vowel *e* is sounded as far back of this centre section, as the vowel *o* is sounded forward of it. Here then, we have the scale of vowel-sounds, commencing with *i* at the interior or lower extremity, and terminating with *u* at the exterior or upper extremity, which is the lips protruded. The vowel *a* lies at the centre of this scale, having the vowel *o* in front of it, and *e* at equal distance in the rear of it; and these three vowels are the only pure and unmodified vocal sounds in our language. Thus we have a pure sound at the centre of our music-box, and one at each aperture, front and rear; together with one beyond each of these, which partakes of the qualities of its own immediate associate; that is, *i* partakes of the sound of *e*, and *u* partakes of the sound of *o*. Therefore, we have three pure vowel-sounds formed in the music-box, with two complex sounds, one behind it, and one before it.

Who does not see by this construction of our grand musical *organ* of articulation, as well as by experience, that the tongue can and does play almost an endless variety of tunes, having the nose for a sort of major diapason? But it must be remembered, that the tongue makes smooth and rough sounds, in both these hemispheres of its orchestra; and whenever a word has notes in it, that are made in both these divisions, said notes coming from opposite quarters, must be corrrespondently smooth or rough. And here I will solve the mystery in the promiscuous *use* of our consonants, such as *g* for *y*, and *qu* for *w*, &c. which is found in our ancient writers. The letter *g* is guttural, as it is called; although it is articulated one grade forward of the tonsils where *e* is sounded. It may be called *guttural*, because it is articulated in the posterior half of the mouth, far back of the sectional line or palate. So also are *k* and *q* guttural for the same reason, as well as *c* hard. But *y* is a compound sound, commencing with *u*, or at the lips protruded, thence suddenly transfered back to *i*, and brought forward and terminated at *g*. Therefore, *y* embraces the sounds of *u*, *i*, *e* and *g*; consequently it took the place of *g* in the words *ye* and *year*, which were formerly written *ge* and *gear*. And here let it be remembered, that the points at which *i* and *u* are sounded, are the two extremes of the scale or gamut; and that between these extreme points all the other vowels and consonants are sounded or articulated. The vowel *i* is a compound sound; for it embraces *e* fully in its termination. And here is the reason that *i* is made *j*, when it is followed by *e*, *a*, *o*, or *u*, thus: *ie*, *je; ia*, *ja; io*, *jo; iu*, *ju;* as in *Iesus*, *Jesus; Iapheth*, *Japheth; Iohannes*, *Johannes; Iudah*, *Judah*, &c. But, when it is preceded by either of these vowels, it maintains its grave vowel-sound, as in *ei*, *ai*, *oi* and *ui*, which is *y* in English; it being neither more nor less, than the Greek *upselon* with the *iota* circumscribed. And this is direct proof of what I have before said about the compound sound of the letter *y*.

But our *w* is a double compound, consisting of a reduplication of *y* and *u*. Here is the reason, that it is a vowel, when it ends a word; for it retains its component sound of *u;* but, when it begins a word, it retains its other component *y*, and therefore becomes a guttural breathing, as *h* is a labial breathing. Or more properly, *w* is a mixed breathing going before any of the vowels and some of the consonants, while *h* is a simple breathing going before the vowels. The letter *g* and the Greek and Roman *gamma*, commence their articulation in words at one and the same point. So also our letters *c* guttural, or hard as it is called, *k*, the Roman *c* guttural, their *q*, and the Greek *kapa*, commence their articulation in words at nearly one and the same point, which is one step or grade forward of *g* or *gamma*. Therefore, the Greeks pronounced their word *kai* with the same articulate sound, that the Romans did their word *que;* so say their ancient philologists, and doubtless they knew, being contemporaries.

Here then, we discover the reason why, our words *who* and *where* were formerly written *quho* and *quhare;* since our *w* embraces *g* and *u*, and *q* and *c*. Therefore, we have *gard*, *guard*, *card*, *quard* or *quart*, *yard*, *yarn*, and *ward*, and *warn*, &c. In these two last words, *w* takes its *y* component sound. So also we have *cag* or *keg*, *gag*, *quag*, *wag*, &c.

The consonants will coalesce with each other, when taken in their order and arrangement forward; as *gra*, *gla*, *cra*, *cro*, *cla clo*, &c.; but in reversing this order they require a vowel to intervene; as *rag*, *lag*, *rac*, *lac*, &c.

Those consonants, that are formed by the same adjustment of the organic muscles, will always coalesce in their composition of words,—as em-power, in-tend, sub-due, &c. The philosophy and reason of the whole matter is this, that many consonants begin their sounds with the same organic posture, in which others close theirs,—as in *n* and *t*, *m* and *p;* and *vice versa*, or in contrary order. So also, some begin alike; that is, either with contracted, or with expanded organs,—as *d* and *t* contracted, *l* and *r* expanded, &c. Now *similis pennis congregantur;* that is, homogeneous natures will coalesce and unite; therefore, these consonants unite or associate together.

The grand prominent points, at which the vowels and consonants of our alphabet are articulated separately, and sounded in their combination in words, are exhibited in the following diagram, scale or gamut. Although there are various other modifications of sound, which they undergo in speech, yet any attempt to define them by other means than oral precepts, would be worse than useless. But what gives value and importance to the scheme as developed in the foregoing illustrations, consists in the readiness, ease and certainty, with which we come at the composition of words, not only in our own language, but also of those in the Greek and Latin,—such as, quis, quæ, quid, &c. which are made up of the copulate conjunction, que, united with the personal pronouns is, ea, id, thus: que-is, and he; que-ea, and she; que-id, and it, &c. So in our personal pronouns, he, she, it, thus: he is from the Hebrew *he*, and she is compounded of he and the Latin sic, thus: sic-he or sche, like he; and females are very much like males in various respects. We find in our old English authors, she written sche. And the pronoun it, is nothing more than the Latin id; for *d* is only *t* made liquid or flowing.

Again: When the mute consonants formed in either hemisphere, are changed to liquid ones, if the word contains more than one, all must be changed to their corresponding liquids,—as in the Latin words pater, mater, probo, &c. Pater is changed into fader or vader, and this again into our father; because *p* corresponds to and coalesces with *t* in sound, just as *f* does with *th*, or as *v* does with *d*. Therefore, our word father is nothing more nor less than the Roman pater. The same is the case with our word mother, which is direct in the same way from the Roman mater. So our word prove is the Roman probo, changing *b* into *v*, and doubling the *o*, or circumflexing it, which is the same thing; because *e* final in our language keeps the preceding vowel long, and the first *o* being long in the word probo, if *e* takes the place of the final *o*, the other *o* will still be long,—as in probe. But *v* is a liquid, to wit, it is *b* raised from a mute to a semi-vocal sound; therefore, its preceding vowel *o* must be raised as much, which is done by doubling it thus, prôve: which circumflex over the *o* lengthens or raises its sound. Herein rests the whole secret of the different sounds of the vowels,—as long, short, broad, grave, or acute; when these vowels are between different consonants, thus: mope changed into move, is sounded like moove, &c.

Thus we discover, that the origin of hundreds of words in the English language, is lost sight of, by this diversified and variously modified articulation,—as in our word love, which beyond all contradiction, is the Hebrew luphe, signifying literally, the fervor of heat; and what does our word love mean, but the fervor of the soul? Now, if the *ph* in luphe, is changed into *v*, the preceding *u* must be changed into *o;* because *v* is the softened, modified and flattened sound of *ph;* therefore *o* is substituted for *u*, because it is precisely the same softened, modified and flattened sound of *u*, that *v* is of *ph;* and so of all the rest.

From what has been shewn in the economy of articulation, we readily perceive the reason and necessity, that some of the letters in simple words, when put together to form a compound one, must either be dropped, or changed into their correspondent ones; that is, mutes into liquids, and *vice versa.* Also, anterior vowels must be changed into posterior ones,—as tango, con-tingo; lego, intel-ligo; mando, com-mendo, &c. The *r* in the prefix *inter* of the verb ligo, has been changed into *l*, beacause *r* and *l* will not coalesce well without a vowel between them.

Philologists have made a great many useless distinctions, in my opinion, in their classifications, with regard to the different sounds of the vowels and consonants. This one thing is very certain, that a consonant must be either mute or not. If it is not mute, then it must have some degree of vocality in it, more or less liquid, full and oral, according to the *manner*, in which they are formed by the organs. The vowels are always vocal, both from their name and nature; but the consonants are more or less liquid or vocal, according to the relative point in the orchestra, where they are made. Those, that are made nearer the palate, in front or rear of it, are more liquid or flowing, and consequently, less shrill or hissing, than those made nearer the lips and the posterior aperture or tonsils.

A great deal more might be said on this subject; but, inasmuch as it was not my purpose here to give a minute detail of all the precise grades of the flats and sharps, of the mutual relations, and of the reciprocal influence and control, which subsist among the letters of the alphabet, I think that enough has been said to shew the incontrovertible truth of the doctrine, and to rouse attention to, and excite a further inquiry into the facilities, value and importance, which the system does, will and must afford, not only in discovering the origin, composition and construction of words in our own and other languages, but also, shewing the family connexion and sameness of definition or meaning, which has been preserved to words in their transfer from one people or nation to another, and from one generation to another.

And here I am brought in the last place, to notice the prevalence of a very false and unphilosophical doctrine, that has gone abroad and been embraced by many, which is this; that words are constantly changing their meaning or signification as representatives of men and things, as well as their articulation and pronunciation in different periods of time, even among the same people or nation; and also, that words have their opposite meaning, or that the same word is applied to opposite results flowing from the same cause. For example: The preposition *in*, say they, when used as a prefix, sometimes means an increase, accumulation, multiplication, or enlargement of an object, attribute or quality; and sometimes the decrease, diminution, paucity, destitution or absence of the same object, attribute or quality. If the laws and economy of nature are constantly undergoing a change in their order, rank, disposition and arrangement; and her numerous ministers, minor officers, supervisors and servants, whom she employs in the execution and discharge of the various offices and duties instituted in her wide and extensive domain, are constantly usurping each other's places, then words, that were made to represent all these things, will doubtless change their signification, in order to keep pace with their prototypes or constituents. But, if all these things remain fixed and permanent in their individual, personal, social, private, public, official, moral, and religious characters, duties and relations; so also, do words remain fixed and permanent in their definition and significancy, as true and legal representatives of all these things. And are not propagation and nurture, cultivation and increase, industry and improvement, decorations and embellishments carried on, maintained, preserved and sought after, in the same way now, that they were two thousand years ago? If the economy of all these things, is the same now, that it always was, and if words were formerly the true representatives of this economy in all its various modifications of constitutional and conditional arrangement; so also, now are they and ever will be the true symbols of all these realities.

Therefore, this doctrine of the fluctuation of language in its signification and use, is a doctrine, that has gained its credence in the ignorance or oversight of what necessarily belongs to every type or symbol, to wit, the reflected portraiture or resemblance of the original. But this doctrine is a very convenient and comfortable doctrine for those, who wish to gain the appellation of *wise*, and gather the laurels of fame by exciting admiration without any farther trouble, than in their complaint of the paucity and meagerness of their means to communicate to others what they wish others to believe, that they alone possess. But I have always found this class of writers to be either very superficial, or to conceal a sure and corroding poison to the true interest and morals of community, under the garb of candor and honest integrity.

To be sure, those few words of a language that are of a general signification, and apply to the habitudes, costumes and etiquette of society, may undergo some modification in different periods of time, when they are applied to particulars, or even when the generic idea embracing the archetype itself, has received a slight accession, diminution or modification of some one or more ingredients contained in the original article; although even this goes no farther, nor applies to any other department of nature, than to human instability, and to human caprice. But what proportion in the number of individuals, to say nothing about their value and importance, does this class bear to the tens of thousands of those uniform actions, effects and appearances, which greet us at every turn and call forth our admiring gaze while surveying this grand panorama presented before us?

Having said this much on the mutation of language, I will now examine some of the terms, that are said to be inconstant in their meaning; and also, some of those, that are thought to have an *opposite* meaning. And first, I will notice the words *rascal* and *villain.* These words have not undergone a *change* in their signification, but only a limitation in their application; for, instead of being applied now as formerly, to the servants generally of the household and estate of a lord, whether these servants were good or bad, faithful and true to their masters, or treacherous and dishonest, the terms have been circumscribed and restricted to those persons only, who are treacherous, unfaithful and dishonest, whether servants or not. Therefore, they have not been *changed* in their signification, but only *restricted* as to the extent of their application. For, unless I substitute one thing for another, one essential ingredient for another, or have added to or diminished the number of ingredients, so as to make the thing essentially different in its nature, no change can properly be said to have taken place; but only a modification of the thing, while the thing itself remains essentially the same.

In view of the foregoing established premises on the stability and permanency of language, in the significancy of its terms, let the pronunciation of it fluctuate as it pleases, I will now proceed to consider several compound words, whose ingredients are said to undergo a diametrical change in their composition. For example: The word *in*, which is used both as a preposition or exponent, and as an adverb signifying the place or position, *where;* the period of time, *when;* the length of time, *during;* the condition, *that;* the manner, *how;* the quantum, *how much*, &c. But when this word is used as a prefix to other words, it is said to have opposite meanings; that is, a positive or crescent one, and a negative or privative one; as in the words intend, increase, induce, &c. where it is positive or crescent; but in the words inaction, inattentive, insufficient, &c. it is negative or privative. If this prefix in these last examples was really the same word as the one prefixed to the first examples, there could be no mistake about one and the same word having distinctly and definitely opposite meanings. But this is taken for granted, which supposition is conceded, and I imagine, will be maintained by many after all; for we are so given to conceded notions, and such creatures of habit, that it requires years with some, to wear off the inveteracy of custom, and to blot out the deep impressions made on the mind, by the frequency of inculcation.

Nevertheless, I will shew, that they are two separate and distinct words coming from two separate and distinct fountains; yes, fountains as distinct as the positive and negative signs of algebra are. For, the prefix *in* of the word inaction, is from a root, that never meant any thing but *not*, *non*, *nemo*, &c. because it is direct from the Hebrew negative adverb *ain*. But our preposition *in*, the Greek preposition *en*, and the Latin preposition *in*, are all from the Hebrew word *an*, signifying place, position, &c. And this same word our ancestors used to spell *an*, *on*, *in*, but never *un;* so the *ain* is spelled *un* and *in*, but never *an*. Therefore, we have even now this same preposition spelled in these three ways. First, *an* in the phrases, a bed, a loft, a head, a shore, &c. Secondly, *on*, as on foot, on hand, on high, &c. Thirdly, *in*, as in place of, instead of, inasmuch as, &c. These all are properly adverbial expressions. It may be asked, why is the *n* dropped in the phrases, a head, a bed and a loft? There are two of the best reasons in nature for an answer to this question. And first, *because* these phrases are taken in a general sense, and are therefore, of universal application, to be used under all circumstances, where these positions are to be pointed out in their general character. Therefore, the restrictive article *a*, could *not* be used before the nouns; consequently the *n* becomes not only useless, but very awkward in pronunciation; inasmuch as *n* does not coalesce with the consonants of these nouns; which constitutes the second reason why it is suppressed. The same reasons that expunged the *n* in *an*, operate to change *a* into *o*, in the second examples, as on hand, on foot, on high, &c.

These reasons are found in the relations or proportions, which are fixed and established in nature, with regard to the rising and falling of tones or notes, as in music. So also, these tones or notes make chords and discords, or harmony and collision, in proportion to their distance from each other in this rising and falling series.

I said, that the key-note or natural sound of our language is the vowel *a;* and that we have three pure inarticulate vocal sounds, viz. *a*, *e*, and *o*. The vowel *a* is sounded with an open mouth, and is the standard or bass note, to which all the others relate. The vowel *e* is sounded at the posterior aperture formed by the tonsils, and *o* at the anterior aperture formed by rounding the lips. The vowel *i* is sounded below or behind *e*, and *u* is sounded above or beyond *o*. Therefore, we have a stave of five lines, on which the five vowels stand constituting a fifth in music. But a fifth contains a double third; therefore, we have the letter *y*, which takes the place of the vowel *i* or middle tone, and divides this fifth into two distinct and separate thirds rising and falling, thus: *y*, *o*, *u*, as in you, your, youth, &c. Or falling thus: *y*, *e*, *a*, as in yea, yean, year, &c. So also, you can make the several consonants take the place of *y*, (for, it is a consonant itself in the above instances,) and thereby you have any of the diphthongs in ascending or descending series, thus: Thou, sour, bow, bound, &c. Or descending thus: Quo, cui, &c. Or, in the descending series, thus: Tea, lea, beat, great, treat, &c. Therefore, we have diphthongs ascending and descending, both in the upper and lower third, contained in the scale or fifth above alluded to.

Here is the whole doctrine of the triphthongs and the diphthongs. I have just broached the principles of articulation; for I have not room here to discuss these principles in detail, but shall do it hereafter. Enough however, has been developed to show, that the articulation and pronunciation of any language are conducted by the laws and doctrine of harmony in sounds, just as music is. And inasmuch as some pieces of music are more melodious, agreeable, and gratifying to the ear, so, some languages have an articulation and pronunciation more agreeable to the ear, than others. But I intend to present the public with a full development of the principles and doctrines of what I have here partially disclosed; and shew them, that those nations, who use and have used the same characters or alphabet, are not half so diverse in the signification of their words, (for thousands of them have a common origin,) as they are in the spelling of them, arising from modified articulation; just as many pieces of music have undergone certain modifications, but still possess the same original air, tune and signification. The reason that the French give our *i* the sound, that we give our *e*, is simply this, that they have sharpened *a*, or rather raised it a tone higher than we sound it; therefore, our *i* being one tone above our *e*, they naturally sound our *i*, *e*, since their *a* is a tone above ours. So we pronounce the *a* in father, broad; that is, as much higher than we do *a* in pate, as *f* is raised above *p*, by making it a semi-vowel; for, *f* is neither more nor less, than *p* made vocal. The same is the case with *v;* it is nothing more than *b* made vocal, as seen in the word David, which is written in the Greek, both with their *beta* and *upselon*, answering to our *b* and *v*. But more of this hereafter.

We will now return to the subject of the preposition *in* having a privative signification. From what has been said with regard to our word *in*, I think it abundantly manifest, that our prepositions *on* and *in*, as now used, together with the abbreviated *an* in the phrases, aloft, ahead and the like, are one and the same word; and that they are no other than the Hebrew *an*, which signifies place or position. But with regard to our inseparable and privative prefixes *un* and *in*, it is equally manifest, that they are no other than the Hebrew *ain*, always signifying *not*, being used as a prefix by them as well as by us; and pronounced by them either *in* or *un*, for the same reason that the *o* in prove, is doubled in the noun proof. All our words, that end in *al*, are from the Greek *als*, *alis* signifying salt, whether direct or indirect through the Latin; for the Latins used it as a suffix, as *mos*, *moris*, *moralis*; *mors*, *mortis*, *mortalis*, &c.; signifying literally the *salt* or operating cause. For when we say that, man is a moral being, we mean, that he possesses an attribute by which his conduct is entitled to that appellation.

Now the word *essence* applies to a single being, as a truth in principle, constituting its savor—as the savor of salt;

but this is not all that belongs to salt, since it may lose it, and then it is fit to be trodden under foot. But salt taken in the entire range of its composition, is a preservative cause or efficient ingredient. Therefore, the termination *alis* or *al*, is beautifully philosophical and appropriate, as a suffix to nouns, to designate the characteristic ingredient of that noun; thereby making it an adjective, as the quality of some other noun. Thus some of our adjective nouns are made more a quality, than they were before,—as logic, logical, &c. I have already told you the difference between adjectives of this ending, and those of *ous*.

We will now advert to the opinions of mankind with regard to the arbitrariness of the original meaning applied to words. If mere *sounds* are so significant that, at a *certain* sound the warrior prepares for battle; so too, physical beings in certain peculiar relations, have been chosen to represent general affections; as manifested in the Latin verb *amo* signifying, to love. The root of the word is *am;* and *am* in the Hebrew signifies mother; therefore, *amare* signifies, to mother; that is, to have the affections of a mother, to wit, to love.

Now, with regard to the making other parts of speech verbs, there are five modes, in which this is done—two from the Greek, two from the Latin, and one is purely English. One of the two from the Greek, is a prefix, and the other is a suffix, viz. *en* or *em*, *in* and *im*, being prefixes; as in the verb *enable*, coming from *able* and the Greek preposition *en*. The verb *empower* is from the noun *power* and the same *en* made *em*. *Moralize* is from moral and the Greek verb *izo* signifying, to make. Every word in English, which ends in *fy*, is from the Latin, having the Latin *facio* or *fio* turned into *fy*, which also means to make. Those from the Latin supines I have already noticed. The English mode is that of prefixing the verb *be* before verbs and nouns, as become, befriend, betroth, &c.

Having divulged the true principles and doctrine of the diphthongs and triphthongs, on which depends the whole economy of poetical measure in long and short syllables, I now leave the reader, till he sees me again in the second part of this treatise.



Note.—The reader will please to excuse and overlook the awkwardness of the artist in his design and execution of the above cut, since, instead of making something to represent a longitudinal section of a human mouth, it looks more like the threatening jaws of an alligator; but it will answer the purpose for which it was intended—to wit—to shew the several points of the *human mouth* at which the letters of the English alphabet are sounded separately, and articulated in words.

FORM OF COPY-BOOK, IN WHICH TO WRITE WORDS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS.

Create. To form out of nothing; to cause to exist, &c.

Convince. To force any one to acknowledge contested propositions.

Dedication. The act of dedicating to a person or purpose.

Entertain. To converse with, or talk to; to treat at table, &c.

Accumulation. The act of accumulating; state of being accumulated.

Divided. Separated into parts; distributed into parcels.

Multiplying. Increasing in number; making more, &c.

Subtraction. The act of taking one number from another.

Sudden. Unlooked for; abrupt; happening without previous notice.

Violently. With force; vehemently, forcibly, &c.

Peter. A proper name; one of the Apostles, &c.

Control. Check, restraint; a register or account kept.

Beauty. That assemblage of graces which pleases the eye, &c.

Liability. The state of being exposed, and obnoxious to another.

Experience. Knowledge gained by trial and practice.

Supremacy. The state of being highest in authority or command.

Susceptible. Capable of admitting or of receiving impressions.

On the opposite page is exhibited a plan, which I adopted for my pupils, and which I have practised for more than twenty-five years in my school, with unexampled success. It not only does away that dull routine of repetition belonging to copy-writing, which can never extend beyond the mere exercise of chirography or hand-writing; but it actually, actively and effectively brings forward and puts into exercise the full power and energies of the mind; while at the same time, it more than accomplishes all the purposes, for which the old mode of writing copies in imitation of exemplars, was introduced. It embraces in one exercise, the entire object in the economy of school-discipline; because it constitutes at once, a writing lesson, a reading lesson, a spelling lesson, a grammar lesson, and a Logic and Rhetoric lesson; all of which are carried on at one and the same time, and with the same ease, facility and rapidity, and even more so, than either one of these branches can be pursued in any other way.

The first thing, that is requisite and that is absolutely necessary for the pupil to have, is some knowledge of the use and value of language in the significancy of its terms or words. Without this knowledge, one might as well attempt to teach colors to the blind, or sounds to the deaf, as to endeavor to communicate to persons the principles and doctrines, that belong to the several departments of literature and science. And how is this knowledge to be obtained? To be sure, the calls and demands of our animal nature compel us to become familiar with the use and meaning of some of the terms, that belong to the necessaries of life; but what portion even of these have any direct reference in illustration or application to the principles, upon which the abstract sciences and refined arts are built? And, unless the mind is called upon and tasked with a peremptory authority, to attend to the relations of things, the whys and the wherefores, that such and such operations must necessarily eventuate in some definite result; I say, unless the mind is tasked to perform the drudgery of that labor, which is preparatory to the reception of the ***reason*** of things, it will scarcely ever take it up of its own free will and accord. To be sure, there are some minds of such a restive and inquisitive turn, that need no further stimulus than their own native vigor, to bring forth their latent faculties and radiate a dawning horizon; but the number is comparatively small, to that of an opposite cast. Here then, the foregoing plan shews its superiority and advantage over all others; since it not only includes in its exercise, all others condensed into one operation, but compels the pupil, if he does any thing right and well, to do the whole so; for there is no loop-hole through which he can slip his neck and make his escape from his own dear interest and duty. And here is another advantage, second only to the first: He can pursue this plan by himself and without the assistance and expense of a teacher, to a very good profit; for, it requires neither help nor money from others, to strengthen the memory and to lay in a store of that, which is and must be the product of the individual's own exertions. Let any one try the experiment and follow out the plan in all its bearings, and my word for it, he will even astonish himself at the rapid progress which he finds his mind is daily making in the knowledge, use and application of words to men and things, as well as to their actions.

And here follows in detail a description of the plan:—First, write down on the left-hand margin of your copy-book, at the beginning of each line, such words as you do not well understand, taken from some good author either historical, moral, or religious; then take your dictionary and find therein the definition of each word written on the margin of your copy-book. Write down these definitions on the line of the words, which they define, taking care that each marginal word has its own definition set against it. Begin with this operation at the top of your book, as you would do in writing a simple copy. Fill out the line with the definition or so much of it, as is required for that purpose. Sometimes the whole definition of the word will more than fill out the line: if so, leave out the balance. Sometimes also, it happens that the whole definition is not enough to complete the line: in this case, repeat the definition till it does. After you have written two or three pages in this way, you have now prepared yourself with a task or exercise of another character; for, you must now commit this task to memory by spelling each word and repeating its definition, till it is fixed in your mind; and at the same time, run through with its conjugation if it is a verb, but if not, trace out the verb, if the word has any; which you will soon discover by the composition and termination of the word. For example,—suppose your word is *judgment:* throw off *ment*, your noun-termination, and you have the verb *judge* at once. Then say,—Present to judge, past judged; participles, judging, judged, having judged, having been judged; judger or judge, the agent-noun; judging, judicial, judicious, the adjectives; judicially, &c. the adverbs. By adding *ly* to each of these adjectives, they become adverbs: judgment, judicatory, judicature,—communicant state of beings; judiciousness, the social or interchangeable condition of beings.

Here you have above twenty words derived from the verb *to judge*. And by attending to the principles laid down in the foregoing pages, you come at a better and more definite knowledge of the meaning of each one, than you will have, or ever can have, by consulting the dictionary for each definition; and for this very plain and obvious reason, that the verb means some kind of power, mental or physical, acting according as the verb specifies; the agent-noun is the one who performs the action; as judger or judge in this instance, is one, who judges; and you have just found what *to judge* means; therefore, he is one, who examines causes and passes sentence upon them. So the adjectives too, mean the attributes of a man capable of exercising this power—that is, one who is judicious—to wit, capable of examining witnesses, hearing their evidence or testimony, and passing *judgment*, or deciding on the merits of the cause. Adverbs, you know, represent the *manner*, in which a person or thing acts when he performs the verb; for he acts precisely in that *manner*, which the verb designates or points out. Therefore, be careful to notice the several parts of speech, that the verbs in their several derivations always embrace, and which are, first, participle; second, agent and subject-noun; third, adjective, both communicant and recipient; fourth, adverb communicant and recipient; and fifth, several classes of nouns, viz.: One representing the action of the verb, as relation; one representing the effect or product of the verb, as creature; one representing the individual communicant state of beings, as efficiency; one representing the concomitant or communicant condition of said state, as effectiveness; one representing the recipient state of beings, as liability; one representing the concomitant condition of this state, as liableness; one representing the state of the private and personal adjustment of the several attributes and qualities of beings, as morality, peculiarity, generality, &c. with its concomitant condition, as generalness; one representing the civil and social state of beings, as generosity, publicity, &c. with its concomitant condition; and one representing the state and condition of the powers and faculties of beings both in plenty and poverty, and as many or few.

A moderate attention to these different classes of nouns, will enable the pupil to distinguish and arrange the various individuals in the economy or household of Nature, under their proper heads, thereby gaining definite conceptions of them. And for the attainment and accomplishment of this, I now leave him to his own contemplation, meditation and reasoning, hoping that he may feel himself well paid for his trouble and expense in the perusal of the foregoing pages, and discover new light breaking forth from several unsuspected and hitherto unthought of avenues, through which Knowledge and Wisdom are pouring out their golden vials, full of odors, regaling and feasting his soul to a joyful and glorious contentment.

END OF THE FIRST PART.